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ABSTRACT 
Title of Thesis: PORT COSTS ? ND PRICING 
Author: JOHN ROBERT MOON 
This thesis is an economic analysis of the pricing practices of sea- 
ports, the problems encountered by the ports when devising their 
tariffs and the alternative solutions which could be adopted - with 
particular reference to the Port of Liverpool. 
The conditions necessary for the first best world of economic theory 
may not be met in the port case. As a consequence, it may be 
necessary to introduce further constraints into the welfare maximis- 
ation problem. The thesis carefully considers the pricing and 
investment problems facing the port under the unifying heading of 
jointness; discusses the recommendations of various official bodies 
and adopts a "commercial concern" maxim; and subjects the allocative 
properties of alternative pricing systems to detailed examination.. 
In spite of the violation of the assumptions of the basic model, 
marginal cost remains intact as the relevant basis for pricing, 
investment and traffic acceptance decisions. In an attempt to 
measure these costs a detailed examination of the concept of escapable 
cost and the allocation of joint costs to the relevant traffic is 
undertaken. This examination expands a methodology suggested for the 
railway case and extends-the analysis to include the temporal 
dimension. This theoretical treatment of escapable costs is then 
applied to the port case, where the problems that may be encountered 
in its implementation are considered. 
A detailed examination of the charging schedules is undertaken, where 
the properties of the charges are considered. 
The charging base and tariff structures are analysed with: an empirical 
investigation of the relationships between alternative bases; an 
examination of measures of consumers' willingness to pay; and 
consideration of vertical and horizontal equity. 
An overall approach to pricing and investment is outlined and some 
methodologies which may be employed by the port when computing its 
prices are developed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I 
The pricing structure at a port will reflect the political, economic 
and social environment within which the--port is operating. Pricing and 
investment decisions made by the port will therefore represent an 
amalgam of factors such as the requirements of financial backers; the 
expected reactions of other ports and port users; past-experience and 
future expectations; social attitudes towards the ownership of capital 
and the benefits conferred on the hinterland by the port; the 
aspirations and attitudes of management and. the quality and quantity 
of information available. Given this environment, charging schedules 
have evolved which either implicitly or explicitly have attempted to 
accommodate these factors. This process invariably results in 
criticism, as either the port cannot accommodate all of the factors 
or it concentrates on some factors to the exclusion of others. 
In this thesis, the economic and financial aspects will be considered. - 
with particular emphasis on pricing and costs. In order to incorporate 
the port's. wider environment into the analysis, it will be necessary to 
either assume some of the factors as given or to indicate how they may 
be accommodated. 
One of the main assumptions of the thesis is that the port's demand 
forecast has been undertaken. This implies that the port has estimated 
the level of demand and that the Marketing Department can ascertain 
the user's willingness to pay. 
A second area where guidelines are considered necessary is that of the 
port's financial and economic obligations. This arises because of the 
1. 
interrelationships and possible conflicts between financial objectives, 
investment criteria and pricing structure. 
This Chapter will consider firstly the main types of tariffs and 
charging bases, secondly the criticisms and defences of the current 
structures and thirdly the financial, pricing and investment 
objectives that will be adopted. Finally, it will outline the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Port Tariffs and the Charging Base 
The prices charged by the port generally fall into one of the three 
categories - charges on vessels, charges on goods, and charges for 
specific services rendered, UNCTAD [1], Heggie [21 
The charges on vessels are variously called harbour, dock, quay, berth, 
port entry or tonnage dues, a distinction usually being made between 
the provision of water access to the port (conservancy) and the 
provision of the berth and docks (berth charges). The duties of the 
port under the heading of conservancy, as defined by Rochdale [3], 
"vary from port to port but they may include maintenance 
of approach channels, dredging, surveying and charting 
the tideway, removing or dispersing wrecks and obstructions, 
preventing pollution, salvage, regulating traffic, providing 
and maintaining moorings, lighting and buoying, supervision 
of the foreshore and licensing lightermen and watermen". 
The revenue from conservancy is required to cover the cost of performing 
these duties. The charging base is the gross registered ton (g. r. t. ), 
net registered ton (n. r. t. ) or the number of tonnes loaded or discharged 
from the vessel. Where the registered tonnage is the basis, the charge 
can be either proportional (that is, the rate per ton is the same 
regardless of vessel size) or progresssive (that is, the rate per ton 
2. 
increases with vessel size). 
The area of the port incorporated within berth charges is usually from 
where the port's conservancy duties end, up to and including the quay- 
wall. Thus, the revenue from this charge is expected to provide for 
the depreciation, interest and maintenance of locks, docks, dockwater 
area, dockwall and quaywall. The charging base is a combination of 
either the tonnage of the vessel (g. r. t. or n. r. t. ) or vessel length 
and the time spent at the berth. 
The charges on goods similarly occur under various titles including 
port, dock, wharfage, quay or goods rates. The revenue providing, in 
principle, for the depreciation, interest and maintenance of the port 
infrastructure including the quays, transit sheds, roads, perimeter 
fences and lighting. The charging base is usually weight, volume or 
the unit adopted on the ship's manifest. The degree of complexity (as 
measured by the number of different rates or the number of listed 
commodities) varies considerably, for example, the Port of Bristol's 
1966 schedule contained approximately 1,500 listed commodities. 
The specific services provided by the port include pilotage, towage, 
linesmen, cargo handling, watchmen, the supply of fresh water and 
bunkers, warehousing and ship repair facilities. These services are 
provided by the port itself or private companies and are usually 
charged for separately. The charging base varies according to the 
service. A measure of vessel tonnage (g. r. t. or n. r. t. ), is usually 
used for pilotage with vessel draft being included in some cases. 
Towage charges are levied either on the characteristics of the ship or 
the tugs used. If the ship basis is used then it is usally g. r. t. or 
n. r. t. and if the tug basis is used then it is per operation or per 
3. 
hour. The per operation basis is also used for linesmen as are the 
vessel's g. r. t. or n. r. t. The charge for cargo handling is generally 
based on weight or volume with a per unit charge being used in some 
cases (for example-, livestock). The cargo handling tariffs appear in 
two forms, firstly where a separate rate is quoted for each commodity 
and secondly where cargoes with similar characteristics (for example, 
cartons, bagst-etc. ) are grouped together and a separate rate quoted 
for each group. Storage and warehousing charges are usually based on 
weight, volume or area occupied. In the case of "transit storage" 
there is usually a free period allowed for both import-and export 
cargoes. 
1.2 Criticisms of Existing Tariff Structures 
The port tariff structures outlined above have. at. times been subject to 
strong criticisms from a range of sources. These criticisms can be 
summarised in the following extracts: 
"Publically owned ports rarely price port services on 
a commercial basis. They do not keep comprehensive 
cost accounts, and they make little attempt to relate 
specific revenues to costs in an organised way. By 
and large, their tariff structures were established 
before the turn of the century and have simply been 
extended and revised to cover their added responsi- 
bilities and their increased costs. " Heggie [4] 
(ii) "Few ports at present have a wholly rational port 
pricing system. One reason is that the concept of 
the autonomous port is a relatively recent one. In 
the past, many ports were administered by bodies 
such as customs or municipal authorities or directly 
as a governmental department, and charges were 
therefore established and amended to satisfy not only 
the port requirements, but also those of other parties 
involved. As a result, most port pricing systems are 
very complicated;: in consequence of technical progress 
in the operation and use of ports, such old fashioned 
pricing systems have become inadequate. " UNCTAD [5] 
4. 
(iii) "... The commonestform of charging for ships is a 
fixed scale per gross or net registered ton covering 
a stated (and quite often lengthy) stay in port. 
The dues on cargo usually take the form of charges 
per ton weight, but are sometimes quoted per 
standard barrel, case, bale, etc., and occasionally 
ad valorem..... This system of charging bears no 
necessary relationship to either the average or the 
marginal costs (short or long period). " 
Goss [6]. 
The conclusions which can be drawn from these quotations are firstly 
that the price of individual services are not based on cost, whether 
these be total, average, marginal, short-run or long-run. This 
criticism is made particularly of the charges on vessels and goods, 
Goss [7], for example, extending the criticism by observing that in 
the 39 ports he visited, no ports operated a peak/off-peak tariff and 
there seemed to be no differentiation in charges between berths or 
other services of differing qualities. Secondly, that one of the main 
reasons for the present structure is historical, that is, it was 
developed before the turn of the century and technical change has 
subsequently made it obsolete. Svendsen [8] reiterates this by stating 
that "the tariff policy is largely governed by custom, and not by 
economic principles. " He also suggests that the method of pricing used 
is "based on formal political decisions of how the users would react".. 
Walters [9] similarly suggests that "the long history of government 
regulation has not produced a rational system of charges either 
according to the marginal cost of providing the service or to any 
discernable principle of social justice .... they-relate more closely to 
what-the-traffic-will-bear principle". The third conclusion is that 
most ports do not keep comprehensive cost accounts and thus, in the 
absence of this information, it is not possible for the port to relate 
prices to costs. 
S. 
In answer to these criticisms, the port may recognise that some charges 
are illogical, inequitable or inefficient. However they would argue 
firstly that the system has evolved from the market place and it works 
(in the sense that it is accepted and given favourable trading 
conditions meets an accounting requirement that total cost, equals 
total revenue). Secondly, the advantages to be gained from an 
alternative which in theory may be financially and economically sound 
will generally be small and the disadvantages large . Thirdly, that 
given the competitive environment and the attitudes of users, any 
unilateral change in established pricing structures would lead to loss 
of traffic. Finally, that in practice it may not be possible for the 
port to operate some of the alternative theoretical systems, De 
Monie [10] for example suggesting that: 
"'Theorists' forget all too easily that in practice port 
authorities are not able to manipulate the tariff system 
of port dues in the short term as a function of the 
traffic in the port and of the available operating 
resources. " 
The three basic issues raised by the defences are the definition and 
information concerning costs; misunderstaninq of pricing recommenda- 
tions and their relationship to costs; and the coordination of ports' 
pricing andiinvestment policies. 
A suggestion that "dues must be related to cost" is usually interpreted 
by the port as meaning that prices must rise and traffic consequentially 
lost. On the other hand, the suggestion that "prices be set equal to 
marginal cost" is interpreted as meaning a fall in price which would 
lead to retaliation from other ports. Neither of these interpretations 
with respect to the price changes are implied-by-the suggestions. In 
both cases some prices may rise, whilst some may fall. If costs are 
defined as escapable or avoidable costs and traffic is lost because it 
6. 
is not willing to pay, then, its loss will result in a net--saving 
to the port. De Monie [101 suggests however that the port does not 
have sufficient data at its disposal in order to calculate the "real 
cost" price. The port may therefore not have the relevant cost 
information on which to base prices and thus, the "advantages" and 
"disadvantages" cannot be ascertained. 
The reaction of other ports and the implied oligopolistic inter- 
dependence of ports could however present a different problem for the 
port. If the port industry does exhibit decreasing costs (an 
hypothesis which is "extraordinarily difficult" to ascertain, Walters 
191) then there would be a tendency towards monopolisation of the 
industry. Given such a "market failure" then there may be a case for 
some coordination of ports. This control could range from nationalisa- 
tion to the issuance of a set of guidelines which incorporate the 
financial, investment and pricing obligations of the port. The 
approach adopted in this thesis is the "guideline approach", as such 
recommendations would also be required in the case of nationalisation. 
The guidelines will be outlined later in this chapter. 
The argument that the market solution is correct is suspect, particu- 
larly given the indivisibilities and resulting jointness involved in 
the port's operations. Similarly, given that a large proportion of the 
port's traffic is accounted for by a small number of users, the 
criteria of "acceptability of a tariff structure by the users" is also 
suspect. 
This is not to deny that devising a tarrif structure is a complex 
problem. In the following chapters, both costs and prices will be 
7. 
considered including the development of a methodology for ascertaining 
relevant costs. If this information can be obtained then at least the 
port would be better informed in making traffic accept/reject and 
invest/disinvest decisions and additionally the information can form 
the basis for a rational pricing structure. 
1.3 First Best Pricing and Investment 
In a "first best" world, economic theory suggests a two-fold rule for 
optimising the allocation of resources within an economy. The pricing 
rule being to set price equal to short-run marginal cost and the 
investment rule being to invest in projects whose benefits (at the 
level of output determined by the pricing rule) exceed their costs [11].. 
The main characteristics of this first best world are perfect competi- 
tion in all markets (no person or firm individually having the power 
to affect prices); each firm experiencing constant returns to scale 
before they become large enough to influence the market; divisibility 
of inputs and outputs (marginal adjustment can be made in both inputs 
and outputs); independence of utility and production functions 
(utility functions are solely dependent upon the goods which the person 
consumes and production functions are solely dependent upon the firm's 
inputs, no joint products being produced); and the consumption of 
the commodity by one person automatically excluding any other person 
from consuming the same unit. 
Given these characteristics and assumptions, the firm will attain long- 
run equilibrium by adjusting capacity so that it is producing at the 
minimum point of its long-run average cost curve. At this point, 
price equals marginal and average costs in the short- and long-run. 
8. 
Thus, setting price equal to short-run marginal cost (at this point) 
is consistent with an accounting objective that total revenue equals 
total cost. 
In the cases where the port industry exhibits increasing returns to 
scale, there exists indivisibilities in factor inputs or there exists 
excess capacity, Short-Run Marginal Costs(SRMC) may be less than 
average costs. Walters [121 , for example, suggests that the SRMC 
of the passage of vessel in an uncongested dredged channel is virtually 
zero. If these conditions exist at a port then SRMC pricing will lead 
to an accounting deficit. This observation raises the particular 
question of how this deficit should be financed and more generally the 
question of the port's pricing objectives. 
1.4 The Port's Pricing Objectives 
Bennathan and Walters [13] outlined the two main doctrines associated 
with port pricing by labelling them the European view and the Anglo- 
Saxon view. "The European doctrine views the port as part of the 
social infrastructure of a region" and thus due to the external 
benefits which it confers on this region there is no requirement that 
the port breaks even in an accounting sense. On the other hand, the 
Anglo-Saxon view is that "the port, like the tub, should stand on its 
own bottom". Webster [14], expressing the views of the National Ports 
Council (NPC) suggested that the primary objective is that "prices 
must yield the revenue from users required to attain the financial 
objectives". Subsidiary objectives included: 
"First, any sensible pricing policy must aim to promote 
the efficient and full use by shippers, shipowners and 
others of port facilities provided by the port. Secondly, 
it should not discriminate unreasonably between users, and 
thirdly, the prices should yield such a return on new invest- 
ments as to encourage port authorities to develop and to 
improve. " 
9. 
The logic lying behind the primary objective is related to the 
allocation of the community's resources to the area where the most 
benefit can be obtained. Ceteris paribus, if the consumers are not 
willing to pay the cost of providing the port's facilities then the 
resources would have been better employed elsewhere. The logic behind 
each of the respective subsidiary objectives is firstly, that some 
flexibility in short-run pricing is desirable in order to obtain the 
maximum utilisation of existing resources. Secondly, it would appear 
from Webster's discussion that no "unreasonable discrimination" 
implies that as far as practically possible, prices should be related 
to costs. In particular, the objective could be rephrased as, "to 
avoid cross subsidisation with regard to escapable costs between port 
users". This objective would then require the port to ascertain the 
escapable costs of the traffic so that it could determine the extent 
to which there was "unreasonable discrimination". The third 
objective recognises that the pricing structures should act as signals 
not only in the short-run (first objective) but also in the long-run. 
In other words, they should assist the port in deciding upon the level 
of investment that should be undertaken. 
In the nationalised sector the stated financial objective of the 
British Transport Docks Board is: 
"to employ their financial resources in a way that will" 
ensure the long-term financial viability of each of the 
ports and of the Board as a whole and to establish and 
meet return on investment goals for each of the ports. 
In so doing to have regard to the financial obligations 
of the Transport Acts, 1962 and 1968, and to the 
Financial and Economic Objectives of the Nationalised 
Industries (cmnd. 1337 and 3437)" [15] 
and 
"In fixing charges at the ports, the Board endeavour to cover 
both direct and indirect costs of providing, maintaining and 
operating the facilities and services. " [161 
10. 
Thus, in this sector of the port industry the NPC's primary objective 
has been stated. 
1.5 Official Recommendations- 
In the United Kingdom, official recommendations relating to pricing, 
investment and financial objectives have initiated from the Rochdale 
Report (1962) and the NPC (1975). In addition, the three white papers 
discussing-the Nationalised Industries (1961,1967 and 1978) would 
appear to be applicable to the port industry. One of the reasons for 
this observation is that with respect to the financial objectives, the 
Rochdale Committee drew explicitly upon the 1961 White Paper and the 
Committee's recommendations on charges are similar to those in the 
1967 White Paper. 
1.5.1 The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised 
Industries (1961) [17] 
This first White Paper considers the objectives of the Nationalised 
Industries under three main headings: Revenue Account (Financial 
Objectives), Capital Account (Investment and Borrowing) and Prices and 
Costs (Pricing). 
Under the Revenue Account heading, it is required that surpluses are 
at least to cover deficits over a five year period. 
When calculating costs, the following items should be included: 
1. Interest. 
2. Depreciation on an historic cost basis. 
3. A provision for the excess of replacement cost over historic cost 
on new investments. 
11. 
4. A provision to meet premature obsolescence or other unforeseen 
contingencies. 
Under the Capital Account heading, the government exercises powers over 
the Industries' investment and borrowing proposals by; reviewing their 
plans for the next five years annually; fixing upper limits on the 
level of investment to be undertaken in the following two years and by 
requiring approval of proposed borrowing. 
The third heading of Prices and Costs is concerned with impressing on 
the Industries their responsibility to the community; recognising some 
of the problems they have in setting prices; and noting that financial 
performance can be improved'not only by increasing prices but also by 
increasing productivity and reducing costs. 
1.5.2 Rochdale Report (1962) [18] 
The Committee's first premise was that they could "see no reason why 
the major ports should not be treated as commercial undertakings" 
(para 155), thus rejecting the concept of 'public service"'. They 
then expanded the port's objectives under similar headings to those 
considered above. The principles of the White. Paper's financial 
objectives were noted and the specific recommendations were "that ports 
should aim at providing, out of revenue, for (a) working expenses; 
(b) interest on loans; (c) depreciation of assets on a replacement 
cost basis; (d) taxation. " (para 167). In addition, a provision to 
meet premature obsolescence, other unforeseen contingencies and minor 
improvements was recommended, however major new developments were to 
be financed from the capital market. 
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Under the heading of Investment and Borrowing, the Committee considered 
the existing. contrbls and their defects. The system in existence was 
essentially one of a fixed limit to borrowing powers and the - 
Committee recommended (para 221) the establishment of an Authority to 
approve schemes of capital development above a minimum figure. 
Probably the most important point arising from the Committee's discuss- 
ion of charges is that the general aim when setting their level is to 
ensure that the financial objectives are achieved. Thus implying that 
pricing considerations are of lower priority than financial consider- 
ations. Three further points were also considered relating to charges 
for specific services. Firstly, that a sound costing system should be 
used and that charges were to be related to the cost of providing the 
service; secondly, that prices should provide where necessary an 
incentive or deterrent "to ensure that the port is properly used as 
a transit facility"; and thirdly it was recognised that it may be 
necessary to bear losses on certain activities that the port under- 
takes - where this is the case "the reasons should be clearly under- 
stood and the costs measured". 
1.5.3 Nationalised Industries: A Review of Economic and Financial 
Objectives (1967) [19] 
This White Paper notes that a conflict can arise between a financial 
objective in terms of an overall percentage return on assets, the test 
discount rate used for new investment and a pricing system which is 
related to costs at the margin. However it also recognises the 
practical necessity of objectives and obligations. In the face of this 
conflict, the Paper adopts a flexible approach, whereby general 
principles are laid down and any conflict arising can be discussed with 
13. 
the Government. 
In setting Financial Objectives (or Targets) the Government was to 
take into account "return on new investment, a soundly based pricing 
policy, social obligations not covered by a subsidy, efficient 
operation and national prices and incomes policy".. Targets which 
have__beenagreed for the various industries at the time of publishing 
the Paper were in terms of income as a percentage of average net assets, 
income being either gross - before interest and depreciation - or net - 
before interest but after depreciation at historic cost. The only 
industry which took into account the replacement cost of assets was 
the National Coal Board which had the target "To break-even after 
interest and depreciation including £10 million a year to cover the 
difference between depreciation at historic and replacement cost". 
The Paper's discussion of Investment can be conveniently divided into 
two parts - firstly a statement of the reason for control and 
secondly the vehicle of control. The reason for control "is that the 
most efficient distribution of goods and services in the economy as a 
whole can be secured only if investments are made where the return to 
the economy is greatest": and the vehicle is the use of Discounted 
Cash Flow (DCF) techniques using the Government'. s Test Discount Rate 
(TDR), which was 8 per cent in real terms at the time of publishing 
the Paper. The Government's flexible approach is again demonstrated 
when the conditions under which. a proposed project, which does not 
meet the 8 per cent DCF rate of return may be accepted, or: which does 
meet the requirement but maybe rejected, are discussed. In the 
former case, the Paper is mainly concerned with those situations where 
there are social costs and benefits which are not normally included in 
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a commercial investment appraisal but which are relevant when consider- 
ing society as a whole. In the latter case it is recognised that the 
TDR is a long-term device for ensuring that the public and private 
sectors' calls on resources do not diverge markedly, however in the 
short=run the government may have to take into account competing 
claims for scarce resources and reject projects which pass the test. 
The first statement in the Paper with respect to prices draws 
attention to the link between sound investment appraisal and pricing 
policies. In keeping with the general policy of treating the 
industries as commercial concerns, it then adopts the criteria that not 
only should prices be set such that revenue covers accounting costs, 
but also that prices should be related to costs at the margin. Whilst 
these are the broad principles, the specific aim of pricing policies 
(Para 18) "should be that the consumer should pay the true cost of 
providing the goods and services he consumes, in every case where 
these can be sensibly identified". The section on prices then goes 
on to discuss three reasons why prices may differ from costs and 
suggests pricing systems which would be applicable in these cases. 
The first reason, is where the cost of providing the goods and 
services to specific consumers is difficult to identify and therefore 
difficult to allocate to these consumers. This situation can arise 
where there is jointness in production or consumption and the Paper 
cites the use of two-part or differential pricing systems. -as attempts 
to minimise distortions in the allocation of resources. The second 
reason is where there are (Para 18) "wider economic or social 
considerations" and the third reason is where excess capacity or 
excess demand can be minimised by charging prices different from 
costs. These two phenomena can be both short- and long-run in nature. 
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In the short-run, it may be that there are peaks in demand - in this 
case, setting prices so as to encourage the utilisation of facilities 
during the off-peak period (such that the price does not fall below 
the variable cost incurred) and discouraging utilisation during the 
peak is suggested. In the long-run, it may be that there is unused 
capacity - in this case, pricing down to escapable cost (if this 
increases demand) is suggested. 
Thus, onecould interpret the discussion on pricing as being consumers 
should pay the true cost but at the same time the relevant (short- or 
long-run) marginal cost should be borne in mind when setting the 
charge. 
1.5.4 The Nationalised Industries (1978) [201 
This White Paper attempts to resolve the conflict:. between marginal 
cost pricing, a test discount rate, and financial targets. The 
principle behind this attempt is shown in fig 1.1. 
The test discount rate of the 1967 White Paper is replaced by the 
Required Rate of Return (RRR). This is currently set at 5% and 
represents the opportunity cost of capital (broadly reflecting the 
pre-tax real rate of return in the private sector). The industries 
are expected to achieve this on all new investments, including those 
which are non-revenue earning (for example, investment in head offices, 
necessary replacements etc. ). 
An interpretation of the recommendations is that from the project 
proposal, the cost of providing the extra tranche of output is 
estimated. This cost estimate, the RRR and the expected demand are 
then input into an'investment appraisal model which in turn outputs 
16. 
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the supply price. The supply price representing that price which is 
required in order to meet the RRR. 
The supply price is then compared with the prices obtained from the 
demand forecasts. Given that the supply price, and price and quantity 
obtained from the demand forecast are compatible then the project can 
be accepted. Paragraph 9 (of the Appendix [20]) suggests that: 
"In the case of industries where the outputs of old and new 
assets are indistinguishable, total revenue would be 
derived directly from the price needed to earn the RRR on new 
investment; where the price which can be charted for the 
output of old assets is different from that which would be 
charged for that of new assets, it will be necessary to 
take account of this in deriving the total revenue 
figure. " 
This implies that in cases where the outputs are indistinguishable, 
price is set such that total revenue would be sufficient to replace 
those assets for which demand exists (that is, price provides a signal 
to the producer indicating which assets should be replaced). 
The data obtained up to this point are then converted into a financial 
target in terms of a Return on Capital Employed (ROCE). The total 
revenue is calculated according to the above quotation from para 9. 
"Costs, including depreciation, would then be deducted and the 
resultant net profit would be expressed as a return either on assets or 
some other appropriate base" (para 9). 
Thus, by carrying out the calculations sequentially the three 
objectives are interrelated. 
In practice, however, the government reserves the right to take into 
account "social, sectoral and wider economic considerations" when 
setting financial objectives. 
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The adoption of the RRR in preference to the TDR is the result of two 
main factors. Firstly, only-a small percentage of investments had 
been appraised using the TDR of the 1967 White Paper and secondly, it 
represents an attempt to relate the return on investment in the public 
sector to that in the private sector. In other words it is attempting 
to recognise the opportunities foregone when one invests in the public 
sector. 
The pricing policy which emerges from the series of calculations is 
that price is related to Long-Run Average Incremental Cost (LRAIC). 
Whilst this approach does not yield the Long-Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) 
'(except in the constant returns to scale case) it does represent a 
closer approximation to LRMC than Long-Run Average Cost (LRAC) and thus 
is a workable interpretation of the 1967 White Paper's recommendation 
that prices should cover LRMC. In the section on pricing, the 1978 
White Paper does reiterate the importance of the structure of prices, 
particularly that peak/off-peak rates should be related to the 
relative costs of supply and also that arbitrary cross-subsidisation 
between different groups of consumers should be avoided. 
The financial target as calculated above will be set for three to five 
years, and will normally be expressed as a percentage return (before 
interest) on average net assets. However, in some industries, 
particularly those which are labour intensive, a more relevant measure 
would be a percentage return on turnover. The White Paper also 
recommends that as soon as possible, financial targets should be placed 
on an inflation adjusted basis. 
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1.5.5 'Financial'Objectives for the Ports Industry (1975) [20] 
Whilst this memorandum is mainly concerned with financial objectives 
it is recognised that in order to achieve these objectives they must 
be based on sound pricing and investment decisions. The minimum 
condition laid down for prices is that they should never fall below 
the escapable cost of providing the service or facility and for 
investment the real return in DCF terms should not be below 10 per cent. 
The link between the port's objectives and those of the Nationalised 
Industries is also mentioned in this memorandum when it states that: 
"The application to ports of the same test discount rate 
as applies to investment proposals in the public sector 
generally is seen as one of many tools for ensuring 
the best allocation of new resources. " 
The two financial objectives that the document-is concerned with are 
Return on Capital Employed and a Cash Flow Target. The general 
conclusion reached is that differing accounting practices and the 
problem of changing asset prices and technology over time produce a 
financial objective on a ROCE basis which is unsatisfactory. However 
if one uses cash flow concepts, where the cash flow has to be 
sufficient to cover specified items (for example, interest, taxation, 
dividends, redemption of capital debt.; etc_)... then most of the problems- 
of the ROCE are bypassed. 
1.6 Aims and Outline of the Thesis 
The recurring theme of the Offical Recommendations is that ports should 
be treated as commercial undertakings. Rochdale adopts this view as a 
"yardstick" for measuring the financial performance of the port. The 
White Papers similarly suggest that where possible consumers should pay 
the '-'true cost" of the goods and services they consume. Whilst the 
concept of "true cost" has not been defined, the "commercial concern". 
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maxim will be broadly adopted in the thesis. The more specific object- 
ives of a pricing structure will also closely follow the views and 
recommendations of the two previous sections, namely: 
(i) To promote the efficient and full use by shippers, shipowners 
and other users of the port's facilities. 
(ii) To avoid cross-subsidisation between port users with respect to 
escapable costs. 
(iii) To encourage the port to develop and improve facilities which 
are justified by demand. 
The overall aims of the thesis are fourfold and include: 
(i) To identify and expand upon the problems facing the port when 
attempting to develop a pricing system or to invest in new 
assets. 
(ii) To investigate the merits of-various pricing systems. 
(iii) To consider a methodology for measuring escapable costs and 
attributing joint costs to the relevant traffic . 
(iv) To outline the principles which could be employed by a port 
authority when considering the pricing policy. 
In pursuit of these aims, the next chapter will consider the problems 
faced by the port when making its pricing and investment decisions. 
Having outlined the problems, the discussion will attempt to demonstrate 
that they are not insoluble. Chapter 3 will consider the merits of 
various pricing systems. The aim of the chapter not being to present 
a comprehensive list of pricing alternatives, but to consider some 
basic systems from which variations may be developed. Chapter 4 
provides a discussion of the traffic characteristics, an input which 
will be used in later chapters. The thesis then contains a block of 
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chapters concerned with the measurement of escapable costs. Chapter 5 
outlines the principles involved in measuring these costs, whilst 
Chapters 6,7 and 8 discuss the application of these principles to 
conservancy, the docks and cargo handling respectively. Chapter 
9. expands the discussion of section 1.1 (above) in the context of the 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Company. Chapter 10 considers the charging 
base which is currently used and Chapter 11 contains the, 
summary and conclusions of the thesis. 
22. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PORT'S PRICING AND INVESTMENT PROBLEM 
2.1 Introduction 
The conditions necessary for the first best world (outlined in 
Chapter 1) are violated in the port case and thus the direct applica- 
tion of a marginal cost rule may not lead to an optimal allocation of 
resources. The problem facing the port is therefore one of optimisa- 
tion in a second best world. 
Apart from the oligopolistic interdependences, the features of the port 
industry which lead to this breakdown include: 
(i) Jointness in consumption. 
(ii) Technical jointness in production. 
(iii) The discrete nature of factor inputs. 
(iv) Temporal jointness in production, including the special case 
of fluctuations in demand over time. 
(v) The specific and durable nature of the port's assets 
(vi) Technological change and the resulting excess capacity. 
(vii) Externalities. 
This chapter will discuss these features and outline their solutions. 
2.2 Indivisibilities and Jointness 
The recurring theme in these features is individibility and 
jointness [1].. These two words are used frequently in the context of 
public enterprise economics, however, their meaning is not always 
clear. Dictionary definitions include such phrases as, in the case 
of indivisible, "not separable into parts" and in the case of joint 
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"shared by two or more persons". A large number of the port's 
problems arise from indivisibilities (interpreted in the-broad sense 
of inability to separate) which leads to joint costs (interpreted as 
being shared by two or more persons or outputs). Thus, the problems 
arise because costs in particular cannot be separated (that is, are 
indivisible) which implies that they are shared (that is, joint). 
Jointness can arise in both consumption and production, table 2.1, 
indicating the main areas in which it can occur. On the consumption 
(demand) side, the consumption of one good in some sense implies 
consumption of another good. These two goods can be either complements 
or substitutes. For example, given that a vessel enters port to 
transfer cargo, then the demand for this transfer implies a demand for 
cranes, a quay, deepwater alongside the berth, and approach channels. 
In other words, there is a joint (complementary) demand for these 
facilities. An example of a substitute is where increased demand for 
container berths implies a reduced demand for general cargo berths. 
Joint consumption can also occur in the case of externalities, where 
either the consumption Of a good by one consumer confers benefits or 
imposes costs on other consumers. For example, the consumption of 
congested port facilities by one consumer imposes a delay cost on other 
consumers. 
On the production (supply side), the production of one, good in some 
sense implies production of a second or more goods. The "sense" can 
either mean production of different goods or the production of the 
same good (jointly) for other consumers. The four main cases where 
this can arise are where discrete factor inputs, "joint" production, 
externalities and public goods exist, with "joint" production incorpor- 
26. 
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ating technical, temporal and spatial jointness. Assuming that the 
port's facilities are uncongested then the general comment attaching 
to each of the cases in table 2.1 is that supplying one output or 
consumer implies that another output or consumer can be supplied at 
little or zero extra cost. Thus, for example, supplying a (discrete) 
dredged channel for one ship implies that other ships can use it for 
no extra cost. If the channel has a life of a number of years then it 
will also be joint in a temporal sense. Spatial jointness occurs in 
the transport context with the "return load problem", that is, 
providing a transport service for traffic-from place A to place B 
implies that capacity is available to transport goods or passengers 
from B to A. Technical jointness can occur where the output is 
technically inseparable or technically separable (Wiles [2]). 
Technically inseparable products are those where "the production of one 
object leads inevitably to the production of the other, whether in a 
fixed or a variable proportion". The classic example of this type of 
product is wool and mutton. It is difficult to envisage any cases 
where the port`s output is joint inseparable, however, the case will 
be discussed below for completeness of argument. Technically 
separable production occurs where "the production of the second object 
in any proportion at all may be at the discretion of the producer. " 
An example in the railway context is the running of both passenger 
trains and goods trains. Wiles further suggests that technically 
inseparable goods can be complementary or neutral and technically 
separable can, in addition, be competitive. For example "if the track 
is better maintained in order to increase goods traffic, passenger 
traffic is also facilitated; but the actual running of more goods 
trains obstructs passenger traffic". In the first case, the goods are 
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complementary, whilst in the second they are competitive. Joy [3] 
draws. a distinction between joint and common costs. 
"Common costs are incurred in the production of two or more 
products, where it is cheaper to produce them together than 
separately, but where the level of common cost would 
decline if production of one of the products ceased... 
Joint costs are those incurred for the production 
of two or more products, the level of which will not 
change with the abandonment of any of the separable 
outputs. " 
Thus it would appear that Joy's joint costs correspond to Wiles' 
neutral separable and Joy's common costs correspond to the complemen- 
tary separable. Another feature of Joy's common costs is, to the 
extent that the level of costs change when one of the products-cease, 
some element is directly attributable to one or more of the traffics. 
Given that this element can be attributed it is no longer of interest 
when considering jointness. There will however be a cost incurred as 
long as one output is produced, this being a "de facto (non-attributable 
common) joint cost" (Joy [41). Baumol [5] suggests that since the 
proportions of traffic can be varied at the discretion of management 
it is possible, in principle, "to trace them to individual services: 
But (Mumby [6]) "though [common costs are] not truly joint, and there- 
fore not entirely arbitrary in incidence, [they] involve sensitivity 
in allocation". As it will be difficult to isolate pure joint and 
Joy's "de facto" joint costs, "joint cost" will be used to incorporate 
both types. 
The discrete nature of many of the port's factor inputs implies that, 
over the range of output represented by capacity, if one consumer is 
supplied then others can be supplied at little extra cost (assuming 
that the whole capacity is not supplied for the first consumer). This 
characteristic of the port's inputs leads to decreasing costs over 
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most of the range of the asset's output. 
Externalities, at their extreme, are a special case of technical 
jointness. External economies arise where the production of one 
output generates a beneficial effect on other producers or consumers 
whilst with external diseconomies a harmful effect is generated. 
Thus, external economies are similar. to complementary inseparable 
products and external diseconomies to competitive inseparable products. 
An---. example of an external economy in the port context is where the 
capital dredging of an approach channel for deep draftedvessels to 
alters the water flow in the approaches that maintenance dredging of 
another channel is no longer required. 
"The essential feature of a pure public good is that its enjoyment by 
one person in no way detracts from its availability to others" [7]. 
Thus, again, if one consumer is supplied then the rest will be supplied 
(simultaneously) at zero extra cost. For the good to be a pure public 
good, two additional features are necessary. In production the 
producer does not have the power to exclude the consumption of the 
output and in consumption the consumer may be forced to consume the 
good or he may have freedom of choice. Thus, for example, a light- 
house located at the port entrance may be used (or not used) by 
vessels passing the port, the port authority having no powers to 
exclude these vessels from using the light. Given that the port can 
levy charges for vessels entering the port, the facilities (apart from 
the lighthouse) are not public goods; however, where facilities are 
uncongested the feature of enjoyment by one consumer not detracting 
from its availability to others is present. 
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2.3 'Jointness'in Consumption 
In the analysis of a first best world, it is assumed, inter alia, that 
it is meaningful to discuss a consumer's Marginal Rate of Substitution 
(MRS) between two goods, say, X and Y, Under these conditions, the 
MRS (slope of the indifference curve) can be used to generate relative 
prices for X and Y for any level of consumption of X and Y. 
If however, X and Y are perfect complements then one cannot sensibly 
discuss rates of substitution between them. Continuing the example of 
the previous section, if approach channels (X) were perfectly 
complementary to quays (Y), then it is meaningless to analyse the 
shipowners rate of substitution of more quays for less approach 
channel or vice versa. Given that quays and approach channels are 
divisible, all that exists is a consumption vector where X and Y are 
consumed in fixed proportions. Thus relative prices are indeterminant 
in that they can range from zero to infinite. 
Whilst one cannot discuss MRSXY, one can however consider the MRS of 
a numeraire, Z for port services (that is, X and Y jointly). This 
then suggests that a price can be found for X and Y jointly, but no 
individual prices for X and Y can be ascertained. Thus, the solution 
would appear to be to charge a single price for these port services 
(X and Y) which are consumed jointly. 
This however is not the only solution. if the production side is 
examined then common Marginal Rates of Transformation of channels (X) 
for quays (Y) exist for all firms producing both, as do common 
marginal rates of transformation of channels for Z and quays for Z 
for all firms producing each pair. Since it is meaningful : to trade 
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off more quays against less channels and vice versa, relative prices 
can be obtained from the slopes of the production possibility curves. 
If the quays and channels are measured in units so that one unit of 
port services provide one unit of channel and one unit of quay, then 
the optimality condition can be written in terms of the numeraire as: 
MRSX 
and Y, Z= 
MRTX, 
Z+ 
MRTY, 
z 
Alternatively, the amount of Z that consumers are willing to give up 
in order to obtain an extra unit of port services is equal to the 
amount of Z society has to give up for an extra unit of channel plus 
the amount of Z that society has to give up for an extra unit of quay. 
Thus, in the case where there are two products in consumption (Z and 
port services) and three in production (Z, channels and quays) prices 
can be obtained from the production side. 
If the assumption of perfect complementarity is removed, then in 
principle the whole problem disappears, for, as soon as the smallest 
trade-off in consumption can be made an indifference curve of finite 
slope in the relevant range emerges and thus (assuming no corner 
solutions) price ratios can be ascertained. 
2.4 Technical Jointness in Production 
On the production side, the first best solution has similarly assumed 
that it is meaningful to discuss producers' Marginal Rates of 
Transformation (MRT) of two goods X into Y. Under these conditions 
the MRT (slope of the production possibility curve) can be used to 
generate ratios of marginal costs of X and Y for various combinations 
of X and Y produced. 
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It may however be the case that two outputs are produced jointly in 
fixed proportions (technically inseparable). In this case, marginal 
rates of transformation cannot be sensibly discussed as all that exists 
is a production vector where X and Y are produced together. Thus, 
relative prices are indeterminant as they range from zero to infinity. 
One can however consider the NET of the numeraire Z for X and Y jointly 
and therefore price these products jointly. Given however that X and 
Y are measured in units such that one unit of the joint product is one 
unit of X and one unit of Y, prices can be determined separately. As 
long as common marginal rates of substitution of X for Y exist for all 
consumers consuming both, as well as common marginal rates of 
substitution of X for Z and Y for Z for all consumers consuming both, 
relative prices can be determined from the community indifference 
curves. e 
Thus, stated in terms of the numeraire: 
MRTX 
and Y, Z 
= MRSX, Z 
+ MRSY, 
Z 
In other words, the amount of Z that society has to give up in order 
to obtain an extra unit of X and Y is equal to the amount of Z that 
consumers are willing to give up for an extra unit of X plus the amount 
of Z consumers are willing to give up for an extra unit of Y. 
Thus, in thecase where there are three products in consumption (X, Y 
and Z) and two in production (Z, and X and Y jointly) prices can be 
obtained from the consumption side. 
If the assumption of perfect jointness in production is removed, then 
again the problem disappears, for once trade-offs can be made between 
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X and Ya transformation curve of finite slope in the relevant range 
emerges and (assuming no corner solutions) cost ratios can be ascert-' 
ained from the production side. 
2.5 Discrete Factor Inputs 
In a large number of cases, it will be necessary for the port to supply 
services in increments, that is, itscannot make the marginal adjust- 
ments which were a characteristic of the first best world. This 
implies that the port incurs expenditures either before any output is 
produced or before increments of output are produced. Consider, for 
example, a numeraire Z and a canal leading to a port which provides an 
output, X, of canal transits for homogeneous ships. Assume further, 
that there are no other inputs (pilots, lockkeepers, maintenance etc), 
that the canal can be constructed instantaneously and that the life of 
the canal is one production period. The port is then faced with the 
twofold problem of whether the canal should be constructed and if it 
is, what price should be charged. 
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A 
B 
fig. 2.1 Indifference and transformation curves for the canal example. 
In fig 2.1, AB represents the amount of Z that society must give up in 
order to obtain OD units of X. The MRT up to the capacity of the canal 
(point K) is zero and at K it becomes infinite. On the consumption 
- side, the community has a preference map where, along any 
indifference 
curve they can make marginal trade-offs between more X and less Z and 
vice versa. In order to resolve the twofold problem, the relevant 
indifference curve is IC . This curve represents all the points where 
the community is indifferent between OA units of Z and no X, and the 
various combinations of X and Z:, Thus, along IC, consumers are being 
faced with an "all or nothing" choice with respect to the canal. 
The optimality conditions require that the port produces 
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xw DX 
that output where MRSX Z=M 
RT 
Z, 
that is, the amount of Z that 
society is willing to give up in order to obtain an extra canal 
transit is equal to the amount that society has to give up in order to 
obtain the extra transit. This condition can be restated as set price 
equal to short-run marginal cost, which in this case implies that, since 
MRTX Z 
is zero at the optimum level of output OE, price should also be 
zero. Whether the investment should be undertaken depends upon 
whether the benefits exceed the costs. In fig 2.1, the maximum amount 
that consumers are willing to pay for OE units of X (compared with OA 
of Z and no X) is HF units of Z foregone. On: 'the production side, the 
total cost of OE units of X is HG units of Z foregone. Since the 
consumer's willingness to pay is greater than the cost, the investment 
should be undertaken. In terms of the MRS and MRT, the total benefit 
can be written as: 
X*' 
MRSX, 
Z(x). 
dx 
and total costs can be written as: 
MRTX, 
Z(xI'C)dx 
+C 
4", 
(where MRTXrz(xIc) is the, marginäl. rate of transformation of X for Z 
. given the initial; capitalexpenditure C (equal to AB)). 
Thus the investment criteria is, invest if benefits are greater than or 
equal to costs, that is: 
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XX* 
MRSX, 
Z(x) 
dxý > MRTX'Z(XIC)dx +C 
0 
In this particular case MRTX Z 
is zero for all X, between 0 and x*, so 
that: 
NIlZSX (x) dx >C 
Thus the problem of accounting deficits outlined in. _the previous 
chapter arise in this example. This need not always be the case and 
will depend upon the consumer's MRS at the capacity level of output. 
On the production side at this capacity level, relative prices range 
from zero to infinite at the point K. If on the consumption side the 
MRS at this level of output is still negative then a positive price 
will emerge which may be sufficient to meet the accounting requirement. 
Thus whilst prices are indeterminant on the production side, they could 
be obtained from consumption. The general problem of meeting an 
accounting requirement given the discrete nature of factor inputs and 
excess capacity remains. Any alternative polidy should have the 
objective of attempting to extract some of the consumer surplus from :,, .. _"" 
the f MRSX Z 
(i) term in the investment criteria whilst requiring that 
at the optimal output level MRSX Z= 
MRTX 
Z 
in the pricing rule. 
ir 
The-problem of discrete inputs need not only be exhibited with a single 
investment. It could arise where individible assets are duplicated. 
For example, the port could be considering how many fork lift trucks 
to purchase. In this case the output, X, could be measured in fork- 
lift hours and assuming three identical trucks with zero operating 
. costs there would be three production points Kl, K2 and K3 (fig 2.2)1 
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fig 2.2 Discrete output of fork-lift trucks 
Applying the above analysis, one fork-lift costs H1K1 and consumers 
are willing to pay H1F1, therefore invest in at least one. Two fork- 
lifts cost H2G and consumers are willing to pay H2F2, therefore invest 
in two. Consumers are not willing to pay for three, therefore do not 
invest in three. In a similar manner to the canal example, the 
dptimum price for two fork=lifts is zero and there will be excess 
capacity of ED2. 
The problem of joint production can also arise in-: the context of 
discrete factor inputs. In this case the pricing and investment 
criteria require further modification. In the two output case, the 
pricing rule becomes, set price such that: 
MRS + MRS = MRT SX, Z Y, Z X andY, Z 
and the investment criteria becomes, 
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x* y* 
J MRSX, Z(x)dx +J MRSY Z(y)dy 00 
max (x*, y*) 
j- 
MRTXandY, 
Z 
(x and y) d (x and y) +C 
0 
Alternatively, the amount of Z that consumers would be willing to give 
up for X (rather than go without it) plus the amount of Z that 
consumers would be willingtto give up for Y (rather than go without it) 
is equal to the amount of Z that society has to give up in order to 
supply X and Y. 
Thus, when considering discrete factor inputs, whether they are used 
to produce a siingle or joint product, the pricing and investment rules 
are clear. The question, however, of pricing to meet an: accounting 
; roc ement, remains and will be considered in the next chapter. 
2.6 Temporal Jointness in Production 
The technical cases of joint production and, discrete inputs can be 
extended to intertemporal production. In the intertemporal case the 
port is considering an asset which takes zero to finite time to 
acquire or construct and which confers benefits on society for one 
production period (sometimes, for convenience, being taken.: as the 
calendar year) or more. Thus, society must sacrifice some consumption 
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"_today" (referring to the whole construction period) in order to obtain 
the benefit of more consumption "tomorrow" (referring to the whole life 
of the asset). 
In the simpler case where construction is instantaneous, inputs are 
continuous and the asset has a life of two production periods then 
given perfect jointness over time the optimality condition becomes: 
MRTXtant+l, Z = MRSXt, Z + MRSXt+l, Z 
In other words, the amount of Z that society has to give up in order to 
obtain an extra unit of Xt and Xt+1 is equal to the amount of Z that 
consumers are willing to give up for an extra unit of Xt plus the 
amount of ZRconsumers are willing to give up for an extra unit of Xt+l' 
Thus, again given three goods in consumption and only two in production 
prices can be obtained from the consumption side. 
If the assumption of perfect jointness is removed then again the 
problem disappears. This occurs particularly in the case of an asset 
where its life is to a large extent determined by the intensity with 
which it is used. Thus it may be possible to force the machine in the 
first production period at the expense of reducing its potential 
output in the second production period. Once these trade-offs can be 
made, an intertemporal transformation curve of finite slope emerges and 
(assuming no corner solutions) prices can be ascertained. 
If the continuous input assumption is removed then the analysis is 
similar to the technical production case. The pricing rule remains the 
same as with continuous inputs, namely: 
MRTXtandXt+1 = MRSXt'Z + MRSXt+l. Z 
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and the investment criteria becomes: 
t 
rr t+l 
X x* 
l MR'SXt, Z 
(xt) dxt +J MRSgt+,, Z (xt+l) dxt+l JO 
0 
max(xt, xt+l) 
-J MRTXtandXt+l (xt and t+l) d (xt and xt+l) +C 
0 
which can be stated as, the amount of Z that consumers would be willing 
to give up for Xt (rather than go without it) plus the amount of Z that 
consumers would be willing to give up for Xt+l (rather than go without 
it) is equal to the amount of Z that society has to give up in order to 
supply Xt and Xt+l 
Finally, the removal of the instantaneous construction assumption 
implies that the numeraire Z becomes a composite of Z's during the 
construction period. Thus if construction takes two years then in the 
above equation substitute Zt_1 and Zt for Z (assuming that these costs 
are incurred at the end of the year to which they apply) and Ct_1 and 
Ct (suitably discounted) for Co. 
Whilst the marginal rates of substitution incorporate the consumer's 
time preference, it will be necessary in practice to compound or 
discount the costs and benefits associated with the asset. Rewriting 
the above equation in these terms and, for convenience, taking the 
date at which the construction is completed as year zero then: 
B1 
+ 
B2 
= 
CC1 
+ 
CC2 
+C (1 + r) +C (1 + r) (1 + r) 
2 (1 + r) (1 + r) 
2 -1 0 
where Bi= total benefit in year i. 
CCi = total variable cost at the optimum output. 
Ci = total capital expenditure in year i. 
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In general terms, the investment criterion is invest if, over the life 
of the asset the consumers are willing to pay, and the pricing rule is 
set price equal to short-run marginal cost. 
Thus, the temporal extension of the canal example requires that the 
consumers, over the life of the canal are willing to pay the present 
value of the construction costs for the port to invest. The pricing 
rule suggests, under the, --assumptions of the example, that zero price is 
charged. 
2.7 Fluctuations in Demand over Time 
The main fluctuations in demand over time are hourly, seasonal, 
cyclical and secular. The solution to this problem being included 
within temporal jointness. Thus, the problems of the daily peak, 
fluctuations during the year due to the seasonal nature of the trade 
in various commodities, cyclical fluctuations due to the business or 
trade cycle and secular decline or growth of trades due to structural 
or technological change can all (if foreseen) be incorporated into the 
general solution of investing in the asset if consumers over the life 
of the asset are willing to pay and setting price equal to short-run 
marginal cost. 
2.8 The Nature df the Port's Assets and Excess Capacity 
In general, the relevant (opportunity or escapable) costs to the port 
are those associated with the decision that the port is taking. In the 
ex-ante case, the investment costs are relevant, since if it is 
decided not to accept the associated traffic then the cost could be 
escaped. In the ex-post case the relevant cost is still the opportu- 
nity cost measured in terms of the opportunities foregone by not 
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employing the asset in its next best alternative. This next best 
alternative could be the use by other traffics or use outside the port. 
If the port is pricing according to the rules suggested above and 
excess capacity still exists then by definition other traffics are not 
willing to pay and the "internal yardstick" cannot be used to measure 
opportunity costs. Due to the specific nature and fixed location of 
the port's assets, the alternative uses externally may also be very 
limited and thus the opportunity cost may be correspondingly low. 
This arises because given the location and nature of the assets, second 
hand markets are virtually non-existent. Thus society as a whole has 
little opportunity to use assets such as dredged channels, locks, docks 
and quays to perform functions other than those for which they were 
specifically designed. Even in the cases where assets are mobile (for 
example, cranes and buoys) the virtual non-existence of markets for 
these assets implies a low external valuation. 
Another characteristic of at least one of the port's assets (namely the 
channel where capital dredging has been undertaken) is that it is 
permanent and will not need replacing. The use of such an asset "gives 
rise to no social cost : (Lewis-(81) and thus their opportunity costs (even 
in the long-run) are zero. 
Assets which fall into the same class as permanent assets, in the sense 
that their long-run opportunity costs approach zero are assets that will 
not need replacing because of a contraction in demand. This contraction 
has presented a serious problem (in an accounting sense) for established 
ports in recent years and has arisen from the rapid technological 
change in shipping. As Lewis [8] states however, this is an 
accounting but not a social cost", a point which has been realised by 
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port authorities when having to "write these assets off" as a 
commercial loss. 
2.9 Externalities 
Given that externalities at their extreme are a special case of 
technical jointness the general pricing rule that: 
MRTXandY, 
Z = 
MRSX, 
Z 
+ MRSY, 
Z 
is applicable (where X is the good or service produced and Y is the 
externality). However, it is possible for MRSY'Z to be either 
positive or negative. If there are no institutional arrangements . -" 
whereby Y is taken into account, the level of output will be set such 
that: 
MRTXXalluy, Z = 
MRSX, 
Z 
Thus, when Y is a good (that is MRSY'Z > 0) too little will be - 
produced and if Y is a bad (MRS YZ< 0) too much will 
be produced. 
Therefore, for an optimal allocation of resources, it is required that 
the amount of Z that society must give up in order to obtain an extra 
unit of X and Y is equal to the amount of Z that all those affected 
are willing to give up for an extra unit of X and Y. 
Thus, in the example of the capital dredging of one channel affecting 
the maintenance dredging in another channel, if the maintenance 
dredging is reduced then the willingness of the traffic using this 
channel to pay should be incorporated in the investment decision. 
Similarly if the maintenance dredging is increased then the willingness 
to pay of the traffic using the channel where the capital dredging is 
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proposed should be taken into account. If this is not done, then 
respectively not enough and too much capital dredging will be under- 
taken. 
In the case of congestion Bennathan and Walters derive the formulae 
that [91, 
Marginal 
cost 
Port 
(per = 
cost 
vessel 
load) 
Additional 
Own delay costs 
+ delay + caused to 
cost all other 
vessels 
An individual consumer perceives the cost of entering the port 
(MRTX 
Z) as 
being;. the port cost (charges that he has to pay) plus the 
cost to himself of any delay. However, his entry to the port-implies 
that the bad (negative good) of delays to all other vessels is jointly 
produced. 
It is also suggested-by some port authorities that they experience some 
non-commercial constraints. They argue that these arise because they 
have a statutory duty "to take such steps as they consider necessary 
for the conservancy, maintenance, operation and improvement of the 
approaches to the port, docks, discharging and loading facilities, 
warehousing and consignment of goods " [10] and that these statutory 
duties are ranked prior to their financial duties. If this is the 
case, then one interpretation is that the statutory authorities have 
recognised that there are external costs and benefits associated with 
the port. 
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2.10 -Summary-and Conclusions 
The discussion of the port's pricing and investment problem would 
indicate that indivinibilities and jointness are one of the major 
causes. Indivisibilities and jointness can occur in both consumption 
and production. In consumption, they arise because the user is 
demanding the set of port services and not just one element of this 
set. In production, they arise due to a number of causes including 
the discrete nature of factor inputs; technical, temporal and spatial 
production; externalities and public goods. Sections 2.3 to 2.9 
considered these problems and indicated that they do not imply that 
prices arEindeterminant. In consumption, prices can be ascertained 
from the production side (that is, costs), the constraint being the 
cönsumers' willingness to pay. Similarly in production, prices can be 
ascertained by concentrating on the consumption side (that is, 
willingness to pay), the constraint being total social costs. 
In-: the cases where decreasinc costs can arise (for example, where 
factor inputs are discrete) a two part rule is required. The optimal 
level of output is ascertained by equating the consumers' willingness 
to pay for an extra unit with the cost of that unit and price is set 
accordingly. The investment criterion requires that the consumers' 
total willingness to pay is greater than or equal to the total cost. 
Under these circumstances, the pricing rule may lead to an accounting 
deficit and given a commercial concern directive the investment rule 
gives no indication of how the total cost may be recovered from 
consumers. The next chapter will investigate various pricing systems 
whereby the port may attempt to allocate resources optimally and at 
the same time meet an accounting requirement: 
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Let, cP = port costs per shipload 
c= delay costs per shipload 
X= throughput (shiploads) 
q(X) = queue length (number of shiploads) 
D(X) = delays per ship 
K(X) = total cost 
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then 
K(X) = cpX +cq (X) 
but D(X) ='q 
(x) 
X 
or q (X) =XD (X) 
so that, 
K(X) =CX+c XD (X) 
Thus the marginal cost (per shipload) is, 
dd M 
_ ýp +c Lx 
ddxD Cx, 
+D (X) J X 
= cp 4- cD(X) + cX 
Dd(X) 
X 
whete Cp = port costs of extra ship 
cD(X) = own delay costs 
dD(X) 
= delay per ship induced by increasing the dX 
throughput by an extra ship 
c XW= additional delay costs caused to all other 
vessels by the entry of an extra ship 
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CHAPTER 3 
PRICING SYSTEMS 
3.1 Introduction 
The discussion of alternative pricing systems requires the specification 
of firstly, the objective of the system and secondly, the criteria which 
will be used to determine whether one system is "better" or "worse" 
than any other system. 
The objectives outlined in Chapter 1 could be incorporated within a 
more general objective of maximising community welfare subject to; 
total revenue equalling total cost; efficient utilization in the short- 
run; individual traffics paying at least the costs that could be 
escaped if they, were not accepted, and encouragement to invest in 
"worthwhile" projects. This objective would require that the community 
indifference curve could, 'in principle, be ascertained, which in turn 
requires that a value judgement is made concerning the equity of the 
disttibution of goods before the curves can be generated. Further, if 
a change in the current pricing system is being considered then this may 
also mean that the distribution of income changes, with some consumers 
"gaining" and others "losing". Given that we have no weighting system 
whereby changes in individual consumer's welfare can be compared it 
will not be possible to state whether a change in the pricing system 
would lead to an improvement or deterioration in community welfare. 
In the following discussion, it will be assumed that the issue of the 
distribution of income is properly the concern of government and not 
seaports. Thus, the current distribution of income can be taken by the 
port authority as exogenously given. Similarly, in considering changes 
in a pricing system, the main concern of the port authority will be the 
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allocation of resources and not the associated distributional issues. 
These assumptions are in keeping with current government policy in the 
U. K. For example, the 1978 White Paper [1] states that: 
"The Government intends that the nationalised industries 
will not be forced into deficits by restraints on their 
prices. When help has to be given to poorer members of 
the community it will be given primarily through the 
social security and taxation system and not by 
subsidising nationalised industry prices. " 
The approach adopted in-the following analysis will be to consider a 
single consumer (or "n" homogeneous consumers). The criterion adopted 
for determining whether a pricing system is "better" or "worse" than 
another will be that "the system under consideration is better than 
an alternative if its application increases the consumer's welfare" 
(that is, places the consumer on a higher indifference curve) subject to 
the above objectives. 
The advantage of this approach is that it is directly applicable to 
cases where there are single users (for example, a single user berth) 
or, where homogeneous (or nearly homogeneous) traffics can be identified. 
The disadvantage of the approach is that whilst it can be used to 
develop a tariff which discriminates intra-consumer (quantity 
discrimination) it does not lend itself to the analysis of inter- 
consumer (price) discrimination. In these cases the criteria for 
considering the relative merits of the proposed pricing system will 
have to be more qualitative in nature and will be related to the port's 
objectives. 
It will also be convenient in assessing the desirability of alternative 
pricing systems to choose one system from which the others can be 
compared. The system chosen will be average cost pricing. Thus any 
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alternative will be considered to be better than average cost pricing 
if it places the consumer on a higher indifference curve. 
The framework for analysing the problem when considering heterogeneous, 
consumers will be the standard partial equilibrium analysis [2]. The 
analysis in the case of the single or "n" homogeneous consumers will 
be conducted in both partial equilibrium and commodity space; the 
analysis in commodity space requiring a preliminary explanation. 
The transformation or production possibility curve (PPC) is interpreted 
as a total cost curve (fig 3.1(b)) and the consumer's price-consumption 
curve or single price offer curve (SPOC) as a total revenue curve 
(assuming that the port can only charge a single price (fig 3.1(a)). 
The vertical axis is labelled money (the numeraire or all other goods) 
and the horizontal axis, X, the good or service with which the analysis 
is concerned. 
Money (a) 
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Thus, in fig 3.1(a) (where the quantities in (a) correspond to the 
quantities in (b)) given a single price of P2 for X, consumers will 
maximise their utility by consuming OQ1 units of X, for which they are 
willing to pay AD units of money. Similarly, BE and CF represent the 
total amount that they are willing to pay for outputs OQ2 and OQ3 
given the single prices P2 and P3 respectively. Thus to the consumer 
this represents a total expenditure curve and to the producer, it is a 
total revenue curve, both being measured downwards from M. In fig. 
3.1(b), if OQ1 is produced then society will have to give up AD' units 
of money. Similarly, if OQ2 and OQ3 units of X are produced then 
society will have to give up BE' and CF' units of money respectively. 
Thus, the PPC is also the total cost curve, measured downwards from M. 
Three cases, relating to the consumer's willingness to pay for any 
particular level of output can be distinguished.. Given that consumers 
are free to purchase any quantity at a single price, fig 3.2 shows the 
offer curves that demonstrate these-cases. With SPOC2, there is only 
0 
Total 
Cost/ 
Revenue 
Real 
Income 
0' 
fig 3.2 Single Price Offer Curves and Willingness to Pay 
X 
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one price (equal to average cost, AC2) where total cost (TC) equals 
total revenue (TR), whilst with SPOCl, there is a range of prices 
between P1 and P2 (corresponding to AC1 and AC2 respectively) for which 
an accounting requirement (including an excess profit) is met. However, 
in the case of SPOC3, there is no single price where TC = TR. The two 
cases of particular interest are associated with SPOC2 and SPOC3 as 
most of the conclusions from the analysis of SPOC2 apply to SPOCl. 
Thus, -the discussion will consider firstly, the case where there exists 
only one single price where total revenue equals total cost and 
secondly, the case where there is no single price such that this 
accounting requirement can be achieved. 
3.2 : Homogeneous- Consumers 
Case I-A Single Price such that Total Revenue = Total Cost 
3.2.1 Marginal and Average Cost Pricing 
A comparison of marginal and average cost pricing under conditions of 
decreasing costs is shown in fig 3.3. In fig. 3.3(a), the SPOC and TC 
curves are derived as in section 3.1. The single price, p*, at which 
total cost equals total revenue is found from the average cost at 
output level Ql, where the SPOC is tangential to the TC curve (point A). 
This corresponds to point A' in fig 3.3(b). At this level of output, 
the marginal cost (slope of the TC curve) is MCQl. Assuming that the 
consumers' real income is unaffected by any deficit incurred by the 
port, the consumer's equilibrium with a price equal to MCQ1 is at E 
(E' in (b)). Thus, by setting price equal to marginal cost the 
consumers' welfare increases from 11 to 12 and excess capacity. to the 
extent of Q1Q2 is utilised. Consumers' welfare can be further 
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increased by charging the marginal cost at output Q2. After further 
iterations final equilibrium is reached at F (F' in (b)) where MCQ3 
equals the consumers' MRS and the level of welfare increases to 1 3. 
At an output level Q1, marginal cost pricing would recover a total 
revenue equal to AB or Q1L (Q1L' x Q1 in (b)) which would lead to a 
deficit of Q1 B, LA or OC (A'L' x Q1 in (b)1 Similarly, at the'final 
equilibrium output level Q3, marginal cost pricing would yield a 
revenue of Q3F or KJ (Q3F'xrQ3 in (b)) and the deficit would be 
Q3 J, FK or OG (F'K' x Q3 in (b)). 
Thus, whilst welfare is maximised with marginal cost pricing, under 
the assumptions of this model the requirement that TR = TC is not met. 
Fig 3.3 indicates however that there is a considerable surplus 
accruing to consumers [3j and the following pricing systems will 
attempt to outline methods by which this surplus could be extracted. 
3.2.2 Two-part Tariffs 
The usual meaning of a two-part tariff is that it consists of one 
charge which is made irrespective of the quantity consumed and a 
second charge which is levied per unit of the good or service consumed. 
One example of a two-part tariff is where the consumer pays a lump-sum 
regardless of the quantity of the service consumed, entitling him to 
pay the marginal cost for the usage of the facilities which he 
consumes. Fig 3.4 illustrates this example and compares it with 
average cost pricing. Average cost pricing meets an-accounting require- 
ment at output level Q1, the corresponding point on the TC curve being 
A. The alternative two-part tariff at this level of output is to 
charge a lump sum of OY2 (which effectively reduces the consumers real 
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income to O'Y2) then the marginal cost at Ql for each unit of X 
consumed. With this system, the consumers' equilibrium is on 
indifference curve 13 at point C compared with average cost pricing 
0 
Total 
Cost 
. If 
Real 
Income 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
1 
fig 3.4 Two-part Tariffs 
where equilibrium is at point A on Il. Thus this two-part tariff is 
"better than" average cost pricing as it leads to an increase in 
TC 
X 
welfare from I1 to 13, utilizes some excess capacity (to the extent of 
Q1Q3) and implies that total revenue (Q3C) exceeds total cost (Q3G). 
Given that the producer only requires that total revenue equals total 
cost , the final equilibrium will be at E (on I4) where marginal 
benefit is equal to marginal cost (that is, 14 is tangential to TC or 
MRS = MRT). For this final equilibrium, a lump sum of OY3 is charged 
followed by marginal cost (at output level Q4) for each unit of X 
consumed. 
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A second example of a two-part tariff is based on the accountant's 
concept of overhead and prime costs. In this case, the consumer is 
charged a lump-sum equal to the overhead costs (costs which in the 
short-run do not vary with the level of output) - OYl, in fig 3.4 - 
then average variable costs (AVC, or average prime costs) for each 
unit consumed. Whilst this system is superior to average cost 
pricing, it is inferior to lump-sum plus marginal cost pricing. 
Having paid the lump-sum OY1 and faced with AVC, consumers will 
maximise their welfare at B where they consume OQ2 units of X. Thus 
this system leads to an increase in welfare from Il to I2, utilizes 
some excess capacity (Q1Q2) and also implies that total revenue 
exceeds total cost. Subject to the constraint that total revenue 
equals total cost, the final equilibrium will lie between Q2 and Q4, 
at which point MRS > MRT (as is the case with average cost pricing). 
The level of output produced under the lump-sum plus marginal cost 
compared with that under marginal cost only, will depend upon the 
income effect. In fig 3.4, the income effect is shown to be positive. 
and thus marginal cost only would lead to a greater output. 
3.2.3 Block and Multi-part Tariffs 
A further extension of the two-part tariff is to practice intra- 
consumer discrimination by the introduction of a block or multi-part 
tariff. This type of tariff discriminates amongst consumers according 
to the quantity which they consume. In its simplest form, it consists 
of a price per unit for the first block of output, then a follow-on 
rate for all subsequent units consumed . In its more complex form, 
there will be several blocks with price per unit declining as the 
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consumer moves between blocks. 
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fig 3.5 Limits for a Two Block Tariff given that Total Revenue = Total 
Cost 
There are numerous ways in which such a system can be applied; thus, at 
present, only the limits of a.. two-block tariff will be considered. 
The lump-sum plus marginal cost two-cart tariff represents one extreme 
of a two-block tariff. In this case, the first block is the first unit, 
for which the consumer pays the lump-sum. The second block consists of 
a price per unit equal to marginal cost. ' Point E in fig 3.5 shows the 
final equilibrium for this two-part tariff, the corresponding lump-sum 
being OY and the marginal cost is that at output Q5. 
The other extreme of a two-block tariff is to charge the price equal to p2 
for the first OQ4 units consumed, then marginal cost (at an output of 
Q5) thereafter. Price p2 is ascertained (in principle) by drawing a 
price line from 0, tangential to the indifference curve 12 on which E 
lies. Since the consumer is indifferent between consuming at C or E it 
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is not clear whether he will choose output Q3 or Q5. If, however, a 
price slightly greater than p2 is charged for a block which is slightly 
less than Q4, followed by marginal cost (at an output of Q5) the 
consumer will be able to increase his welfare to 12 by moving to E. 
In between these two extremes, numerous two-block tariffs can be 
devised whereby a price, p, which lies in the range, 
" p2 <p< lump-sum 
can be charged for the first block with a follow-on price equal to 
marginal cost. The size of the first block corresponding to that level 
of output where the price line from 0 intersects the marginal cost 
line (YE). For example the port could charge price pl (equal to the 
only price at which TR = TC) for a block equal to 0Q2 units of X, 
followed by a price equal to marginal cost at output Q5. 
This system can be extended to a multi-part tariff where there are 
several blocks for which different prices (declining with output) are 
charged such that price equals marginal cost in the last block. For 
example, 
0 
0 
fig 3.6 Multi-part Tariff 
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fig 3.6 shows a three part tariff where price pl is charged for the 
first OQ1 units-f price p2 for all units consumed between Q1 and Q2 then 
price equal to marginal cost for all units in excess of Q 2. The 
consumers' final equilibrium will be at C as movement from A to B to C 
leads the consumer to successively higher welfare levels. Thus, the 
multi-part tariff is "better than" average cost pricing as again it 
leads to an increase in welfare from Il to I2, utilises some excess 
capacity and meets the accounting requirement that TR = TC. 
There are numerous variations on this basic principle. Bennathan and 
Walters [4], for example, suggest three such systems: Lease-a-Quay 
(LAQ); Annual fee to enter (AFTE) and Shippers' license to use the port 
(LUP). At one extreme, with the LAQ system, the port leases a berth or 
quay to the user at a fixed rental regardless of the traffic volume. 
Thus, the marginal cost to the user is zero. The system may at the 
other extreme incorporate a volume related charge. Under the AFTE 
system the shipowner pays an annual fee,. which entitles him to use the 
port's facilities for a low nominal fee which could approach zero if 
there is excess capacity. The LUP is similar to AFTE but applicable 
to shippers who regularly use the port. 
Several other versions of the multi-part tariff which may or may not 
meet the requirement that marginal cost is paid for the last unit 
consumed are shown in fig 3.7. In fig 3.7(a) a rate a is charged for 
the first x1 units consumed, a lower rate (which may be expressed as a 
percentage reduction on a) for the next x2 -x1 units and an even 
lower rate for units in excess of x2. Whilst such a system may be 
"worse than"-the multi-part tariff in fig 3.6 (marginal cost is not 
charged for the last unit consumed) it can be designed so that it is 
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X 
"better than" average cost pricing. For example, if a in fig 3.7(a) 
was average cost then consumers' welfare can be increased from Il to 12 
and some excess capacity can be utilized by changing to this tariff. 
In fig.. 3.7(b), a rate a is charged for all units consumed, with rebates 
being given once the user has consumed x1 and x2 units. If a is average 
cost, then this system can also improve the consumers' welfare from Il 
to 12. A further variation on this system is to have the rate declining 
as the consumer moves between blocks. In fig 3.7(c) a rate a is 
charged for units in the blocks Oxl, x2x3 and greater than x4 with 
X 
2 
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Xi x, 
"free entries" to the extent of x1x2 and x3x4 after x1 and x3 entries 
have been made respectively. This tariff can be designed to improve 
consumers' welfare from Il to 12 and the rate can decrease as the 
consumer moves between blocks. 
Thus, multi-part tariffs can be designed so that they are "better 
than" average cost pricing but "worse than" the multi-part tariff 
where marginal cost is being paid for the last unit consumed. 
3.3 Homogeneous Consumers 
Case II- No Single Price such that Total Revenue = Total Cost 
In the case which has been considered above, the accounting requirement 
that total revenue equals total cost has been achieved by extracting 
part of the compensating. variation. It was further indicated when 
comparing average cost with a lump-sum plus marginal cost that an. 
additional compensating variation could be extracted from the consumers 
.40 wo1 
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W 
fig 3.8 Extracting compensating variation 
(where "compensating variation" is defined as "the-amount of 
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Qx 
compensation paid or received, that will leave the consumer in his 
initial welfare position following the change in price if he is free to 
buy any quantity of the commodity at the new price. " [51). Thus, in 
fig 3.8 the compensating variation, following a price change from P1 = 
AC to P2 = MC, is equal to OY2, whilst the lump-sum is the lesser 
amount equal to OYl. 
Thus, the port authority could have charged a lump-sum equal to the 
compensating variation then marginal cost at A. This would have left 
the consumer on the same indifference curve as with average cost 
pricing, some excess capacity will have been utilized and an excess 
-profit will-have been made. 
The observation that this compensating variation exceeds the lump-sum 
(from case I) can be employed in an attempt to meet the accounting 
requirement in the case where there is no single price at which this 
can be achieved. 
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In fig 3.9, a price which minimises the producers' total loss, AB, has 
been chosen as the reference pricing system. Indifference curve I1 
(passing through A) is also (fortuitously) tangential to the total cost 
curve at C. Thus, in this example, it would be possible for the port 
to meet an accounting requirement by extracting all of the compensating 
variation, OY, in the form of a lump-sum payment, -then to charge the 
marginal cost at Q2 for each unit consumed. Indifference curve Il 
could have fallen below TC, in which case, the port could have 
extracted a revenue greater than the total cost. Alternatively it may 
lie above TC, in which case the port would still not meet the accounting 
requirement, however total revenue would have been greater than it would 
have been with a single price. 
In general the maximum possible amount that the port can extract from 
the user is found from the indifference curve passing through 0. The 
slope of this curve yielding Gabor's "exploitation possibility (EP) 
curve" [6] or the Hicksian compensated demand curve [3]. 
In fig 3.10(a) the relevant indifference curve is Io. The consumer is 
faced with an "all or nothing" choice of varying quantities of X or no 
X. The vertical distance downwards from the OX axis to I* then 0 
represents the absolute maximum amount that consumers are willing to 
pay. For example, at output level Q* consumers are willing to pay Q*B 
for X rather than go without it. Thus, in fig 3.10, the port could 
charge a lump-sum equal to OY then marginal cost or use a block tariff 
with Po as the minimum price for a block OQ1 followed by marginal cost. 
Thus, even in the case where there is no single price such that total 
revenue equals total cost it may be possible by using a two- or multi- 
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part tariff to meet this accounting requirementt, -`Such systems can be 
designed to be efficient (in the sense that the marginal condition 
that MRT = MRS is not violated) as long as the consumer pays marginal 
cost for the last unit consumed. In other words, the consumers' 
surplus is extracted without violating the marginal conditions. 
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3.4 Heterogeneous Consumers 
3.4.1 Perfect Price'Discrimination 
The block tariffs which have been discussed above are examples of 
quantity discrimination. In its limiting case, where the blocks 
consist of single units this becomes perfect price discrimination which 
is pareto optimal for a single or "fl" homogeneous consumers. In the 
case where there are a large number of heterogeneous consumers perfect 
price discrimination is similarly pareto optimal. This can be 
demonstrated by considering two consumers who constitute total demand 
(fig 3.11). The total demand curve is simply the horizontal summation 
Price 
A p =MR x+y 
MC 
B 
0 
E_ . _. y 
- FG 
0 Qy Quantity 0 
Consumer Y 
Qx+y Quanta 
Total Demand 
fig 3.11 Perfect Price Discrimination 
of the individual demand curves and given perfect price discrimination 
and no income effects, the demand curves are also the marginal revenue 
curves. Setting price equal to marginal cost, equal to aggregate 
marginal revenue (Total Demand Diagram), then for the last unit both X 
and Y pay marginal cost. The difference however is that X pays OA for 
the first unit then a price declining to OB (equal to marginal cost) 
for the QXth unit whilst Y pays OE for the first unit then a price 
declining to OF (also equal to marginal cost) for the QY 
th 
unit. 
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QX Quantity 
Consumer X 
In order to apply such a system when there are a large number of 
heterogeneous consumers involves the problem of ascertaining how much 
every consumer is willing to pay for each unit that they consume. It 
is. -highly improbable that this task could be satisfactorily attempted 
and thus the port must resort to various proxies for willingness to 
pay or simplification by grouping consumers into market segments with 
similar price elasticities of demand. The result is a system of 
imperfect price discrimination which by its very nature is pareto 
sub-optimal. 
3.4.2 Imperfect Price Discrimination 
Price discrimination is usually interpreted as being the act of selling 
the same commodity, produced under single control, at different prices 
to different buyers. Three conditions are required for it to take 
place. Firstly the goods bought on the cheaper market cannot be 
resold in the dearer market, secondly consumers cannot transfer them- 
selves between markets and thirdly the price elasticities are 
different in each market. The_principle__involved can be demonstrated 
by considering consumer X. and consumer Y in the previous example. In 
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fig 3.12 Imperfect Price Discrimination 
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this case, price discrimination is not practical inside the sub-market 
so that the marginal revenue and demand curves do not coincide. The 
firm will then maximise its profits by producing that total level of 
output where marginal cost equals aggregate marginal revenue (QT), 
selling Qx in market X and Qy in market Y (both determined by the 
point where respective marginal revenues equal aggregate marginal cost) 
and charging separate single prices in each market (deterthined by the 
elasticities in each market at their respective output levels). As 
described, this system would lead to the same output as would be 
produced by the simple monopolist who would charge the same price, 
equal to PS, in both markets. However, by redistributing his output 
from market X to market Y the simple monopolist can increase his total 
revenue. Since total revenue is equal to the area under the marginal 
revenue curve up to the output which is being produced the increase in 
total revenue leads to the marginal revenue curve shifting upwards. 
Similarly, since total revenue is also equal to average revenue times 
the output being produced, the demand curve will also shift upwards. 
P 
MC 
Qs QI QP 
fig 3.13 Price Discrimination 
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Setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue, the firm practising 
imperfect price discrimination will produce more than the simple mono- 
polist. However, it is sub-optimal compared with perfect price discrim- 
ination as firstly output is less and secondly those consumers in each 
sub-market willing to pay marginal cost will not be supplied. 
3.4.3 Full-Cost Pricing 
There are several versions of full-cost pricing, however the basic 
principle applied is that: 
P= AVC + AFC + Profit margin 
where: Pw= price 
AVC = average variable cost 
AFC = average fixed cost. 
k 
Proponents of the model submit three main points in its favour. 
Firstly, it is argued that demand cannot be estimated with the certainty 
required by marginalists. Secondly, it is observed that prices are 
"sticky" in the trade cycle, reflecting the firm's goal of long-run 
profit maximisation (as distinct from the fluctuating prices which 
would be the result of the application of the short-run profit maximi- 
sing objective of the marginalists). Thirdly, empirical evidence 
suggests that the firm's AVC curve is constant over the relevant output 
range (and thus coincides with the SRMC curve). 
Following Koutsoyiannis [71 it can be demonstrated that full-cost 
pricing is consistent with marginalism and implicitly involves the 
estimation of long-run price elasticities [8]. 
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For profit maximisation 
MC=MR 
Given a downward sloping demand curve 
MR=P11-nJ 
given also that 
MC = AVC 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
then, substituting (2) and (3) into (1) and rearranging 
P= AVC[1 n 
11 
(4) 
where: n= long-run price elasticity of demand (Inl > 1) 
Now, the full cost principle is usually applied in the form 
P= AVC (1 + a) (5) 
r 
where: a= mark-up to cover fixed costs and profit (a > 0) 
Thus, from (4) and (5) 
(1 + a) _ 
ýn n1J (6) 
or nt_ 
rl +aj (7) 
a J 
In other words, if a constant mark-up is used for all consumers, the 
pricing system is implicitly assuming that the long-run price. Lelastici- 
ties of demand are the same for all consumers. 
This method of pricing contains a fixed cost element in the price for a 
marginal unit and is thus inferior to a system based on marginal cost for 
the last unit consumed. 
Whether the system is "better than" average cost pricing is difficult 
to establish. For example, the cargo handling schedule at Liverpool 
uses full cost pricing whereby there is a constant mark-up on the AVC's 
of handling the separate commodities or groups of commodities. Whether 
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this system is "better than" average cost pricing depends upon firstly, 
the extent to which average fixed costs are related to average variable 
costs and secondly, the implied elasticity assumptions of the two 
systems. Fig. 3.14 shows a hypothetical mapping of AVC onto the 
commodity (for example, if commodity B has an average variable cost of 
AVCB - and therefore price of AVCB(1 + a) - then it maps the 
corresponding points on the vertical axis to B on the horizontal axis). 
P, AVC P=AVC(1 + a) 
(Constant long-run 
elasticity) 
pA ------------- 
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fig 3.14 Average Variable Costs and Commodities 
C represents that (imaginary) commodity which all prices would map to 
if average cost pricing was used by the port. 
If it could be demonstrated that average fixed costs are directly 
proportional to average variable costs (in a causal sense) then full 
cost pricing may be "better than" average cost pricing in the sense 
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that the commodities which impose the higher long-run costs are 
required to pay these costs. Thus, in fig 3.14, B pays a rate lower 
than E and A pays a higher rate. On the other hand, if the line 
P= AVC(l + a) is a constant long-run elasticity curve, then average 
cost pricing assumes that commodities with a less than average AVC have 
a greater ability to pay (lower elasticity) than commodities with a 
greater than average AVC (which conversely have a lesser ability to pay 
or higher elasticity). Thus, if the fixed costs were joint (where the 
traffic is required to pay jointly) and AVC was directly related to 
elasticity then average cost pricing would'be"'less distortionary than 
full-cost pricing. 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The objective of this Chapter has been to investigate alternative 
pricing systems which attempt to recover total cost without distorting 
the marginal conditions. 
The spectrum of traffic demanding port services, according to 
frequency of service and trade volume, ranges from the regular users 
(for example, shipping lines, liner conferences, port based industrial' 
users and other charterers) to the one-off user. It has been demon- 
strated that, in principle, the frequent user can be resolved with some 
form of block tariff. This type of pricing system can, in the circum- 
stances discussed above, meet the objective by extracting consumers' 
surplus and simultaneously charging marginal cost for-the last unit 
consumed. The surplus being extracted with either a lump-sum payment 
or by charging a rate per unit consumed for one or more blocks (with 
the rate decreasing to marginal cost as the consumer moves between 
blocks). 
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In the one-off user case, it is much more difficult to devise a pricing 
system which meets these objectives. For this case, the three basic 
systems, average cost, full-cost and price discrimination have been 
discussed. Whilst it may be possible to design these systems to meet 
the accounting requirement, they invariably imply that the marginal 
conditions are not met. Ruggles [9] however suggests that: 
"Demand curves are not smooth and continuous and single 
valued; they contain many discontinuities, and there 
are many products for which demand is almost perfectly 
inelastic within the relvant range. Taking advantage of 
such discontinuities and inelasticities, the construction 
of workable systems of price discrimination which will 
not violate the marginal conditions is quite feasible. " 
In the port case, the one-off user may have these demand characteristics 
in the short-run. This could, for example, arise if the port had a 
spatial monopoly. In the longer-run, however, demand may become more 
elastic and the marginal conditions may not be met. 
One alternative is to adopt short-run marginal cost pricing for these 
users, so that when excess capacity exists they are charged a low rate 
and when congestion exists a higher rate. Depending upon the extent 
of excess capacity, such a system may meet an accounting requirement, 
however, in the case of Liverpool this is unlikely. If the system 
was adopted in conjunction with a block tariff for the frequent users, 
then with excess capacity, these users may prefer to claim that they 
are one-off users every time they enter the port. Thus, any system 
which is designed must maintain "equity" between the frequent and one- 
off users. This could include a system which covers at least the long- 
run escapable costs of accepting these traffics and which makes some 
contribution towards the port's joint and fixed costs. 
If it can be demonstrated that the one-off user only represents a 
73. 
small proportion of the port's traffic, then, assuming equal weighting 
of gains and losses, the aggregate distortionary effects of average 
cost, full cost and price discrimination may be small in relation to 
the total traffic.:. 
In practice, the implementation of a block tariff may be more difficult 
than the above analysis suggests. This arises firstly because each 
frequent user may be shipping different volumes through the port and 
secondly because many of the costs which the port is attempting to 
recover may be joint to several traffics. Under these circumstances 
an "inappropriate" choice of lump-sum or block rates and structure may 
be considered "inequitable" by port users (Port authorities in Great 
Britain usually being "prohibited by statute from discriminating 
between users in like circumstances as far-as their principal charges 
are concerned"-- Rochdale [10] ). One interpretation of "inequitable" 
could be that more surplus is extracted (in relative terms) from some 
users than others. For example, fig 3.15 shows two consumers with 
identical preference maps whereby all of consumer I's surplus is 
removed with LSI but only part of consumer II's surplus is removed 
with LS II* 
Thus, the block tariff must be seen to be. "equitable" in this respect. 
Given that the users may be shipping different volumes this may also 
require that different lump sums or blocks are devised for each user. 
The alternative is to have a system similar to the United Kingdom 
light dues where, for example, coastal vessels pay for their first 14 
entries and are then exempt from paying for all subsequent entries 
during the year. Such a system may again appear "inequitable" 
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fig 3.15 Consumers with Identical Preference Maps and different 
Lump-sum Payments 
between users if applied to the port case. 
The above discussion has considered cost in general terms, however 
more specifically, it will be the escapable; cost which is relevant to 
the pricing system adopted. Thus, it will be necessary to investigate 
these costs before considering further development of alternative 
pricing systems. 
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[1] HMSO, "The Nationalised Industries", Cmnd 7131, para 54. 
[2] For example, Ko: Lýtsoyiannis, A., "Modern Microeconomics" Macmillan, 
1979. 
[3] There are various measures of consumers' surplus including 
compensating variation, compensating surplus, equivalent; variation, 
equivalent surplus and t aMarshallian "extra expenditure" (Currie 
J. M. et al "The Concept of Economic Surplus and its. use in 
Economic Analysis", Economic Journal, December 1971, pp 741-799. ) 
The measure that will be used in the above analysis is compensating 
variation. This is defined as "the amount of compensation paid 
or received, that will leave the consumer in his initial welfare 
position [that is, on the same indifference curve] following the 
change in price if he is free to buy any quantity of the 
commodity at the new price". The main difference between; this 
measure and the Marshallian measure of the area under the ordinary 
demand curve is that the Marshallian measure assumes constant 
marginal utility of money and thus constrains the consumer to buy. 
the quantity associated with the new price. 
In the figure below, OA represents the consumer's income. At a 
price greater than or equal to Po no X is consumed. If price is 
lowered to Pl the consumer's new equilibrium will include 
consuming OD units of X. By considering all such price changes 
and equilibria, the ordinary demand curve is generated. The 
Hicksian Compensated Demand Curve is derived by adjusting the 
consumer's income after each of these price changes so that the 
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consumer remains on Io. Thus the Hicksian curve shows the slope 
of 10 at each quantity of X. The amount AB represents the 
compensating variation (the amount the consumer would 
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fig 3.16 Demand Curves 
DX 
have to pay to stay on his initial indifference curve) and measures 
the welfare effect on the consumer of the price change. An alternative 
measure is the triangular area P0P1F. This arises because the 
compensated curve is the marginal curve to 10. The amount the 
consumer would be willing to pay for OC of X rather than go without it 
is RT, and RT is equal to the area under the HCDC between 0 and C, 
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that is OPö C. The consumer actually pays RS which is equal to 
OP1FC. The difference of ST (= AB or compensating variation) is 
therefore equal to. the area P0P1Fi(that is, OP FC C- OP1FC). 
Thus, the welfare effect of the price change can be measured by 
AB or the area Po P1F under the HCDC. 
If one is considering the welfare effect of a change in an 
existing pricing structure then, if compensation has already been 
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paid then a_. new HCDC is constructed starting from R and the 
welfare effect is measured by 0FGP1 or AB (in fig 3.17). 
[4 J_ Bennathan, E. and Walters, A. A., "Port Pricing and Investment 
Policy", O. U. P., 1979. 
[5] Currie, J. M., [3]. 
[6] Gabor, A., "A Note on Block Tariffs", Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol 23,1955, pp 32-41. 
[7] Koutsoyiannis, [2] p 279. 
[8] Layard, P. R. G. and Walters, A. A., "Microeconomic Theory", McGraw- 
Hill,. 1978, p 262. 
In the short-run, the price elasticity of demand for a factor of 
production (port services) can be quite low. However in the 
longer run, substitution can occur (for example, using other 
ports, making fewer port calls by using larger ships or reducing 
the number of ports in an itinerary) so that the elasticities will 
have larger absolute values. 
[g] Ruggles, N., "Recent developments in the theory of marginal cost 
pricing", Review of Economic Studies, Vol 17, (1949-50). 
[101 Rochdale, Viscount, "Committee of Inquiry into the Major Ports of 
Great Britain", cmnd 1824, HMSO 1967, para 196. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PORT COSTS AND TRAFFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
4.1 Introduction 
The broad conclusion of the criticisms of the current pricing 
practices of ports (Chapter 1) was that prices bear "no necessary 
relationship to either the average or the marginal costs (short or 
long period)" (Goss [1]). The Chapter also indicated that the relevant 
measure of cost is escapable cost. Before discussing the measurement 
of these escapable costs it is necessary to consider firstly the 
facilities provided by the port and the costs incurred in their 
provision and secondly the characteristics of the traffic and the 
costs which they impose on the port. Thus, this chapter will be 
divided into two parts, part I suggesting possible relationships 
between facilities and costs, and part II considering traffic charac- 
teristics, costs and demand. For the purposes of exposition, the port's 
services will be divided into the four areas: conservancy, docks and 
berth, cargo handling and the shore infrastructure and superstructure. 
I FACILITIES AND COSTS 
4.2 Conservancy 
4.2.1 Entrance Channels 
(a) Capital: The amount of capital dredging which the port will be 
required to undertake will be related to any geographical advantage 
which it may have, some measure of vessel size and a measure of the 
manoeuvrability of those vessels. The vessel dimension which will be 
of major importance will be draft. However the vessel's beam, length, 
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manoeuvrability and whether the port will accept both incoming and 
outgoing vessels at the same time will affect both the width and 
curvature of the channel. 
(b) Maintenance: - The amount of maintenance dredging required will 
depend upon the "natural depth" of the channel, the rate of siltation, 
the effects of capital dredging and training walls constructed by the 
port and any additional siltation created by larger and faster vessels. 
These factors form part of the very complex relationships which exist 
in tidal waterways. For example, Price and Kendrick [2] when invest- 
igating siltation in the Mersey Estuary stated in 1963 that; 
"It seems likely that the persistence of poor conditions 
on Bromborough Bar since 1953 might well be due to the 
excessively high dredging rate..... The M. S. C. C. were 
advised to consider the possibility of discontinuing, 
or at least severely limiting, the dredging on 
Bromborough Bar for an experimental period in order 
. to see whether better conditions return naturally. " 
In order to ascertain whether dredging costs are related to draft it 
would be necessary to know a "natural depth" of the channel, the present 
depth, the rate of siltation and the relationship between the resource 
cost of dredging and the depth at which this dredging is undertaken. 
if the rate of siltation is constant and dredging costs are not related 
to depth, then in the long-run, the cost of "holding" the channel at 
any depth is joint to all traffic requiring more water than the 
natural depth. If, on the other hand, the rate of siltation is 
constant or increasing and cost increases with depth, or the rate of 
siltation increases with depth and cost increases, then in the long-run 
maintenance costs will be related to vessel draft. 
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4.2.2 Training Walls 
(a) Capital: Whether training walls are required or not will depend 
upon the stability of the river bed and the scouring effect which they 
maintain. To the extent that they maintain the stability of the 
channel, the costs incurred can be said to be joint. to all vessels. If 
on the other hand, they improve the channel's scouring effect one will 
have to consider the trade-offs between the cost of the training wall 
and changes in the level of maintenance dredging required. 
(b) Maintenance: Expenditure on the maintenance of a training wall will 
in all probability be capital in nature and thus subject to a similar 
treatment. For example when considering the trade-off between 
maintenance dredging and a training wall, its maintenance over time 
would also be required to be taken into account. 
4.2.3 Surveying and Charting 
This will also depend upon the stability of the river bed, that. is, if 
it is stable,. -then it will not be required to be surveyed very often. 
The utilization of the river will also be an important factor. If 
vessels are not using part of the river then surveys need not be as 
frequent as if it is being used. Similarly if only one particular 
traffic is using a section of the river, then the cost of surveying with 
that traffic less the normal surveying without any traffic can be 
directly allocated to that traffic. 
4.2.4 Navigation Aids 
The hypothesis submitted in the case of navigational aids is that the 
benefit gained from them is subject to diminishing returns as the 
standard. supplied increases. Furthermore, the level at which diminish- 
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ing returns "set-in" varies with traffic type and density. 
The benefits of navigational aids will accrue in the first round to 
both the vessel and the port. Thus it is in the interests of both 
parties that certain minimum standards are attained. 
In general, it is suggested that the standard of navigational aids 
required by the vessel will depend upon: firstly, the nature of the 
approach channel - the "more dangerous" the channel, the higher the 
standard required.; secondly, the expected visibility at the port - if, 
for example, the port is affected by fog, then a higher standard will 
be required; thirdly, the rate of flow of the tide - the faster the 
rate, the more difficult it will be to correct a navigational error, 
and therefore the higher the standard required.; fourthly, the size of 
the channel and the existence of navigable water outside the channel - 
if the channel is not very wide, and there is a lack of navigable 
water outside. it, then a higher standard will be required;. fifthly, 
the traffic density -the higher the traffic density, the higher the 
standard required.; sixthly, the value of the vessel and cargo - the 
greater the value of the vessel and/or cargo the higher the absolute 
cost of loss, thus the standard required will be higher. One may 
further suggest that a low standard of aids would mean that the vessel 
will enter port at a slower speed and thus impose a cost of delay which 
will be higher for the more valuable vessels and cargoes. 
On the other hand, the standard required by the port will depend upon: 
firstly, the consequences of an accident resulting from an insufficient 
provision of navigational aids, for example, the port being closed by 
a vessel obstructing the channel, or the pollution risk from a collision 
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or vessel running aground; secondly, the increased berth productivity 
as a result of a vessel being able to enter the port at all states of 
the tide and time of day; thirdly the increased attractiveness of the 
port to shipowners. 
In order to ascertain the costs imposed on the port by each traffic, 
it would be necessary to ascertain the minimum requirements of each 
traffic. Subjectively, one may state that the standard required by 
small coasters is lower than that required by VLCCs. In addition, the 
interaction between vessels would have to be taken into account as 
traffic density increases. 
4.2.5 Contingencies 
This service relates to the provision by the port of various facilities 
for the purposes of salvage; raising, removal or destruction of wrecks; 
and obstructions. and pollution control. The level at which these 
facilities are required to be provided depends upon: firstly, the poten- 
tial for the vessel to affect the port as a commercial concern- (for 
example, a vessel sinking in mid=channel effectively closing the port) 
and secondly; the potential of the vessel, sto'pollute the port. 
A priori, one may state thats firstly the equipment necessary to control 
an oil spill from a coaster would be less than that required for a VLCC; 
secondly, the salvage equipment for a coaster would be less than that 
required for a foreign-going general cargo vessel; and thirdly, the 
facilities required to remove a wrecked coaster would be less than that 
for a foreign-going general cargo vessel. Thus it would appear to be 
vessel type and size which are the main determining factors in this case. 
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4.3 Docks and Berth: 
4.3.1 Locks 
(a) Capital: This is also related to the geographical advantage which 
the port may have, for example, a port without a large tidal range may 
not require an enclosed dock system. The lock itself will have the 
dimensions of length, breadth and sill depth, and the material with:!. 
which it is constructed. Its method of construction will impart 
various strengths to it. Thus, the cost of the lock will depend. upon 
the vessel characteristics of draft (depth of sill), beam (width of 
lock), length (length of lock) and displacement (the strength of the 
lock walls) as well as any tidal restrictions in the port. Furthermore, 
the size of the lock will be affected by the number of vessels wishing 
to gain access to the enclosed dock system. 
(b) Maintenance: A general comment which applies to the maintenance 
of all assets is that it can be required for four main reasons. These 
include maintenance required due to the passage of time (temporal), 
use of the asset (usage), accidents (stochastic) and legal requirements 
(statutory). Temporal and statutory maintenance.. may be required 
regardless of whether the asset is used. In addition to being related 
to traffic volume, usage and stochastic maintenance may be related to 
vessel size. It could, for example, be hypothesized that it is the 
vessels with greater displacement that cause more "wear and tear" on a 
given lock. 
4.3.2 Enclosed Dock Wall 
Apart from any geographical advantage (or disadvantage) that the port 
may have, the capital cost of the dock wall will depend upon the 
capacity and configuration of the docks and quays. The internal 
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figuration of the docks will in turn be affected by the traffic type 
and size. For example, vessel type may affect the berth layout, and 
vessel size will influence the manoeuvring area required. 
4.3.3 Quay Wall 
(a) Capital: The two characteristics of the wall which will need to 
be taken into account are length and strength. The length of vessel 
will determine its length, and the displacement of the vessel its 
strength. 
(b) Maintenance: Again, it is argued that it will be the-.. larger 
vessels with greater displacement which will tend to cause more "wear 
and tear" at a given berth. 
4.3.4 Dock 
Dredging and Surveying: Whether or not these services are required 
will depend upon whether there is siltation in the docks. If there is, 
then the considerations may be similar to those of maintenance 
dredging and surveying of the main channel. 
4.4 Cargo Handling' 
4.4.1 Dock Labour 
In the longer run, the cost of dock labour will, inter alia, depend upon 
the volume of traffic passing through the port, the commodity 
structure and the packaging of the cargo (including the ship). The 
extent to which different cargoes impose costs on the port being 
outlined below. 
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4.4.2--Cranes, Fork-lifts and Other Mobile Equipment 
(a) *Capital: The main characteristic of this type of equipment is its 
lifting capacity expressed in tonnes. Thus, it will be the "optimum 
size" of lift which will determine the capacity of the crane. For 
example, the optimum lift for pallets may be 1.5 tonnes (that is, two 
pallets at 750 kg each) whereas for copper it may be 5 tonnes. Thus 
one could ascertain the minimum level of facility (lifting capacity of 
the crane) for each commodity and allocate the costs accordingly. The 
level required would depend upon the stowage factor and method of 
presentation. 
(b) Operating Costs: Costs such as fuel and electricity will depend 
directly upon the particular traffic. 
Maintenance cost considerations will fall into the four categories 
discussed under lock maintenance. 
4.5 Shore Infrastructure and Superstructure 
4.5.1 Quay apron, open storage areas, vehicle holding yards and roads 
within the port 
(a) Capital: In general, there will be trade-offs between various 
factors when considering the surfacing. These include the land area 
required, the quality of the surfacing and the cargo handled. For break 
bulk, it will be the commodities with a high load concentration which 
will impose higher costs. This in turn will depend upon the density of 
the cargo (loosely defined as the reciprocal of the stowage factor). 
With container traffic, the quality of the surfacing in the holding area 
will need to be higher as stacking height increases. 
The costs incurred by the port in the provision of the road system will 
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depend upon the properties of the sub-soil, the axle load of the port's 
vehicles and the vehicles receiving and delivering cargo, and the 
traffic volume. The port will tend to construct those surfaces for 
maximum load conditions. However, the relative "damaging effect" 
would appear to increase as-the fourth power of the axle load (3]. 
Thus some incremental costs may be allocable to specific traffics. 
(b) Maintenance: Having designed the surfaces for maximum load 
conditions, maintenance will tend to be related to time (including 
weather conditions) and "unforeseen" faults in the subsoil. However 
traffic volume and axle loading will influence the life of the road 
system. 
4.5.2 Transit Sheds 
These are sheds constructed next to the berth so that cargo can be 
held for a short period of time prior to loading or delivery. Their 
construction will thus depend upon volume of each commodity, maximum 
floor loading, stacking height, time in transit and method of stowage 
in the transit shed (e. g. pallets may require more floor space than 
cartons in that the pallets will require access avenues). 
Maintenance costs will again fall under the four headings of temporal, 
usage, statutory and stochastic. 
4.5.3 Perimeter Fence 
This will be required for the general security of vessels and cargo and 
may be required by the Customs and Excise Authorities. 
Thus the level of security provided by the fence will depend upon local 
social attitudes towards property, the value or hazardous nature of 
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the commodities handled by the port and the standard required by the 
Authorities. 
4.5.4 Quay Lighting 
Lighting will be provided for three main purposes - general security, 
as required under the Factories Act, and for working cargo during the 
night. Thus this cost will depend upon the value or hazardous nature 
of the cargo, the time of day at which the cargo is worked, and the 
statutory requirements. 
II TRAFFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
4.6 Characteristics of Ships and Goods 
The above discussion has suggested that different characteristics of 
ships and goods could impose identifiable costs on the port. Traffics 
will also have characteristics which will affect their willingness to 
pay for the port's services and facilities, in other words, demand 
characteristics. In most cases, there is no clear line which disting- 
uishes these supply and demand characteristics, however broad 
distinctions will be attempted. 
Considering the port as being a transhipment point, then the major 
division of traffic is the ship and the goods. 
4.6.1 Characteristics of Ships 
The main characteristics of ships may be listed as follows: 
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(i) Physical dimensions: 
Length, Beam, Draft, Height, g. r. t., n. r. t., deadweight, 
displacement. 
(ii) Performance characteristics: 
Speed. 
Engine power (ahead and astern). 
(iii) Type of vessel: 
Tanker. 
Bulk and ore. 
Container. 
General cargo. 
Other specialist vessels. 
(47) Cargo handling equipment: 
Derricks, 
Cranes. 
(v) Loaded state: 
Loaded. 
Partly loaded. 
Light. 
In Ballast. 
(vi) Voyage length: 
Home Trade. 
Middle Trade. 
Foreign Going. 
(vii) Berth of area of destination within the port. 
(viii) Time for which the port's facilities are required (particularly 
when the port is congested). 
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(ix) Nature of visit: 
To lay-up vessel 
Bunkering. 
Drydocking. 
(x) Frequency of service. 
(xi) Value of vessel. 
;. (xii) Value of cargo. 
(xiii) Commercial characteristics: 
Shipowner with single user berth. 
Chartered vessel of major importer/exporter. 
Ship belonging to a liner-: conference. 
It could be argued that the main cost (', suppLy)determining character- 
istics of the vessel, particularly in the long-run, are the physical 
dimensions, performance characteristics, type of vessel, berth of 
destination, commercial characteristics and the time for which the 
port's facilities are required (particularly when congestion exists). 
In the long-run, it will be these characteristics which will determine 
the level of capacity provided by the port. On the other hand, the 
port's ability to discriminate amongst consumers will depend upon the 
price elasticity of demand of the services and facilities which it is 
providing. The higher the unit value of the cargo, the more easily 
a charge can be absorbed. Economies of ship size indicate that as 
size increases, the unit sea transport cost decreases. Thus there may 
be scope to discriminate on grounds of size and voyage length. The 
loaded state and nature of visit to the port are both cases where the 
vessel may have a lesser ability or willingness to pay. The prices 
of substitutes for a port's services will affect the port's long-run 
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elasticities, as will the elasticity of supply of the commodity 
shipped in the country of origin. (If the supply in that country is 
inelastic, then any increase in price will have a minimal effect on 
quantity demanded). 
It may however be the case that specification of a particular berth in 
the port automatically determines both the supply and demand character- 
istics of the vessel and cargo. For example, the berth description, - 
oil jetty that can only handle partly loaded VLCCs - broadly defines 
all of the characteristics listed above. In general, it is likely that 
most of these characteristics will be correlated. For example, for 
any particular vessel type, the physical dimensions will be correlated, 
Similarly, vessel size will be correlated with voyage length, value of 
vessel, time for which the port's facilities are required and frequency 
of service. Thus, whilst it is possible to identify various vessel 
characteristics, it is difficult to classify them as being solely 
supply or demand factors. 
4.6.2 Characteristics of Goods 
The main characteristics of goods may similarly be listed as follows: 
(i) Physical Dimensions: 
Length, Breadth, Depth, Volume, Weight (Stowage Factor). 
(ii) Size of individual units handled: 
Cartons, Cases. 
Drums, Barrels. 
Pallets. 
Containers. 
Barges. 
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(iii) Awkwardness of the unit (for example, steel constructional 
pieces). 
(iv) Special properties: 
Protection from the weather. 
Fragile. 
Secure and safe stowage. 
Hazardous cargo. 
Refrigerated cargo. 
Stacking height. 
"Dirty" cargoes. 
(v) Time for which service is required. 
(vi) Unit value. 
(vii) Size of consignment. 
(viii) Volume of trade flow in commodity. 
(ix) Origin/destination of the cargo. 
(x) Nature of transit through the port (forcexample, transhipped 
cargo). 
In building a model of relative prices in Conference Trades, Deakin [41 
included the supply-based factors of cargoes which were hazardous, 
valuable and required refrigerated or cool chamber stowage. The 
demand-based factors included unit value, size of consignment, 
magnitude of trade flows in the commodity and "certain qualities of the 
market or markets supplied in the areas of destination of the service". 
In general, it is the first five items which determine the costs 
incurred (particularly in the longer-run), by the port in providing 
services and facilities for goods. Weight will affect the surfacing, 
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the type of handling equipment required and the speed of transit 
through the port. Volume will affect the transit area/volume required 
and thus the size of the transit shed. The size of the unit (e. g. 
carton, pallet or container) will affect the method of handling. This 
in turn will affect the transit area/volume required, since, for 
example, pallets will require a larger operational area for the 
machines. However, it may be possible to stack them higher than 
cartons particularly if pallet racks are used. Cargoes requiring 
special treatment will ceteris paribus impose higher costs, for example 
shed storage will be required by cargoes requiring protection from the 
weather. Similarly, high value, bonded, hazardous and refrigerated 
cargoes will require special facilities which impose higher costs, The 
amount of time which the cargo will spend in the port before and after 
loading will impose an opportunity cost if the port is operating 
optimally or with congestion and thus will be an important consideration 
when these conditions exist. 
On the demand side, it will be the last five items in the list which are 
of importance, because they will influence the consumer's ability or 
willingness to pay. In addition, seasonal fluctuations, charges at 
other ports, supply elasticities in the market of origin and the size 
of the consignment are all important demand considerations. 
The distinction between the supply and demand characteristics for goods 
tend to be more clear cut than for ships. There will however be 
correlations. between unit value and special properties of the goods in 
that, ceteris paribus, the goods with special properties will tend to 
have higher unit values. Similarly it could be argued that large 
consignments cost less to handle (supply factor) but that a larger 
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shipper is more important to the port's revenue (demand factor). 
4.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to suggest possible relationships between 
facilities and costs. In most cases, they only have the status of 
hypotheses and would need to be investigated further by the port. 
However, they will be used in order to provide an input in later 
chapters. 
One noticeable feature of the discussion is that the suggested relation- 
ships tend to be longer-run in nature. In other words, they were the 
relationships which the port should have taken into account when 
considering investment in the asset. The only exception to this feature 
is the.: fuel cost of operating some of the port's equipment. In 
considering traffic characteristics, some additional items.. could be 
included in the exceptions. For example, labour may receive payments 
for handling certain types of commodities or congestion may impose 
costs on other users. Thus, it would appear that a large proportion of 
the port's costs are long-run in nature. 
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Notes 
(1] Goss, R. O., "Port Investment", in Munby (ed) "Transport", Penguin 
1968. 
[2] Price, W. A. and Kendrick, M. P. "Field and Model Investigations 
into the Reasons for Siltation in the Mersey Estuary", Proc. 
Instn. Civ. Engrs, vol 24, pp 473-518, April 1963. 
[3] Croney, D. "The Design and Performance of Road Pavements", 
EMSO, 1977. This paper quotes the result of American AASHO Road 
Test completed in 1962. This test found the number of passages 
of varying axle loads required to cause the same damage as one 
passage of a standard axle of 8160 kg (equivalence factor = 1). 
Regression analysis of these results suggest that, 
Rn (EF) = -35.81 + 3.97Ln (AL) 
(r2 = 0.999) 
where EF = equivalence factor (8160 kg = 1) 
AL = axle load (kg) 
For example, the passage of one vehicle of approximately double 
the standard axle load is equivalent to 15 passages of the 
standard axle. 
[4] Deakin, B. M. "Shipping Conferences", CUP, 1973. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MEASUREMENT OF ESCAPABLE COSTS - INTRODUCTION 
5.1 Introduction 
The discussion in previous chapters has indicated that the relevant 
cost for resource allocation purposes is the escapable cost. In this 
chapter, a general model for ascertaining these costs will be outlined. 
The next section investigates the extent to which escapable costs can 
be obtained from the port's published accounts. The remainder of the 
chapter will consider the basic methodology for measuring these costs 
including a discussion of the problems which may arise in the approach, 
with possible solutions being suggested. 
5.2 The Accountant's Approach to the Measurement of Marginal Cost 
The two main branches in the accounting profession are financial and 
cost accounting. The financial (traditional) accountant is concerned 
with the ex-post recording and presentation of money flows. In 
performing this function, the financial accountant adopts a number of 
procedural conventions [1]. These conventions include, inter alia, 
the ongoing concern and the cost convention. These are particularly 
important if one is attempting to ascertain the feasibility of 
extracting marginal costs from financial accounts. The ongoing 
concern convention imparts into the firm's accounts the assumption 
that it will continue to exist in the foreseeable future. The impli- 
cation of this assumption is that the financial accountant does not 
need to concern himself with the problem of valuation of assets if the 
scale of the firm's operations were significantly changed. The cost 
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convention adopted by the financial accountant is that the cost of an 
asset is its historic acquisition cost. Thus in using these conventions, 
the financial accounts represent an historical record where costs are 
measured by tradition. - 
The cost accountant, on the other hand, is concerned with the costs of 
goods, processes and operations of a firm for the purposes of pricing, 
budgeting and control of manufacturing methods and factor inputs. One 
of the tools of the cost accountant is marginal costing and the 
following discussion of this tool draws upon "A Report on Marginal 
Costing" published by the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants 
(I. C. W. A. ) [21 " 
The definition of marginal cost suggested by I. C. W. A. [2, p 8], is: 
"... the amount at any given volume of output by which 
aggregate costs are changed if the volume of output is 
increased or decreased by one unit. 
Note - In this context, a unit may be a single article, 
a batch of articles, an order, a stage of 
production capacity, a process or a department. 
It relates to the change in output in the 
particular circumstances under consideration. " 
This definition is not inconsistent with the economist's definition, 
however, differencesin principle arise when an attempt is made to 
measure these costs from the data available. This measurement process, 
viz, marginal costing is defined as [2, p 8] 
"The ascertainment, by-differentiating between fixed 
costs and variable costs, of marginal costs, and of 
the effect on profit of changes in volume or type of 
output. " 
(fixed and variable costs being differentiated according to whether 
the costs, respectively, are unaffected or vary with changes in the 
level of output). Thus, it is not clear whether the fundamental 
distinction between marginal and variable cost is being made at this 
98. 
measurement stage. It becomes even. less obvious when an attempt is 
made to present financial results in accordance with marginal costing 
[2, pp 49-531. These accounts are presented in the form: 
Total Sales Revenue 
less 
Marginal (or variable) 
cost of goods sold 
yields 
Gross profit (or contribution) 
less 
Total fixed overheads 
yields 
Profit before taxation. 
and an accompanying note to the accounts states that: 
"In arriving at the gross profit the marginal cost: -of sales 
must be ascertained. This includes a small number of well 
defined items, such as direct materials, direct labour and 
sales carriage, which tend to vary with the volume of 
business and at the same time can be readily identified 
with the different segments of the undertaking. " 
In the list of fixed overheads, items such as overtime premiums, 
consumable stores, electricity and fuel are included. Thus, items 
which under some circumstances may be fixed, for example direct labour, 
are considered as being marginal, whilst other items which may be 
marginal, for example overtime, are considered as being fixed. This 
observation is recognised in the report and the I. C. W. A. therefore 
suggests that [2, p 49], 
"For this reason the main use of marginal costing is for 
ad hoc cost investigations to provide information for 
particular decisions, in which case the variability of 
each heading of cost can be assessed in the particular 
circumstances of the decision to be taken. " 
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From this brief discussion it would appear firstly that the firm's 
financial accounts are an historical record and that costs are measured 
by convention. Secondly, that the money flows within a firm are 
recorded primarily for the financial accountant and that it is these 
data with which the cost accountant has to work. Thirdly, and partly 
as a result of the previous point, the distinction between marginal 
and variable cost is not clear and the time horizon over which costs 
are considered to be marginal is limited to the shorter end of the 
spectrum. 
Thus, whilst marginal costing represents an attempt to measure marginal 
costs, the financial accounts of the firm appear to be an inadequate 
data base for such calculations particularly if one wishes to ask the 
"what would happen if? " type of question necessary to ascertain 
marginal costs. Therefore, one is left in the position stated by 
I. W. C. A. where each case must be considered according to its own 
particular circumstances. 
5.3 The Economist's Approach to the Measurement of Marginal Costs 
5.3.1 Escapable Costs 
Whilst the economist would agree with the definition of marginal 
(or incremental) cost submitted by I. C. W. A. he would prefer to use the 
concepts of opportunity cost and escapability. There are various ways 
in which the opportunity cost concept can be stated: 
(i) The value of the benefit lost, in not employing the factor-: 
in its next best use. 
(ii) The value to other producers of the resources which are used to 
produce [the good] [3, p 61]. 
I 
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(iii) The value of the alternative opportunity given iip by choosing 
the action rather than the alternative. 
Whilst these statements may convey slightly different facets of 
opportunity cost, they are simply different ways of defining the same 
concept. 
Lewis [3, p 61] extends the concept to measurement and states that: 
"cost is measured by computing what expenses would be 
saved if production were curtailed and resources 
released for use elsewhere. " 
Additionally, Lewis-draws a distinction between fixed costs and 
opportunity costs, stating that [3, p 611: 
"The economist's costs are those which can be escaped; 
fixed costs are those which cannot; escapability 
is the essence of the distinction. " 
Thus, from a resource allocation point of view (i. e. the Economist's 
view) the relevant costs are opportunity costs and these costs are 
measured by considering the costs which could be escaped (or saved) by 
not producing a particular output. 
Foster [4, pp 330-41 in an Appendix briefly described an "Outline of 
a Costing System for Railway Charging", whereby one may attempt to 
measure the cost saving (escapable costs) of discontinuing particular 
traffic flows and then attribute these costs to specific traffic . In 
other words he divided the problem into two parts, the first being to 
ascertain the escapable costs and the second to attribute these costs 
to specific traffic. 
Considering the first part of the problem, the escapable costs can be 
ascertained by asking the question: 
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WHICH COSTS WOULD BE ESCAPED IF THE FOLLOWING TRAFFICS 
WERE NOT ACCEPTED? 
An alternative formulation of this question is to ask the two part 
question, 
1. WHAT ARE THE TOTAL COSTS WITH THE TRAFFIC? 
2. WHAT ARE THE TOTAL COSTS WITHOUT THE TRAFFIC? 
The difference between the answers to 1 and 2 yielding the escapable 
cost. In-principle, this information could be obtained from the port's 
accountant by asking him to draw up the port's accounts under the 
hypothetical conditions where the respective traffics were not 
accepted. The fixed costs (those costs which cannot be escaped) will 
appear in both the with and without cases and thus will cancel out on 
subtraction. 
For the purposes of exposition, consider a port with four traffics 
(I, II, III and IV). In this particular case, there are sixteen 
calculations to be performed (Table 5.1). For example, using the 
second formulation, the escapable cost of not accepting traffic- I and 
IV (item 8, table 5.1) is equal to the total cost of the port less the 
total cost without these two traffics. 
One point of interpretation arising out of Table 5.1 which requires 
clarification is EC0. This escapable cost represents the cost which 
could be escaped by not rejecting any of the traffic . TC_(O) is 
similarly interpreted as the total cost of servicing all of the traffic 
under consideration by the most efficient means (i. e. in a least cost 
sense). Thus, EC 
0 
is a measure of the port's technical efficiency, 
taking the value zero when the port is operating efficiently and a 
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Table 5.1 
Calculation of'Escapable Costs (EC) 
1. EC0 = TC - TC_(o) 
2. ECI = TC - 'TC_M 
3. ECII = TC - TC(IIT 
4. ECIII = TC - "TC_(III) 
5. ECIV = TC - TC_(IV) 
6. ECiandIl = TC - TC_(iandll) 
7. ECIandIIl = TC - TC-(IandIII) 
8. EClandIV = TC - TC_ (I andlV) 
9. ECIIandIIl = TC - TC. Ilandlll) 
10. ECIIandIV = TC Tc-(IlandIV) 
11. ECIIIandIV = TC - TC 
-(iIIandIV) 
12. ECIandllandlll = TC - TC_ (IandIIandIII) 
13. ECIandllandIV = TC-(IandlIandlV) 
14. ECIandIIIandIV = TC - TC- (IandIIIandIV) 
15. ECIlandlllandlV = TC TC 
-(IIandIllandlV) 
16. EC 
IandIIandlllandIV =- 
TC - TC_ (IandIIandlllandlV) 
where TC = Total Cost 
EC = Escapable Cost 
Negative sign on subscript (e. g. TC_(I)) = Total cost without I 
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positive value when it is not (although there may be valid reasons for 
ECo being positive, for example, where demand is fluctuating over time). 
Given these escapable costs, the second part of the problem is to 
attribute these costs to the traffic . Examination of Table 5.1 
indicates that there is a considerable degree of double counting, for 
example, ECIandIIandIII includes not only those costs which are truly 
joint to the three traffics, but also the costs which are truly joint to 
I and II, I and III, and II and III, the costs which are specific to 
I, II and III and the costs incurred due to technical inefficiency. 
This double counting problem can be overcome simply by deducting the 
escapable costs which can. be allocated to other traffics or combinations 
of traffics. The resulting cost could be called the Joint Escapable 
Cost (JEC); a more formal definition of the concept being, 
Those costs which can be escaped if two or more traffics 
are not accepted and which cannot be attributed to any 
proper subset of these traffics. 
Whilst this definition embodies the normal meanings of jointness and 
escapability as understodd in economics, it is not quite adequate for 
our case, as it does not include the case of a single traffic where one 
is required to deduct the costs incurred due to technical inefficiency. 
Thus it is proposed that Directly Attributable Cost (DAC) is used, its 
formal definition being, 
Those escapable costs which can be attributed solely to 
the traffic under consideration and which cannot be 
attributed to any proper subset of them. 
Table 5.2 lists the sixteen calculations necessary in order to determine 
the DAC's in the four traffic case. Thus, for example, the DAC for 
traffic I, II and III (item 12, table 5.1) is equal to the EC for these 
three traffics (TC =. TC_(IxIIxII2)) less the costs which have already 
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Table 5.2 Calculation of Directly Attributable Costs (DAC) 
1. DACO = TC - TC- (C) 
2. DACI = TC - TC-(I) - DAC0 
3. DACII = TC - TC-(II) - DAC0 
4. DAC 
III 
= TC - TC-(III) - DAC0 
5. DACIV = TC - TC-(IV) - DAC0 
6. DACixII = TC - TC-(IxII) - DACI - DACII - DACC 
7. DACIxIII = TC - TC-(IxIII) - DACI - DAC III - 
DAC0 
8. DACIxIV = TC - TC-(IXIV) - DACI - DACIV - DACO 
9. DACIIXIII = TC - TC-(IIxIII) - DACII - DACIII - DACO 
10. DACIIV = TC - TC IIV) - 
DACII = DACIV - DACO 
11. DACIIIxIV = TC - TC-(IIIxIV) - DAC III - 
DACIV - DAC0 
12. DACIxIIxIII = TC - TC-(IxIIxIII) - DACIxII - DAClxIII - DACIIxIII 
13. DACIxIIXý = TC - TC(IxIlzIV) 
DACI - DACII - DAC - DAC III D 
- DACix1I - DAC iv - 
DACI 
iv 
- DACI - DACII - DACE - DACO 
14. DACIxIIIxIV = TC - TC-(IXIIIxIV) - DACIxIII - DACIxIV - DACIIIxIV 
- DACI - DAC III - 
DACIV - DAC0 
15. DACIIxIIIxIV = TC - TC-(IIxII2xIV) - DACIIxIII - DACIiW - 
- DACIIIxIV - DACII - DAC III 
- DACIV - DAC0 
16. DACIxIIxIIIxIV - TC TC-(SxIIxIIIxIV) - 
[L. H. S. of items 1-15 above] 
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been attributed to the three pairs of traffics I and II, --I and III, and 
II and III; the three single traffics I, II and III; and the not 
rejecting any traffic escapable cost. 
Having determined costs in this manner, one can apply the logic that 
if costs can be escaped (either singly, or jointly) then they can be 
rationally attributed to the traffic concerned. Further, if the 
traffics were not willing to pay these attributable costs then there 
are grounds for not accepting them. 
5.3.2 Simplification of the Calculation of Escapable Costs 
The previous section outlined the basic principles to be applied in 
order to compute a measure of marginal cost. In developing these 
principles various implicit assumptions have been made and several 
complications of the method have been overlooked. In this section, 
an attempt will be made to enumerate the main assumptions and 
complications and to indicate how they may be incorporated into a more 
general analysis. 
In-the above example, only four traffics were considered and this 
required sixteen calculations of Directly Attributable Cost to be 
undertaken. In general, there are; 
n 
nk =2n 
r 
r=0 
where n= number of traffics 
n n:. C= 
r r! (n - r) 
calculations required. Thus, the number of calculations necessary to 
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identify the Directly Attributable Costs increase very rapidly as the 
number of traffic increase. 
One way in which this problem could be approached, is to devise simpler 
and more efficient means for calculating these costs than those 
indicated in Table 5.2. A brief inspection of this table, suggests 
that apart from the number of calculations increasing as the number of 
traffics increase one could easily'lose trac1'of; which DAC's had been 
calculated, whether the list was complete and whether the necessary 
number of DAC's had been deducted from the EC's. Thus a systematic 
means of listing all of the possible combinations of traffics and the 
necessary deductions is required. 
One means of listing the possible combinations in a systematic mariner- 
is as follows; 
0 
I Write down the "reject no traffic case", traffic I, 
II traffic II and the combination of traffic IxII. 
IxII 
. 01 
III Write down traffic III. 
IxIII Combined III with all of the traffics above it (excluding 
IIxIII O)-by running down the list. 
IxIIxIII 
IV Write down the next traffic i. e. IV. 
Ixiv 
IIxIV 
IxIIxIV Combine IV with all of the traffics above it (excluding 0) 
IIIxIV by running down the list. 
IxIIxIV 
IIXIIIxIV 
IxIIxIIixIV 
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If there is a fifth traffic, then write it down and combine it with all 
of the traffics above it (excluding 0) on the list. 
Listing the calculations in Table 5.2 in this order and rearranging 
the sixteen equations as a matrix equation further facilitates the 
total calculation. Table 5.3 shows the result of performing these 
operations, namely, shifting all of the DAC's to the left hand side 
of the equations in Table 5.2, rearranging in the order suggested above, 
defining the right hand sides as escapable costs (see table 5.1) and 
writing the whole system as a matrix equation. Since the calculation 
of DAC is the objective of the exercise, it remains to invert the 
matrix A to obtain the equation, 
DAC =A1. EC 
(see Table 5.4). Since the matrix A is lower triangular with a 
recurring pattern the inversion is relatively straightforward. 
Alternatively the equation, 
A. DAC = EC 
can be solved by forward substitution. A further method of obtaining 
the equation, 
DAC = A-1. EC 
is to derive the A1 matrix directly from Table 5.2 supplemented by 
the escapable costs from.:. Table:: 5.1_by substituting the relevant 
escapable costs for the directly attributable costs in the right hand 
sides of the equations in Table 5.2. 
Inspection of Table 5.4 indicates that the matrix can be partitioned 
into 4x4 matrices-of the form, 
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P 0 0 O 1 O 0 0 
-P p 0 0 -1 1 0 0 
where P= 
-P O P O -1 0 1 0 
P -P -P p 1 -1 -1 :1 
Given this simple structure a matrix of any required size can be 
generated as follows. For the five traffic case, the matrix will be 
55 
x2 2. Partition this array into four 16x16 matrices, The top left, 
bottom left and bottom right matrix are. duplicates of the 16x16 case 
and the top right is the 16x16 zero matrix. For the n traffic case, 
the matrix will be 2nx2n. Partition this array into four 2n-lx2n-1 
matrices. The top left, bottom left and bottom right are duplicates 
of the 2n-lx2n-1 case and the top right is the 2n-lx2n-1 zero matrix. 
Whilst this may appear to represent a-considerable amount of. wokk, it 
is a task which can be performed by a computer, leaving the port to 
ascertain the vector of escapable costs. 
In the even: Z, the calculation of directly attributable costs can be 
further reducedtb a conceptually easier task of ascertaining total cost's 
without specified traffics. Reference to Table 5.1 shows that, in 
vector form, 
EC = TC - TC* 
where TC* = vector of total costs without the specified traffics. 
Thus, 
DAC =A1. (TC - TC*) 
1l 
=A . TC -A . TC* 
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Now, since firstly, TC is the same for every traffic and secondly, the 
row sum of all but the first row in A -l is zero, A 
1. 
TC is a vector 
with the scalar TC as its first element followed by zeros. Thus, for 
all but DAC0 the directly attributable costs are found from -A 
1. 
'^C*. 
Thus, in principle, the problem at hand breaks down into one of 
considering what the total costs of the port would be according to 
whether various traffics are not accepted. 
5.3.3 Reduction in the Number of Calculations 
In principle, there exists an optimum number of traffics to identify. 
This optimum represents a trade-off between the costs and benefits of 
undertaking the calculations. The benefits are not onlr--the cost 
savings to society of reducing the misallocation of resources. It may, 
for example, assist the port in marketing a schedule if they can 
demonstrate that the schedule is cost based. 
I 
In practice it may be difficult to ascertain this optimum number as, in 
particular, it may be necessary to undertake all of the calculations 
in order to ascertain the benefits. However, by selective choice of 
traffics and subsets of traffics it may be possible to reduce the 
number of calculations to a level well below that suggested by the 
formula in 5.3.2. Foster [4], for example, considered, in principle, 
six traffics (coal and general'. merchandise on three routes). This would 
imply that the directly attributable costs of 64 traffics are required 
to be calculated. Reduction in this number of calculations was 
acheived by considering the three traffics separately (total of eight 
calculations) and then considering coal and general merchandise as 
subsets. Thus the number of calculations was reduced from 64 to 22 [5]. 
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A further reduction to 10 calculations is possible if coal is carried 
on-only one route (8 combinations of three traffics plus the two 
subsets of coal and merchandise on one of the routes). However, as 
this example demonstrates, the extent to which it is possible to reduce 
the number of calculations depends upon the circumstances of the case. 
Thus this exercise will be considered further when dealing with 
specific cases. 
5.4 Escapable, Opportunity and Conventional Costs 
The essence of the methodology developed in the previous section is 
that escapable cost can be measured by deducting total costs without 
the traffic from total costs with the traffic. This outline has not 
however examined the full implications of not accepting a particular 
traffic. 
In some cases, this may simply mean that a factor input is not purchased 
by the port and thus its cost is saved. In other cases, the port may 
own the asset and thus instead of letting it lay idle, they could find 
alternative employment for it. Assuming that this alternative employ- 
ment earns the port a net revenue, then the total cost without the 
original traffic is effectively reduced by the extent of this revenue. 
Interpreted in this manner, the escapable costs correspond to the 
opportunity costs. If a temporal dimension is introduced then the 
definition of opportunity cost becomes, 
'the present value of the benefit lost (to society) of 
not employing the factors in their next best alternative 
use. 
In some cases, opportunity cost agrees with cost as conventionally 
understood, however in a number of cases it differs markedly. 
113. 
The cases where opportunity cost most closely agrees with cost as 
conventionally interpreted are firstly, where there are ihputs which 
are used up simultaneously with the production process (e. g. fuel) and 
secondly at the point in time immediately before the inputs of goods 
and services are purchased and contracts signed (that is, the ex-ante 
case). The reason for this is that by purchasing the inputs or 
entering into a contractual agreement, the producer pays, or commits 
himself to paying say £x for the input. Now, there are a number of 
ways in which this £x can be interpreted. Under conditions of perfect 
competition, price represents society's evaluation of the good in its 
next best alternative. Thus, the £x represents the value to other 
producers of the inputs under consideration. Alternatively, it could 
be argued that in purchasing the input for £x, the port forgoes a 
claim of £x over any alternative uses towards which the £x could be put. 
Thus, in the ex-ante case, market or contracted price (i. e. the 
conventional measure of cost) corresponds to opportunity cost, provided 
that perfect competition exists. 
The case where opportunity cost and cost as conventionally measured 
diverge is from the point in time immediately after the goods and 
services are purchased or the contract signed (i. e. the ex-post case). 
In the port context, this problem arises with most of the traditional 
factor inputs (capital, land and labour) and thus it would be necessary 
for the port to reassess the "cost" of these assets using the- 
opportunity cost definition. 
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1. Capital 
The discussion of the "Port's Pricing and Investment Problem" (Chapter 
2) suggested that due to the specific and durable nature of the port's 
assets they may have little alternative use and thus their opportunity 
costs may approach zero. This observation is not however uniform to 
all the port's assets and it will be necessary for the port to 
investigate the various options available for the deployment of these 
assets. At the simplest level, the port can decide to retain or to 
sell/scrap the asset. Figure 5.1 outlines further the main courses of 
action available to the port under these two headings. 
Given the temporal definition of opportunity cost, if the port is to 
retain the asset and employ it in its current use, then the value 
imputed to it will be the maximum of; the amount that other port users 
would be willing to pay for it in its next best use; the amount that 
other producers would be willing to pay if the asset was leased or 
rented to them; the value to the port of leaving the asset idle for a 
period of time then either using or selling it; the value to the port 
of selling/scrapping the asset and replacing it or purchasing another 
asset; the value to the port of selling the asset and investing in 
paper assets, and; the value to the port of any feasible combination 
of the options. Whilst this list is not exhaustive it gives an 
indication of the main options open to the port. The costs calculated 
in this manner can be escaped and therefore can be allocated to the 
traffics concerned. 
In each of these cases, the port is effectively required to appraise 
pairs of mutually exclusive projects on the basis of their discounted 
costs (the revenues which could be earned in the alternative to the 
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proposed use being recorded as negative costs). 
The incremental present value then represents the opportunity cost. In 
other words, 
Opportunity Cost = Escapable Cost 
= Total Cost (with) - Total Cost (without) 
= Present value of Costs in Proposed Use (P) 
- Present value of "Costs" in Alternative 
Use (A) 
CPi (CAj - RAi) 
1 
(1 + r) 
ii 
(i + r) 
= Incremental Present Value. 
Under the general heading of capital, there are a number of features 
which will need to be taken into account when considering opportunity 
cost. These features relate to the maintenance, economic depreciation 
and obsolescence of an asset and_fnclude: 
(i) Maintenance due to the passage of time. 
(ii). Maintenance due to use of the asset. 
(iii) Stochastic maintenance (repairs). 
(iv) Statutory maintenance. 
(v) "Depreciation" due to time. 
(vi) "Depreciation" due to use. 
(vii) Obsolescence. 
To be more specific, consider a particular asset, for example a crane 
and assume in the first instance that it is left idle for say a year. 
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Firstly, if it is left "in situ" some maintenance will be required due 
to the effects of wind, weather and climate. These effects will 
necessitate painting, oiling, greasing, etcetera of the crane. (Even 
if the crane "moth-balled", some preparation for this storage would be 
required. ) Thus, there is a maintenance cost incurred due to the 
passage of time. Secondly, even with this maintenance, there will be 
a deterioration df`:. the crane due to the passage of time. This deter- 
ioration will reduce the economic life and technical efficiency of the 
crane relative to when it was first left idle. This item is the 
Economic depreciation düe to time. Thirdly, in addition to this 
depreciation and regardless of the maintenance and storage conditions, 
the technical efficiency of the crane may be relatively lower at the 
end of the year due to technological change. This relative fall in 
technical efficiency is the obsolescence. Both economic depreciation 
and obsolescence will reduce the value of the asset to the firm and 
thus represent opportunity costs. 
If the crane is used during the year, then the four additional opport- 
unity costs are incurred. Firstly, there are the. maintenance costs 
which are required to keep the crane in good working order and are 
incurred due to usage of the crane. Secondly, in spite of the 
maintenance carried out, the asset will deteriorate due to use. The 
fall in value of the asset due to this reduction in technical efficiency 
is the depreciation due to use. Thirdly, an "average" crane will 
breakdown for various unforeseen reasons, necessitating repairs to be 
effected (in excess of the maintenance due to use) and more cranes to 
be provided than may have been the case if these events did not occur. 
Thus, a cost is incurred by the port, the level of which can only be 
determined stochastically, given sufficient data, or subjectively when 
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sufficient data do not exist. Fourthly, there may be statutory 
requirements that the crane is surveyed, tested and maintained to 
certain minimum legal standards. 
Whilst these features of capital can be outlined in principle, in 
practice it may be difficult to identify them separately. 
One measure of opportunity cost whose "neglect has been one of the 
commoner errors in economic discussion" (Lewis [6]_) is the "user cost". 
Lewis suggests that "for any year (or unit of output)" there are three 
methods by which they can be calculated. 
The first method is derived from the decision afwhether to sell the 
asset today or operate it for the rest of its life. The criterion being, 
continue operating ifz 
n Pn 
n> 
po 
(i + r) (1 + r) 
i= 
where Ri = gross revenue in year i. 
Ci = running costs in year i. 
pi = proceeds of sale of asset in year i. 
r= discouxtt rate. 
Re-arranging the inequality as follows, 
n 
R1; - Cl Ri - Ci Pn 
(l+ r) 
PO 
(1+r)i (l+r)n 
The right hand side gives the first measure of user cost. In words, the 
present value of the net revenue earned by employing the asset in its 
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current use must at least equal the price for which the asset could be 
sold today less the present value of the net revenue (in its current 
use) over the remaining life of the asset, less the present value of 
the scrap value. 
The second method compares sale today with operating for a year and 
then selling. The criterion for continuing operation is, 
R1 - C1 
P- 
P1 
(l+r) o (1+r) 
the right hand side giving the second measure of user cost. In other 
words, the user cost is at least equal to the loss in present value 
through selling next year, instead. of now. 
The third method compares the return from operating this year with the 
return which is excluded by operating this year. If the life of the 
asset is, determined by obsolescence then clearly this user cost is zero. 
if however life is determined by use then it will be positive. For the 
purposes of exposition consider the specific alternatives of operate the 
the asset for n consecutive years from now compared with leave the 
asset idle this year then operate for n consecutive years. The criterion 
for operation this year is, 
n Rl - Ci 
-P+ 
Pn n+l Ri - Ci 
P+ 
Pn+l 
i=1 
(1 + r) 
i0 (1 + r) n i= (I + r)1 
0 (1 + r) n+l 
Rl - C1 Rn+l - Cn+l 
[_'n 
Pn+l 
(1 + r) (1 + r)n+l (1 + r)n (1 + r)n+l 
the right hand side giving the third measure of user cost. In words, 
it states that the present value of the net revenue earnt by employing 
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the asset this year must at least equal the present value of the net 
revenue foregone by operating this year less an adjustment for loss in 
present value of the scrap value by selling the asset in year (n+l) 
compared with year n. 
It would appear that Lewis has only taken into account the "sell" 
and "leave idle" options in fig. 5. l, however, the use elsewhere options 
are implicitly taken into account in the second-method whereby it is 
assumed that the loss in present value through selling the asset next 
year instead of now reflects (at the margin) the value of the asset to 
other producers or if redeployed elsewhere in the port. This loss in 
present jvalue also incorporates the concepts of obsolescence and 
economic depreciation due to use and time. 
In approaching the problem in this manner, Lewis has implicitly 
assumed that a year is a relevant time horizon for the purposes of 
ascertaining opportunity costs. The relevant time horizon is that 
associated with the decision which the port is taking and may therefore 
be different from the year. The principles outlined can however be 
extended to take into account different time horizons. 
It must also be taken into consideration that opportunity cost is 
concerned with what would be the next alternative and in the port case, 
it may not be feasible to be continually buying and selling assets. 
2. Land 
In the case of land, the two main alternatives available to the port 
are to sell the land or to rent/lease it to another user. Potential 
land users could include office block, housing or marina developers, 
industrial users, or simply a firm proposing to provide car-park 
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facilities. 
The opportunity cost of using the land-area as a port is then the 
maximum of the alternative users willingness to pay for the land 
(either in terms of a sale price or rental). 
3. Labour 
Accounting practice tends to treat labour as a current resource cost. 
In the event, however, labour . is employed on a contractual basis and 
immediate escape is extremely difficult. The contract with labour 
precludes the transfer of labour outside of the port and also defines 
their area of employment within port. Thus, the opportunity cost of 
labour could also be low. The two main next best alternatives are to 
redeploy the labour elsewhere (within the terms of their contract) or 
to leave them idle. The measure of opportunity cost obtained in the 
first case is the amount which other port users would be willing to 
pay and in the second case the difference between "standby pay" and 
the amount actually paid. (including any payments on this increment 
which employers are required to make, for example employers' National 
Health Service Contributions). - 
5.5 Opportunity Cost and Asset Valuation 
The pricing rule of the 1978 Nationalised Industries White Paper [71, 
in the case where the output of new and old assets are indistinguishable, 
is that the price of the output from the old assets should be equal to 
the supply price of output from the new assets. The implicit 
recommendation of this rule is therefore that the price of all output 
should be related to the replacement cost of an increment of capacity. 
12 2. 
This recommendation is implemented after a demand forecast and. 
investment appraisal have been undertaken. Thus, it assumes either 
that the existing capacity is fully utilized and extra capacity is 
required or that existing capacity is deteriorating and there is a 
demand for replacement capacity. Therefore, in the case where demand 
for the asset exists and where asset replacement/investment will be 
undertaken the value of the existing asset is implicitly related to 
its replacement cost. 
This replacement cost will be fully reflected in the opportunity cost 
measures discussed above in that alternative port users will be - 
willing to pay this cost. In the case, however, where excess capacity 
exists (and consequently no replacement or investment undertaken), 
these opportunity cost measures may tend to be low (particularly where 
the assets are specific to the port). Consequently, a pricing system 
based on these costs will not yield sufficient revenue to replace even 
that part of capacity for which there was a demand. Lewis [8] suggests 
that: 
"This transfer of income to the consumer is a gift which hei 
never expected, to which he has no particular right, and 
which he will receive only temporarily while excess 
capacity lasts. " 
It could be argued that given perfect competition there is nothing 
wrong with this in that the market is performing one of its functions 
of removing excess capacity. The port industry does not however 
satisfy the conditions necessary to be a perfectly competitive 
industry and "experience shows that the agony may be very long-drawn- 
out, and that it is not always the right firms that disappear. " [9] 
Even if, the next best employment of the asset suggests a low 
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opportunity cost, this does not imply that the valuation of the asset 
by existing users is correspondingly low. The users may be willing 
to pay an amount in excess of the opportunity cost but not the full 
replacement cost. Thus in both cases, where the asset will and will 
not be replaced, some means of asset valuation is necessary. 
The traditional accounting valuation used in the preparation of the 
Balance Sheet is historic cost or professional valuation (for example, 
the valuation of land by estate agents or ships by brokers). In 
addition to thismethod, Merrett and Sykes [10] cite three commonly 
used methods namely; the cost of replacing the asset with a similar 
asset; the value that could: be realised if the asset were sold; and the 
net present value of the expected futtre earnings of the asset. 
There are two further methods by which the full replacement cost can 
be incoporated into the computation of opportunity cost. The first 
method "simulates the capital investment decision which would need to 
be made when the assets under consideration require renewal" 
(Bromwich [li]). Thus, the port is treated as though it is a new 
capital investment, with those assets which will require to be 
replaced being valued at replacement cost and those assets which will 
not be replaced because of their durability having zero replacement 
cost imputed to them. 
The second method is to adopt the general valuation formulae developed 
by Merrett and Sykes [12]. The concept of value used by Merrett and 
Sykes is: 
"the sum of money which would just compensate the firm for 
[the asset's] loss in stated conditions, given the action 
that will be taken by the firm to minimize this loss. " 
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In order to obtain this valuation, the present value of the costs of 
continuing to operate the asset followed by its infinite stream of 
replacements ("project" A) is compared with loss of the asset now and 
replacement by the infinite stream ("project" B). For the firm to be 
no worse off after the hypothetical loss than it was before the loss, 
the present values of these two streams should be the same. Thus, by 
setting the present value of A equal to the present value of B the 
value of the existing asset can be found. Fig 5.2 shows the costs 
involved in these two alternative "projects". 
Let: K(m) = value of existing asset in year m (= z- k) of its life. 
C= capital cost of replacement asset. 
D(k) = present value of operating costs of existing asset over 
its remaining economic life k. 
R(n) = present value of operating costs of replacement asset over 
its economic life n. 
S(i) = present value of scrap value of the asset over its 
economic life, i=k for existing asset and i=n for 
replacement asset. 
r= discount rate. 
Then the present value of the infinite stream of replacements 
(project B) is equal to, 
pv _C+ 
R(n) -S (n) 
B Li- (1 + r)n 
Converting this into an annuity, 
A_ 
C+ R (n) -S (n) r 
1- (1+r)-n 
125. 
M 
N 
a 
N 
ý a " U" cn a 
a 
" N 
" a 
" c a v) Ua 
N 
x x 
x Ä "' 
N 
' -I a 
EI a 
N -- --- -- b4 43 - --- - a 01 9 c n 41 0 4-4 4. ) 0 
ÖU ý 
r 7 
0 
-4 r. Co 
Ei tu 41 tu 41 -4 Ö i 
4 -4 
R 
-4w 
tu 
Ü 0 $-4 W º. 7 W Ü id W Ü UO W UOW 
Q PO 
W W 
ä ä 
x 
Ell 
x 
1 14 
++ 
-41 ý4 
U 
II 
a 
0 
ro 
4J 
c 
ul 4 
N 
b+ 
44 
126. 
and the present value of this annuity over k years is, 
_C+ 
R(n) - S(n) r 
I'- (I + r) -k 
L1- (1+r) nr 
=[C+R(n) -S (n), 
1- (l+r)-k 
1- (l+r)-n 
Thus, the present value of project B can be considered to consist of 
this amount plus an annuity of A per annum from year (k + 1) to 
infinity. 
The present value of project A can similarly be considered to consist 
of, 
K(m) +D (k) -S (k) 
plus the same annuity from year (k + 1) to infinity. Thus when the 
present values of A and B are set equal to each other the annuities 
cancel out and, 
)+D (k) S (k) = 
CC 
+R( ) K( -S( )1 
1- (1 + r) -k 
n m - n J 1- (1 + r)-n 
Thus, the value of the existing asset in year m _of _its life is, 
K(m) = 
CC 
+ R(n) - S(n), 
1- (1 + r) -k D(k) + S(k) 
L1- (l+r) 
This method assumes that the time pattern of revenue flows for both 
alternatives are the same and that the net present value of project B 
is non-negative (that is, consumers are willing to pay for the set of 
infinite replacements). If the time patterns of revenue flows are 
different then it will be necessary to incorporate them into the 
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analysis. If X and Y are the present values of these revenue flows 
(to infinity) for A and B respectively, then the value of the existing 
asset will be changed to the extent of (X - Y). This could arise 
because it takes a"number of years to replace the asset after loss. 
In this case (assuming that the revenue flows are the same after the 
lost asset is replaced) the value of the existing asset will be 
increased to the extent:. of the present value of the lost revenue.. 
Revenue could also change over time due to the deterioration (and 
obsolescence) of the existing asset. This could be incorporated into 
the analysis by adding a term, 
X(k) - Y(n) I1 - (1 + r)-k 
1- (1+r)-n 
to the above formula. 
Where, X(k) = present value of revenue from the existing asset over its 
remaining economic life k. 
Yin) = present value of revenue from the replacement asset over 
its economic life n. 
The reduction in revenue, in this and the more general case, could also 
be included in the analysis by imputing it as a cost resulting from 
the asset's reduced productivity. 
Of the seven possible valuation methods, the historic cost is the 
least useful. This arises because of possible changes in the price 
level, technology and capacity utilization since the original invest- 
ment was undertaken. The resale value has been discussed above, and 
represents a possible lower limit on opportunity cost. An upper limit 
is the cost of replacing the asset with another of similar age and 
state. In a perfect second-hand asset market, the replacement cost 
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with a similar asset, the resale value and the general valuation 
formula (assuming replacement with a duplicate asset) should yield the 
same asset value. However, given the transactions costs and the 
imperfections in the second-hand market (due partly to the specific 
nature of the port's assets), the cost of replacing the asset 
with a similar asset will be greater than the resale value, with the 
formula possibly yielding a value in-between these two. Replacement 
with a similar new asset will clearly yield a value higher than these 
valuations, however, one is not comparing like with like as asset lives 
and operating cost patterns will be different. The present value of 
expected future earnings yields the "true" value to the port of the 
asset if these expectations are realised. In general, this value in 
relation to new cost, second-hand value and resale or scrap value 
provides signals to the port as to when to invest or sell an-. asset 
(Merrettand Sykes) - if the expected value of earnings is greater than 
the new or second hand value, then invest, and if it is likely to fall 
below resale value then disinvest. In the context of this thesis, the 
present value of expected future-earnings would introduce some 
circularity of argument if used to value the asset. This arises 
because one is attempting to devise a "cost based" pricing system and 
such a method of valuation would require a knowledge of prices before 
costs could be ascertained. 
Thus, given the imperfections in the second hand market, the possi- 
bility of replacement with an asset of different capacity and that the 
general formula implicitly incorporates replacement cost and the 
differing time pattern of operating costs, the formula method is 
preferred. 
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Thus, in the circumstances where the existing asset will be duplicated 
or replaced with an asset of different capacity the formula for K(m) 
could be used. 
There remains however three cases where some difficulty may be 
encountered in using this method. These arise firstly where the asset 
is permanent (that is, it will not require replacement in the fore- 
seeable future), secondly, where the asset is likely to be replaced 
but at the point in time when valuation is being attempted neither the 
nature, location nor cost of the replacement can be ascertained with 
any degree of certainty, and thirdly where the asset will not be 
replaced because replacement is not warranted by demand. 
In these cases, it may be necessary for the port to adopt an iterative 
approach in order to value the assets. This would require, in the first 
instance, the computation of the limits of a range. ýdf costs. The lower 
end of this range representing the opportunity cost of the asset 
(which could be zero) and the upper limit reflecting the replacement 
cost of the asset. Given this range of "costs", the port authority 
will have to attempt to estimate the user's willingness to pay (present 
value of expected future earnings) so that prices may be obtained. 
Alternatively, given the range, the port would have a basis for 
negotiating prices with consumers. 
In these three cases the estimation of the lower limit is, in principle, 
easier than the upper limit. Where the asset is permanent, its 
opportunity cost approaches zero, but, by definition, the asset does not 
require replacing. The 1978 White Paper to a certain extent bypasses 
this problem by employing the long-run average incremental cost of $ 
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proposed investment. Thus, it suggests a "yardstick" (the incremental 
investment) with which to work. Given the excess capacity at United 
Kingdom ports, such a "yardstick" may not be available. Thus the port 
may have to resort to artificial investments (that is, the port 
authority will have to investigate and cost feasible expansion and 
replacement projects) or to the use of data from "recent" investments. 
The third case can arise either because users are not willing to pay 
for a discrete factor input which has a capacity in excess of that 
required or where demand is declining--over time. In both of these 
circumstances, the valuation formula can be used to ascertain the upper 
limit of "costs". 
5.6 Opportunity Costs, Asset Valuation and Time 
The approach to measuring escapable cost outlined in section 5.3 did 
not specify the time horizon to which the costs referred. As 
Lewis [13] states however, 
"Escapable cost is not just short-run and long-run, 
intermediate and ultimate. It varies for as far ahead 
as you care to look ... as each commitment falls due for 
renewal, say for x years, all those due to expire during 
those x years have to be considered, since if any of 
those will not pay and will be discontinued, this may not 
pay either. [Thus] ... this collection of costs itself 
varies from day to day; as current commitments alter. " 
Of this "collection of costs", it is necessary to ascertain the short- 
run escapable costs, as these are directly relevant to the pricing 
of marginal units of output. The intermediate- and long-run escapable 
costs are relevant to the traffic accept/reject and invest/disinvest 
decisions, and the pricing of output in the medium- and long-run. 
13 1. 
A second problem which the analysis has not yet considered is the 
allocation of costs to traffics over time. The only requirement to 
date has been that the traffic over thewirifinite time horizon is 
willing to pay the long-run escapable costs. The accountant approabhes 
this problem by using the device of depreciation. Thus, according to 
the rule adopted (straight line, reducing balance, sum-of-years-digits, 
etcetera) these costs are allocated to each year of the asset's life. 
In chapter 2 however, it was suggested that these costs are joint to 
the traffic over the asset's life and consequently it will be necessary 
to ascertain prices from the consumption or demand side. If the year 
is considered appropriate for pricing purposes, a measure of the value 
of the asset to users during any year is the loss in the present value 
of the consumer's willingness to pay during that year. Thus, having 
ascertained whether the traffic is. willing to pay over the asset's 
life (which in principle also requires that the willingness to pay 
during each year of the asset's life is ascertained) the port can 
attribute costs to the traffic in each year. If demand is stable or 
the traffic's willingness to pay is constant over time, then equal 
allocation of costs to each time period using an annuity formula may be 
appropriate. If however demand conditions or willingness to pay are 
changing over time then it may be necessary to consider each year 
separately. This approach applies to the asset; any assets which the 
port may require. in: conjunction with the asset; and any operating costs. 
Thus, for example, in the provision of a cargo handling service the 
port may required a berth (life 30 years), a crane (life 10 years) and 
annual operating costs for both of these assets. Even if the traffic 
132. 
is not willing to pay for the replacement of the berth, it will be 
required to pay for; the replacement of the crane if it demands the 
facility after year 10; and the annual operating costs each year if it 
is to be accepted each year. In other words there are subsets of costs 
that can be rationally attributed to traffic in subintervals of time. 
A third problem in the analysis is that it has assumed that it is 
possible for the port to'forecast costs and revenues into the 
indefinite future. Clearly, it is unreasonable to require of the port 
authority that these forecasts are undertaken and thus a more manage- 
able time horizon will have to be adopted. Prudent planning practice 
will however require that the port makes some attempt to ascertain the 
traffic from which they propose to recover their capital outlays. 
A formal approach to the problem is to consider a "planning horizon" 
over which it is deemed feasible to estimate costs and demand. The 
time horizon normally'used for such an exercise would appear to be five 
years, for example, the five year Corporate Plan, Planning horizons 
in some cases extend beyond this period, for example, the MDAC Ten Year 
Profitability Study. In other industries, the planning horizon may be 
15 years, for example, in the-Gas Industry in the United Kingdom, the 
"Area Board" model considers a 15 year period [14], and in the case of 
the planning of major capital investments (Portbury [15]) a time 
horizon in excess of 25 years was used. 
In deciding upon the appropriate planning horizon it will be necessary 
for the port to consider the longevity of its assets, the nature of 
long-run forecasts and the relative magnitude of individual expenditures. 
The estimates of asset life suggested by the N. P. C. (for depreciation 
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purposes) are shown in table 5.5 . These lives would suggest (if 
one accepts the depreciation life as a proxy for economic life) that 
if the port was to commence operation"today"with a new set of assets 
then the minimum planning horizon would be 10 to 20 years. The 
assets those lives exceed this period presenting a problem that will 
be considered below. 
The ability of the port to forecast future traffic will also influence 
the choice of time horizon. In general, their ability to forecast 
year on year fluctuations in traffics decreases with time. Thus, as 
the planning horizon expands forecasts will, by necessity, be 
expressed in terms of underlying trends and growth (or decay) rates. 
There will however be varying "degrees of confidence" with which 
particular traffic can be forecast and thus there are "degrees of 
confidence" with which these trends and growth rates can be expressed. 
The third factor in£luehcing the time horizon is the relative 
magnitude of the expenditure. If there is. a proposed major investment 
likely to be undertaken within the relevant time horizon, then it may 
be desirable to consider this as a separate subset of the port's 
overall planning process. 
Thus, whilst one can consider the factors which may be relevant to the 
planning horizon, the actual choice of time horizon will depend upon 
the circumstances of the case. It is however suggested that 10 years 
represents the=minimum time and the recent (1980) Profitability Study 
of M. D. H. C. would suggest that it is technically feasible to adopt at 
least this time period as a planning horizon. 
The adoption of a planning horizon of h years effectively truncates 
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Table 5.5 NPC Asset Lives 
Life.: 
Land - 
Excavations and dredging 35 
Grants Various 
Docks, quays and river walls 35 
Roadways and surfacing 25- 
Railway lines 25 
Landing stages and jetties 35 
Warehouses 25 
Sheds 25 
Other buildings 25 
Miscellaneous items 15 
Oil installations 20 
Lighthouses 35 
Hydraulic mains 25 
Hydraulic machinery 20 
Bridges 25 
Cranes other than electric or mobile 15 
Mobile cranes and trucks 10 
Electric cables 15 
Electric cranes 15 
Electric machinery 15 
Floating plant 15 
Scale beams and weights 10 
Weighbridges 15 
Locomotives 15 
Public lighting 15 
Canteen equipment 5 
Air compressor 10 
Heating installations 10 
Hoists 15 
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
Life 
Pipelines 20' 
Grain elevators 15 
Boilers 10 
Motor vehicles 5 
Dust and fume extraction plant 10 
Radio communications 10 
Refuse handling plant 15 
Scientific instruments 10 
Office machines 10 
Electronic computer 7 
Hardening and tempering furnaces 20 
Buoys and beacons 15 
Salvage pumps 15 
Accumulators 15 
Lanterns and flashers 15 
Radar equipment 10 
Diesel oil engines 20 
Salt water mains 25 
Heating equipment foundry 20 
Hose handling facilities 20 
Diesel welding sets and oil lighting sets 15 
Baling presses 15 
High pressure steam cleaners 10 
Decca Hi-fix installations 10 
Dock gates 35 
Caissons 35 
Container cranes Seaforth (Inc. Marine Leg) 15 
Grain- marine towers, silos 40 
Machine tools 10 
Timber handling m/c 10 
Misc. cargo handling 10 
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the analysis at this point in time (fig. 5.3). Thus assets will fall 
into one of the four categories: 
(a) Assets purchased and used up during the planning horizon. 
(b) Assets existing at the beginning of, and used up during the 
planning horizon. 
(c) Assets purchased during, and still existing at the end of the 
planning horizon. 
(d) Assets existing at the beginning and the end of the planning 
horizon. 
Category (a) assets are relatively easy to deal with - if the traffic 
was not accepted then their cost could be escaped. Thus, their costs 
are attributable to the years during which the asset is used. Category 
(b) assets will however require valuation at the beginning of the 
horizon. For the purposes of valuation the valuation formula can be 
used. In effect, this formula equates the-present value of the costs 
of the existing---asset (including the unknown K(m)) over its life with 
the present value of an annuity over the same number of years. This 
annuity is found by converting the present value of the capital costs, 
operating costs and scrap value of the first replacement asset 
(project B) into an annuity. Category (c) assets will, in the absence 
of any other information, require some arbitrary apportionment of costs 
to both sides of year h. one method of achieving this is to find the 
present value of the capital. cost and scrap value of the replacement 
asset, convert this into an annuity over the asset's life of n years, 
then attribute the present value of this annuity over (h - k) years 
(project A) to the planning horizon and the balance to the (n -h +"k) 
years beyond the planning horizon. If however the port does have 
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knowledge of the traffic's demand and willingness to pay then this can 
be used to attribute costs. Category (d) assets represent a combin- 
ation of (b) and (c) and can therefore be treated accordingly. 
Alternatively, the asset can be valued at the beginning and end of the 
planning horizon, using the valuation formula. The loss in present 
value of these valuations being attributed to the planning horizon. 
The suggested method for attributing costs where the asset exists at 
the end of the planning horizon can be criticised for being arbitrary, 
however, there are a number of reasons why this may not be particularly 
serious. Firstly, it is suggested as a last resort and only to be 
used where no Other information is available. Secondly, in discounting 
the costs, the effects of errors tend to be reduced. The scale factor 
is equal to the discount factor. Thus for example, with a discount 
Discount Rate 
I 
Years 
I 
Discount Factor 
10 5 0.6209 
10 10 0.3855 
10 15 0.2394 
10 20 0.1486 
10 25 0.0923 
factor of 10 per cent any error in costs at year 10 are reduced to one- 
third of the initial error and at year 15, to one quarter. Thirdly, 
as Turvey [16] states, 
139. 
"We do not have to decide this year what to do next year; 
we only have to decide what to do this year. Next year and 
subsequent years are relevant now only because what will 
be possible or desirable for us to do then will depend- 
partly on what we have done this year... Thus, in order to 
make an actual decision now, we,. have, at the same time, to 
make hypothetical decisions about the future. " 
Thus, given that some of these costs are ex-ante they are hypothetical 
and can be considered in more detail when one arrives at the purchase 
date. It is however important to, -. consider them now since-if the 
commitments today will "not pay" then these commitments in the future 
may "not pay either" (Lewis [17]). Finally, the forecasts near the 
end of the planning horizon may only be expressed in'terms of general 
trends and thus an annuity based method (tilted to reflect a trend if 
necessary) would appear appropriate. 
5.7 Directly Attributable Costs and Time 
In principle, the incorporation of a temporal dimension into Directly, 
Attributable Costs leads to the same calculation as outlined in the 
first part of the chapter, that is, 
DAC = A-1. EC 
In practice however, when time is introduced each asset (or service) 
enters the calculation with two extra properties-i namely a date and an 
economic life. In general, if costs can be escaped in any time 
interval then they are attributable to the traffic in that interval. 
This implies that both the DAC and EC vectors will be matrices (or 
tables) with the rows representing traffic and the columns time. 
The stages involved in ascertaining attributable costs include, 
estimating demand, identifying the facilities required to meet this 
demand, imputing the costs of these facilities then allocating the 
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cost to traffics. 
Consider for example, the provision of a conservancy service by a port. 
Assume that the port has'two areas of destination and that the only 
facilities provided are buoys, which once on station require no 
maintenance or servicing for their lives (fig 5.4). There is one main 
channel buoy (M) which costsl5o; one buoy to area A (Al) which costs 50; 
and one buoy to area N (B2) which costs 8O. The buoys have zero scrap 
value and their lives and replacement dates are shown in fig 5.5. 
A 
Al 
. 
4L 
M ý. 12 
fig 5.4 Conservancy Example 
The calculation of escapable cost proceeds as follows; 
Let _1- 
Cl + r) -m 
Pm, n !1- (1 + r) n 
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Area A: 
Buoy Al 
Existing Buoy 0 to (50p2 
5)02 
1st replacement (50)2 5 . 
2nd replacement (50P 3,5)7,3 
Area B: 
Buoy B2 
Existing Buoy 0 to (80p3,7)0,3 
Replacement (80) 3,7 
Area AxB: 
Buoy Al 
Buoy A2 
As Area A and B 
Buoy M 
Existing Buoy 0 to (150p10,15)o, 10 
where, '(i) lives are cgiven in fig 5.5 
(ii) subscripts outside bracketed items refer to the date and 
the period of time to which the costs are allocable 
(the date referring to the end of the year) 
The matrices for the general two areas of destination and ten year time 
time horizon case (assuming discrete time)are written out in full in 
table 5.6, whilst table 5.7 contains the matrices 
of the maximum escapable costs for the example under consideriý: 
ation. The minimum escapable cost matrix is found by inserting zeros 
in the place of (50p2,5) for buoy Al, (80p3, ß) for buoy A2 and 
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and 115Op10,15)0,10 for buoy M (assuming they have no alternative use. 
Thus, for example (table 5.7) over the first two years the traffic to A 
should be willing to pay between zero and 5Op2,5* Howdver over years 
three to seven (inclusive) they will be required to pay 50 and over 
years eight to ten (inclusive) 50p3 3,5 
(sinless the port authority has 
other information concerning the traffic's willingness to pay in these 
last three years and the two years beyond the planning horizon). 
In the case of the buoy M, the traffic would be required to pay 
between zero and 150p10,15 over the whole planning horizon [18]. If 
operating costs were also introduced into the analysis, then they 
would accrue to the years over which they could be escaped. 
5.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined a methodology whereby the port authority can 
attempt to measure escapable costs. The escapable cost of a specific 
traffic can in principle be ascertained by asking "which costs would 
be saved if that traffic was not accepted? " In general, the port's 
existing financial accounts have not been designed to answer questions 
of this nature and thus in a similar manner to marginal costing, it may 
may be necessary to undertake separate investigations into these 
costs. Further investigation into the practicalities of measuring 
escapable cost suggest that for even a small number of traffics the 
calculation becomes complex and thus a systematic approach was 
outlined. The number of traffics still remained considerable, however, 
by judicious choice of traffics and subsets of traffics this could be 
reduced and it was further suggested that the extent to which these 
reductions could be achieved depended upon the specific case. 
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Section 5.4 outlined some of the conceptual differences between 
opportunity cost and cost as conventionally understood. In section 
5.5, it was suggested that the opportunity cost of some of the port's 
assets may tend to be low; equally this does not imply that these 
assets are of no value to their users. By approaching pricing from 
the cost side one does however lose this "degree of freedom" and 
thus artificial investments which reflect the replacement cost of the 
asset are considered. Given the opportunity cost and escapable cost 
the port authority has a range of costs within which it can place the 
user according to his willingness to pay. Alternatively this range 
can be used when negotiating prices with users. 
Section 5.6 introduced intertemporal jointness and noted that the only 
requirement. in-_the case of the port's capital assets was that the 
traffic was willing to pay over the life of the asset. Thus costs 
would have to be allocated to each time interval according to the 
traffic's willingness to pay in each of these intervals. The analysis 
also recognised the unreasonable requirement that the port authority 
forecasts costs and revenues into the indefinite future. It was 
therefore suggested that a "planning horizon" approach is adopted 
whereby the port authority forecasts costs within the horizon and 
values assets at the beginning and end of the horizon. There is 
however, even when using this approach, an implicit assumption that a 
forecast beyond this horizon can be undertaken. It was however 
suggested that the analysis may not be particularly sensitive to this 
assumption. 
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Finally in section 5.7 the temporal dimension was introduced into the 
basic methodology for ascertaining directly attributable costs. The 
suggested approach was-to change the escapable cost and directly 
attributable cost into matrices with time for columns and traffic for 
rows. These matrices can be alternatively considered to be (the 
conceptually easier to understand) tables of costs. 
The analysis has indicated that a general model of escapable costs 
would be particularly complex, however if particular cases are 
considered then the problem may become manageable. In the following 
three chapters the three areas of conservancy, docks and cargo handling 
at the Port of Liverpool will be considered in an attempt to ascertain 
the extent to which the general model can be simplified. 
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1181 Given the nature of the data in this example, as long as the 
traffic is willing to pay the escapableicost, then, it is not 
necessary in practice to consider all of these cases. The 
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requirement is that over the planning horizon, A pays 50p10,15, 
B pays 80p108 and AxB pays 150p10,15' The example however 
illustrates the general methodology. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MEASURING ESCAPABLE COSTS - CONSERVANCY 
601 Introduction 
The exercise of ascertaining the attributable costs of the services and 
facilities provided under the heading of Conservancy will be approached 
in the steps outlined at the end of the last chapter. These steps are 
summarised in fig 6.1 
1. Broad description of 
services and facilities 
2. Identification of Traffics 
5. Allocation of the 3. Identification of the 
Costs to the Traffics Facilities Provided for 
these Traffics 
4. Identification of the 
Costs of the Facilities 
Fig 6.1 The Approach to Measuring Escapable Costs 
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6.2--The-Services-and Facilities 
Under the general heading of Conservancy, the port provides four main 
services, namely: 
1. Surveying. 
2. Buoys and Lights. 
3. Dredging. 
4. Port Radar Station. 
6.2.1 Surveying, 
The Hydrographic Department of the Port undertakes surveying inside the 
Liverpool and Birkenhead Dock complexes and also in the River Mersey. 
For the purposes of Conservancy, only the surveying in the river and at 
dock entrances will be. considered. The main assets used in surveying 
the river include: 
!3xM; 2 m wooden launches - used for surveying upstream of the 
port radar station. There are usually two launches operational 
at-any one time, with the other being overhauled etc. 
"1 x 16.5 m catamaran - used for surveying in the main channel. 
-Position fixing 
. Hi-Fix Chain - on shore. 
"Hi-Fix Receivers-on board. 
"Sextants and Station pointers. 
-Sounding 
"Kelvin Highes Echo Sounders. 
"Hand leads. 
*Tide Measuring 
"6x automatic tide gauges. 
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? Miscellaneous bottom samplers, water samplers, current meters, 
salinity/temperature meters and siltmeters. 
and, the labour force comprises 
"5 hydrographic surveyors. 
"a pool of 14 seamen for manning the launches. 
"4 cartographers and draughtsmen in the drawing office. 
In order to systematically survey the river, it is divided into 
approximately 31 areas. The frequency of survey varies from area to 
area depending upon, its utilization, experience of previous 
siltation rates, and movements in banksaand the navigation channel. 
Table 6.1 contains a list of the survey areas, the frequency of survey 
and the number of working days spent surveying each area. 
6.2.2. Buoys and Lights 
Entrance to the River Mersey is effected by proceeding along the 
Queen's Channel then the Crosby Channel, there being no alternative 
channels for commercial vessels. The Queen's Channel is buoyed with 
approximately 14 buoys and boat beacons. (lightfloats), whilst the 
Crosby Channel is buoyed with approximately 29 buoys and floats. The 
light floats are all located on the port hand of the channel (the 
reason for using floats being that the buoys heel over in the strong 
currents of the Mersey and become difficult to observe from a ship); 
some are named, but the majority are numbered (the named floats being 
larger than the numbered floats). All are "first class" buoys.. and 
floats. Up until 1981, the spacing of the buoys along the channel was 
based upon an assumed minimum visibility of one quarter of a mile which 
implies that they were spaced one half of a mile apart. However, with 
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Table 6.1 Survey Areas and Frequency of Survey 
Frequency 
Days per 
Survey 
Days per 
annum 
Cumulative 
Total 
River Mersey --Rock Lt. Ho 
5Y 150 - - 
to Warrington 
River Mersey - Eastham & 
2Y 20 - - 
Garston to Rock. Lt. Ho. 
Eastham Channel 6M 6 12 12 
Eastham Bar 3M 3 12 24 
Garston Channel 2M 6 36 60 
Garston Bar 1M 1 12 72 
pluckington Bank 6M 2 4 76 
Middle Deep/South Anchorage im 2* 24 100 
Tanker Cleaning Jetty 6M 11 1 101 
Tranmere Oil Stages 2W 1 26 127 
Cammell Laird& Wall 6M & AR 3 6 133 
Monk's Ferry to Woodside lY 1 1 134 
Woodside Stage lY 1 -12 134/ 
Alfred Entrance 2W / 13 147/ 
Liverpool Stage (Monthly) 1M 3+ 150/ 
(2 monthly) 2M 1* 6+ 15611 
I. O. M. Stage 6M 2 4 1601-1 
Waterloo Entrance (Exam) 2W 11 10t 17011 
(Full) 2M 1 6f 176/ 
Langton South Bank lY 1* 1 177/ 
Langton Entrance 2W 1 26 203/ 
Gladstone South Bank - lY 1* 1 204/ 
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Table 6.1 (continued) 
Frequency Days per 
Survey 
Days per 
annum. 
Cumulative 
Total. 
Gladstone Entrance 2W 1 26 230/ 
Shoal of New Brighton 
(Monthly? ' im / 40 234/ 
(Quarterly) 3M 2 8° 242/ 
Crosby Channel (South) lY ill 137 244 
(North) 2W 1l 39 283 
(Margins) lY 2 2 285 
Queen's Channel (East) 2W 1 26 311 
(East 
lY 1/ ill 312/ 
Margins) 
(West) 1M 2 24 336/ 
(West 
lY 2/ 2/ 339 
Margins) 
Queen's Channel & part of 
2W 1/ 39 378 
Taylor's Spit 
(Margins) lY 2/ 2/ 380 
Notes: 
k 
Y= Year, M= Month, W= Week, AR = As Required 
=* Estimated 
2M =6 times per yr x1 day =6 
1M = {12 times/yr - (6 times for 2M)} x 11 day =3 
'f 2M =6 times/yr x1 day =6 
2W = {26 times/yr - (6 times for 2 M)}-x i day = 10 
3M =4 times/yr x2 days =8 
1M = {12 times/yr - (4 times for 3M)} x/ day =4 
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the modern navigation aids available, this has been thought no longer 
necessary so that the new spacing is 1.1 km except on the bends, where 
the old spacing will be retained. 
In the River Mersey between the Port Radar Station and Bromborough 
there are seven first class buoys marking miscellaneous banks. 
The channels to Eastham and Garston are both buoyed with can and 
conical buoys, there being approximately 7 and 9 buoys respectively 
with a lit dolphin at the end of each channel. The buoys in the 
Eastham Channel and numbers 1 and 2 in the Garston Channel are all 
first class buoys. The remaining buoys in the Garston Channel are 
smaller and constructed of GRP (glass reinforced plastic). 
The moorings for the buoys depend upon the size of the buoy/float and 
its location. The larger floats are moored with two anchors or with 
a4 ton cast iron sinker and a 30 cwt "backer" sinker (especially for 
the buoys/floats on the edge of banks). The ordinary buoys and floats 
are moored with sinkers of 30 or 50 cwt. 
All of the buoys and floats are lit with gas, the gas bottles in most 
cases having a capacity to last for 15 monhts. This, in conjunction 
with a need to scrape and paint the hulls of the buoys and floats means 
that they are kept on station for approximately 12 months with some of 
the named floats, however, remaining on station for 2 years. This 
requires an annual programme for lifting and maintaining them. In 
order to lift and position the buoys, the port owns an 817 g. r. t. 
buoy tender and salvage vessel called "Vigilant". This vessel was 
purchased in 1978 and replaced a similar vessel which was built in 
1953. 
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The shore facilities for repairing and maintaining the buoys consist 
of a branch dock (in an otherwise unused part of the port) and a large 
single level building for storing equipment, working undercover and 
overhauling and resetting flasher units. At this buoy store, the port 
employs a gas fitter, an assistant gas fitter and a labourer. As 
well as working on the lights in the buoy store, the gas fitters under- 
take minor repairs, resetting and relighting of buoys an station. 
6.2.3 Dredging 
Dredging is undertaken inside the docks, at the dock entrances and in 
the main approach channel. No dredging is currently being undertaken 
in the river (incldding the Garston and Eastham Channels). The port 
itself dredges the docks and dock entrances whilst the dredging in the 
main channel is contracted out to"a private firm. 
The contract dredging is performed by trailer suction dredgers on a 
campaign basis (that is, it is undertaken for a:. number of weeks at a 
time and not on a continual basis). The contract was negotiated in. 
1975 and runs for six years. The contract names seven dredgers with one 
being used as a basis for calculating the amount due to the contractor. 
Twelve weeks' work for the standard dredger is guaranteed with eight 
weeks' notice being required. The minimum length of a single campaign 
is four weeks (one week mobilisation and three weeks' dredging). In 
1975, the least depth in the main channel was 7.5 m below chart datum, 
however, 7.0 m is currently maintained in this channel. The two main 
areas dredged by the contractors are Queen's East Channel and Crosby 
Shoal, with approximately 200,000 m3 and 100,000 m3 respectively being 
removed from these channels annually. 
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The port owns two grab hopper dredgers and employs them in the docks 
and at the dock entrances. During each of the years 1979 and 1980, 
these dredgers removed in excess of lea million tonnes of silt, however, 
in considering conservancy, we will only be concerned with the-dock 
entrances. There are four dock entrances, three at Liverpool where 
million tonnes were removed and one at Birkenhead where 50,000 tonnes 
were removed. Thus, approximately 30 per cent of the silt is removed 
from the dock entrances. 
6.2.4 Port Radar Station 
The Port Radar Station is located on the seaward side of the Seaforth 
Docks. It is operational for 24 hours a day and provides radar 
coverage for a radius of 20 miles from the station. In addition to 
general traffic surveillance the station broadcasts traffic movements 
at set times and on request. In reduced visibility vessels may also 
request reports on their own position whilst navigating within the 
station's coverage. 
6.3 Traffic Identification 
Schiller (1] when considering cost allocation in the electricity 
industry suggested that: 
"For the purpose of cost allocation it is convenient to 
deal in the first place with groups or classes composed 
of consumers of similar characteristics, whereby 
"consumer" may be taken in a personal sense (e. g. 
purchaser of energy) or material sense (e. g. water 
heater). The group performance is determined essentially 
by the behaviour of the majority, and consequently 
reflects general trends and characteristics. " 
whiltt Schiller was investigating the peak-pricing problem, the 
principle of identification of groups or classes or traffic with 
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similar characteristics is equally applicable to the problem at hand. 
In the case of Conservancy at the Port of Liverpool one notes the 
geographical area covered by the port in the performance of its duties. 
For some of these areas, the port provides a service for particular 
groups of traffics. Thus it would appear that one similar character- 
istic could be the area of destination within the port. 
The other possible characteristics were discussed in chapter 4 and, 
included measures of vessel size, manoeuverability and type. In the 
case of Conservancy, the port itself has suggested that particular 
attention is paid to maintaining and surveying channels for the deep 
drafted vessels which proceed to Seaforth Container and Grain terminals 
and also for the large tankers proceeding to Tranmere. Thus a measure 
of size may also be an appropriate characteristic to classify the 
traffic. Vessel type, whilst being highly correlated with the traffic 
proceeding to particular areas of the port is not that important in the 
case of Liverpool. In particular, the Port does not adopt specific 
procedures for the arrival and departure of these vessels (for example, 
other traffic movements in the port are not significantly curtailed 
when specific vessel types are moving). 
Thus, in the first instance, the "similar characteristics" by which the 
traffics are grouped will be area of destination, with vessel size 
being noted for the traffics proceeding to Gladstone and Tranmere. 
Fig. 6.2 indicates the ten areas of destination within the port. 
The decision to use area of destination and possibly a measure of 
vessel size as the characteristics relevant for cost identification 
still confronts one with_. a problem which is overly complex for 
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practical application. Given the 10 main areas of destination within 
the port there are; 
10 
10 210 
r=O 
or 1024 different combinations of these traffics. If one further 
considers three different vessel sizes to each of these 10 areas then 
there are 230 (over 1 billion) combinations. Thus, a considerable 
degree of simplication is required. Two ways by which this simplica- 
tion may be attempted are to consider size as a subset of area of 
destination and-then to introduce a "natural sequence", into the order 
in which the areas are considered, which does not require one to delve 
into all of the possible combinations of areas. Table 6.2 shows the 
extent to which the number of calculations may be reduced by using 
these two devices in the 10 destination, 3 size example. In the 
second case (Table 6.2) size is a subset of area. Thus, for the 1024 
combinations of areas the escapable costs are ascertained. Then, 
within each of these combinations, (excluding the not rejecting any 
traffic case), theeescäpable costs of the seven combinations of three 
sizes are computed. In the third case, the areas of destination 
would all lie (geographically) on a single line. Here, it is only 
necessary to consider the 10 areas (plus the reject no traffic case) 
and the nine combinations of areas in order (for example AxB; AxBxC; 
etc - areas being named from upstream starting at A),. then within each 
combination the seven size combinations. Whilst this has reduced the 
number of traffics to a more manageable 140 combinations, some costs 
may be computed as being joint to more traffics than they should have 
been. For example if B and D are the only areas to which deep drafted 
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Table 6.2 The Number of Combinations of Traffics 
Traffics Formulae, Number 
36 
1. 10 areas and 3 sizes. = 230 
3OC 
1,073,741,824 
r 
r- 
2. 10 areas, 3 sizes as 
10 
lOC 3 
+1 C 
) 
r S subsets of the areas. =1 s 
(210 - 1) (23 - 1) + 1} 7,162 
3. 10 areas separately 
3 
((n + 1) + In - 1)) 3C 
plus combinations in S. 
order, 3 sizes as 
10)(23 1 _ (2 14 - x ) 0 subsets. 
4. 10 areas_separate1y 
plus combinations in ((n +1) + In -1) (s + (s -1)) 
order, 3 sizes = (2 x 10)(2 x3- 1) 100 
separately plus com- 
binations in order as 
subsets. 
Notes: 
n 
(i) Case 2- 1C nCr includes the not rejecting any traffic case 
which: has . no subsets... Thus it is not_ included in either 
of the summations, but it is added back at the end of. 
the calculation. 
(ii) Case 3- (n + 1) =n separate areas plus not rejecting any 
traffic. 
(n - 1) = 1x2; 1x2x3;...; 1x21... xn. 
(iii) Case 4-s occurs by itself as the not rejecting any traffic 
case is not relevant to subset s. 
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vessels proceed, then the joint costs of these two traffics will be 
allocated jointly to AxBXExD. If this problem does not appear to be 
particularly prevalent then extra traffic combinations (B and D in this 
case) may be added to reduce its effect. Case 4 indicates how a further 
reduction of 40 combinations-may be achieved by considering size in 
order, instead of all the combinations. However, similar comments to 
case 3 also apply to this case. 
The reductions in cases 3 and 4 were made possible by taking a specific 
example. In general, simplification may be achieved by considering 
the circumstances of the case including the geographic configuration 
of the port and the facilities provided for these various traffic. 
6.4 Traffic and Facilities 
In order to identify the traffic by facility provided, it will be 
necessary to investigate the extent to which the level of the facilities 
provided would change if traf ficsswere abandoned. This investigation 
will be undertaken by considering the four main services provided 
under the heading of Conservancy. 
6.4.1 Port Radar Station 
it is unlikely that the level of service provided by the station would be 
reduced if a particular traffic was not accepted. Thus, the costs 
associated with the station will tend to be joint to all of the 
traffic entering the port. 
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6.4.2 Buoys and Lights 
In general, the quality and spacing of the buoys is determined by the 
weather and sea conditions and not by the traffic. Thus, neither the 
quality nor the spacing of the buoys would be changed if traffics were 
not accepted. The abandonment of particular traffics would however 
allow the port to reduce the number of buoys in certain areas. For 
example (see fig 6.2) if the traffic to Garston (A) was not accepted 
then the Garston Channel (I) would not have to be buoyed. Similarly, 
if traffics to B and C were not accepted then sections II and III would 
not have to be buoyed. Thus, in--the case of the*. buoys, it is not 
necessary to consider every possible combination of area of destination. 
Starting at A and B one can proceed downstream through each of the 
numbered sections; allocating the cost of the buoys in each section to 
its corresponding area and areas upstream df it. For example, the cost 
of a buoy in area IV (Pluckington Bank Buoy) is joint to all of the 
traffic upstream and including Tranmere (D), whilst the costs of the 
buoys in the Queen's and Crosby Channels (X) are joint to all of the 
traffic using the port. 
The two remaining facilities associated with the buoys are the 
"Vigilant" and the buoy store. Again, one asks whether by rejecting 
specific traffics the level of provision of these facilities could be 
reduced. In the case of the "Vigilant" this is unlikely, as a vessel 
of similar size and type would still be required to lift the buoys in 
the open waters of the main channel. In the case of the buoy store it 
has been hypothesized that no significant reduction in cost could be 
achieved by rejecting particular traffics. The port has approximately 
65 buoys on station, 42 in the main channel, 7 in the River Mersey, 
9 in the Garston Channel and 7 in the Eastham Channel. It is therefore 
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conceivable that, the hypothesis is incorrect and that the storage area 
at the buoy store could be reduced if the traffic to Garston and/or 
M. S. C. were rejected. If this were the case then this cost would be 
joint to these two areas. The remaining costs would then be joint to 
all of the traffics (the labour costs are joint due to their indivisi- 
bility, that is, even if the port serviced only the buoys in the main 
channel it would still require the gas fitter, his assistant and a 
labourer). 
6.4.3 Dredging 
Chapter 4 indicate that the port may provide the service of a channel 
where capital dredging has been undertaken andaalso the service of 
maintaining the channel. In the ex-ante case, the relationship between 
traffic and capital dredging will depend upon the reason for the 
dredging. If it is for channel deepening then the dredging is related 
to the deeper draft vessels. If however it is channel widening or 
investment to maintain the stability df the river bed then it may be 
related to all traffics jointly. In the ex-post case, capital dredging 
tends to be a permanent asset (not requiring replacement) and thus has 
zero opportunity cost. 
The two areas where maintenance dredging is undertaken by the port 
presents two different problems when attempting to identify traffic 
with the facility. In the main channel, there may exist in principle a 
natural depth where no maintenance dredging was required. Consider, 
for example, a case where there are four possible depths (metres) 
at which the channel could be maintained (that is, dredging is a step 
function of depth). The cost of maintaining the channel for the first 
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(top) metre(S1) will be joint to all traffic requiring more water than 
the natural depth. if the cost of maintaining the channel at the 
second metre is S1+6 Sl, then 6 Sl is joint to all vessels requiring 
this depth and more. Table 6.3 indicates the joint costs for the four 
possible depths. The problem facing the port authority however, is one 
of forecasting th costs of maintenance dredging at these various 
Table 6.3 Joint Maintenance Dredging Costs 
Natural 
depth plus: 
Maintenance 
dredging 
Joint 
escapable 
Attributable to vessels of max. 
draft equal to natural depth 
plus: 
(metres): cost cost 
1 2 3 4 
1 Sl Si x x x x 
2 S2S1+6S 6S1 x x x 
3 S3S2+6S 6S2 x x 
4 S4 = S3 +6S 6 S3 x 
depths. No comprehensive study has been undertaken to ascertain these 
costs and it has been suggested that even if such a study was attempted, 
there would be a considerable degree of uncertainty attached to the 
results. Thus, whilst one may hypothesize that it is the deeper draft 
vessels which impose higher dredging costs on the port, there is no 
substantial information upon which to base the hypothesis. 
The considerations in this case raise the question of whether these 
costs could be deemed to be joint (due to lack of information) to all 
the traffics. Whilst it is recognised ex-hypothesi that they may not be 
joint, it may be appropriate as a practical expedience to consider them 
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Ö. For pricing/traffic acceptance purposes, the implication of this 
assumption is that the traffic in aggregate will be required to pay. 
If in turn, the shallow drafted vessels, say, are only willing to make 
a relatively small contribution to this cost, then this condition could 
still be met by the deeper draft vessels making a correspondingly 
larger cottribution. 
The dredging at the dock entrances presents a problem of jointness across 
Conservancy and the Docks themselves. If the port dredged solely inside 
the docks, then it is unlikely that the capacity of the grab hopper 
dredgers would be changed. This, combined with the observation that 
a little under 30 per cent of the silt is removed from the entrances 
suggests that the costs of the dredgers are joint to both the Conser- 
vancy and Dock Undertakings. Thus, these costs will be further 
discussed when considering the Docks. 
6.4.5 Surveying 
Surveying presents a similar problem to that of dredging in that this 
service is provided fnr both Conservancy and the Docks. In the case of 
surtreying however, the factors used in the provision of the service aze 
more easily associated with one or other of these undertakings and thus 
the problem is less severe. 
The 16.5 m catamaran and the Hi-Fix navigation system are used for 
surveying the main channel. One could argue along similar lines to 
those of the dredging case and suggest that, in the main-channel, it is 
the deeper draft vessels which require the surveys. This is unlikely to 
be the case as the size of the catamaran and the navigation system are 
determined by the location of the channel and not the traffic. Thus the 
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cost of these two assets are joint to all the traffics. 
In the River, it may be possible to save some costs, however due to the 
individibility of the launches and labour these savings are unlikely 
to be significant. Column 4 of table 6.1 indicates the number of days 
per annum required to survey the various sections of the Port. Column 
5 further shows the cumulative total commencing at Eastham. Now, a 
hydrographic surveyor spends approximately 200 days per year on the 
boat surveying and one launch is used for surveying purposes for 
approximately 150 days per year. Thus from table 6.1 nearly all of the 
port's traffic-would need to be rejected before the cost of one 
hydrographic surveyor could be saved and all of the traffic excluding 
Liverpool and Birkenhead would beed to be abandoned in order to save the 
cost of a survey launch. Thus the labour costs and two launches are 
joint to all of the traffic with the third launch possibly being joint 
to the traffic upstream of Birkenhead (although a more rigorous analysis 
than that suggested above would be required to ascertain the traffics to 
which this cost is joint). 
6.4.6 The Escapable Cost Matrix 
In summary, the following facilities would appear to be joint to all of 
the traffics: 
Port Radar Station; Buoys-in the main channel (42 out of a 
total of 65 buoys); "Vigilant"; most of the buoy store and 
all of the labour at the store; dredging in the main channel 
(due to lack of information); catamaran and Hi-Fix navigation 
system for surveying the main channel; 2 of the three launches 
for surveying the River and all of the hydrographic surveyors 
required for main channel and river surveys. 
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The remaining facilities may be joint to smaller groups of traffic or 
specific to particular traffics and include: 
The buoys in the River, and Garston and Eastham Channels; 
that part of the buoy store not joint to all of the traffics 
(joint to Garston and Eastham); one survey launch for 
surveying the River (joint to all of the traffics excluding 
Liverpool and Birkenhead). 
Thus, the above considerations would suggest firstly that most of these 
facilities are joint to all of the traffics using the port. Secondly, 
it has not been possible to associate any of the costs with vessel size 
and therefore it will only be possible to take area of destination as 
the traffic characteristic-. 
Another group df costs which have not been taken into account when 
considering the facilities are the current factor inputs. This 
includes items such as the fuel for the. launches, catamaran and the 
"Vigilant" xfuel for the hopper dredgers will be considered under the 
Dock Undertaking), other consumable items (for example paint for the 
buoys) and gas for the buoys. Some of these items will tend to be 
specific to particular areas of destination within the port. For 
example, the fuel used in surveying the Garston Channel is directly 
attributable to the traffic proceeding to Garston. In other cases the 
costs are incurred whilst servicing joint facilities and thus are joint 
to groups of traffics. It is also conceivable that a further element 
of jointness occurs with these costs where for example the "Vigilant" 
lifts two buoys from different areas of the port on the same day, with- 
out returning to the buoy store after the first buoy was lifted. In 
general this problem is not particularly significant and will therefore 
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not be dealt with. If however it was occurring to any significant 
extent the Actual practice of the port would need to be taken into 
account. 
Referring to the geographical configuration of the Port (fig 6.2)and 
the considerations of the facilities provided under the heading of 
conservancy it is appropriate to consider the 10 areas separately plus 
the combinations of areas in order, with a slight adjustment being 
made for the fork at Garston and Eastham Channels. Table 6.4 sets out 
the matrix for ascertaining the directly attributable cost in the 
timeless case, time being introduced by considering the DAC and EC 
vectors as matrices. 
6.5 Identifying Escapable Costs 
The identification of escapable cost requires that the port's planning 
horizon is defined. Having identified the traffics, facilities and 
this time horizon, the computation of the individual elements of the 
escapable or directly attributable cost matrices can proceed. This 
exercise requires that a table for matrix) is constructed 
which shows the facilities (including their lives)- required to service 
the expected demand over the planning horizon. In order to demonstrate 
the methodology, the principles for computing the escapable costs of 
the traffic proceeding to Garston will be outlined. The procedure for 
ascertaining these costs for other areas and combinations of areas will 
be similar to the Garston example. However, a number of issues which 
are different in nature arise when considering the escapable costs of 
not accepting the traffic to all areas. These issues will be 
considered after the Garston case. 
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6.5.1 Area ' of ' De stination *- "' Garston 
1. Services and Facilities Provided 
The conservancy services and facilities provided for this area include 
the nine buoys (including flasher units and gas bottles), the 
maintenance of the buoys, surveying of the bar and surveying of the 
channel. Table 6.5 lists these items along with the life of the 
asset and frequency of the maintenance or surveying for an assumed 
planning horizon of ten years. The port has suggested that all of the 
buoys have a remaining life of at least twenty years and thus it is 
unlikely that they will require replacement within any foreseeable 
planning horizon. Given that this channel is the only one with glass 
reinforced plastic buoys, any spare buoys of this type should also be 
included. The buoys are lifted annually for maintenance and to refill 
the gas bottles. The Bar is surveyed monthly, and the Channel every 
two months. 
2. Factor Inputs 
(i) Buoys 
The. main factor input under this heading is the buoy itself, the gas 
bottles and the flasher unit. The maintenance of the buoy will however 
require further factor inputs. At the annual maintenance, the usual 
procedure is for the "Vigilant" to go out to the buoy, lift and replace 
it with a buoy prepared for that station then return it to the buoy 
store. At the store, the buoy is repaired, scraped and painted, the 
gas bottles recharged and the flasher unit overhauled. Thus, the 
factor inputs attributable directly to this traffic include: the fuel 
and any other consumable stores used by the "Vigilant"; the paint for 
the buoy and any parts required for minor repairs; the gas; and any 
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i 
consumable stores or parts used in overhauling or repairing the 
flasher unit. The parts and consumable stores used in major repairs 
of the buoys or flasher units are also to be included as factor inputs, 
however, the period of time to which they are attributable will usually 
be greater than the annual maintenance. 
In this case the spare GRP buoys are included as they are not inter- 
changeable with other buoys. in the more general case where they are 
interchangeable, the port will have to investigate whether the holding 
of spare buoys could be reduced if the traffic under consideration was 
not accepted. If this was possible then the saving is attributable to 
that traffic. 
(ii) Buoy Store 
The buoy store itself is included where there are cost savings in 
reducing the capacity of the store if the traffic was not accepted. 
Similarly, it may be possible to reduce the labour force necessary '. to 
paint, scrape and repair the buoys. The spare flasher units and gas 
bottles being treated in a similar manner to the general case of spare 
buoys. 
(iii) Surveying 
The discussion above has indicated that the only factor input which is 
even slightly significant in the surveying of this area is the fuel 
cost and other consumables of the launch. 
3. Valuation of Factor Inputs 
The valuation process follows the procedure outlined in chapter S. 
(i) Buoys 
If the buoys will be replaced at the end of their economic lives (that 
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is, if consumers are willing to pay for the replacement of the buoys), 
then the escapable cost is the present value of the loss in value of 
the asset. Thus, for each buoy (including the spare buoys); 
EC =V (O) -V 
(IO) 
) 
lo 
(1 +r 
where: EC escapable cost 
V(i)= valuation of asset in year i of the time horizon 
and this cost is attributable to the Garston traffic over the ten year 
planning horizon. If the buoys will not be replaced because the 
Garston traffic is not willing to pay, then the cost floor for pricing 
purposes is the loss in opportunity cost over the planning horizon. 
Thus, 
EC'= OC (O) - 
OC (10) 
(1 + r)lo 
where: EC = escapable cost 
OC(i) = opportunity cost in year i. 
The actual magnitude of the opportunity cost of the buoys is difficult 
to obtain as the only experience the port has of selling buoys is for. 
scrap metal (a first class buoy containing approximately 10 tonnes of 
scrap iron). If the buoys were interchangeable then by not using them 
in the Garston Channel, there may be cost savings resulting from the 
port being able to postpone replacement of buoys in other channels. 
The escapable costs of the maintenance of the buoys includes the fuel 
and other consumables required by the "Vigilant" to lift and 
reposition the buoy, and the paint, parts and minor repairs to the 
buoy. These are all current factor inputs and are therefore valued 
at their market price. These expenditures are however similar to the 
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expenditure on a capital asset which has a life of one year because 
they are undertaken so that the buoy can be used for a year. Thus 
(assuming discrete time) they are attributable to the year in which the 
expenditure is incurred. In. the case of major repairs, the life of 
the asset is usually prolonged for more than a year and thus the 
escapable costs of these repairs are attributable to a correspondingly 
longer period of time. 
(ii) Buoy Store 
If it is possible to reduce the capacity of the buoy store by not 
accepting the Garston traffic then there is an incremental cost which 
is attributable to this traffic. Assuming that the life of the store 
exceeds the planning horizon, then this can be computed by valuing the 
store at the beginning and end of the horizon using the replacement 
cost with and without the Garston traffic. Thus, 
- VS(10) ]_[b0) 
EC =V (O) .. - VS(O) GL 
(1 + r) 
10 
V (10) V (10) 
= EvL(o) -S- [v5co- S 
(1+r)10 (1 + r) 
10 
= ECL - ECS 
where: ECG = escapable cost, Garston traffic. 
ECL = escapable cost, large capacity (that is, with Garston). 
ECS = escapable cost, small capacity (that is, without 
Garston). 
VL(i) = valuation in year i, large capacity. 
VS (i) = valuation in year i, small capacity. 
and ECG is attributable to the Garston traffic over the planning 
horizon. 
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If the labour necessary to paint, scrape and repair the buoys could be 
reduced by not accepting the traffic to Garston then this cost saving 
should also be incorporated into the analysis. 
The spare flasher units and gas bottles are treated in a similar 
manner to the buoys. 
(iii) Surveying 
The current factor inputs used in surveying the Channel and Bar are 
valued at their market prices. They are attributable to the time 
horizon over. which they are incurred, that is, monthly to the Bar and 
two monthly to the Channel. 
6.5.2 Traffic to All Areas 
In considering the escapable cost of accepting no traffic, dredging 
presents a number of different issues. A channel in which capital 
dredging has been undertaken represents an asset which is permanent 
in nature and thus by definition will not require replacement. In the 
ex-ante case, as long as the traffic is willing to pay then the invest- 
ment may be undertaken. Ex-post the opportunity cost approaches zero 
and it is doubtful whether any attempt to value the asset from the cost 
side would yield meaningful results. Thus, whilst the asset may be of 
value to port users the port may not be able to obtain°. an upper limit 
to the asset's value from the cost side. In this case it would there- 
fore appear that the port authority will have to value the asset at its 
opportunity cost then zeassess this position when considering the 
traffic's willingness to pay. 
The cost of contract dredging the main channel has three aspects: the 
contract cost of twelve weeks' work per annum of the standard dredger 
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over the six year life of the contract; the incremental cost of any 
dredging in excess of the basic case; and the cost of reneging on the 
contract. The opportunity cost in the basic case is equal to the 
present value of contract payments for the standard dredger over the 
remaining life of the contract less the present value of a settlement 
which would allow the port to withdraw from the contract. This amount 
is attributable to the traffic over the remaining life of the contract. 
The incremental cost of any dredging in excess of the basic case is 
also escapable and therefore attributable. The period of time to which 
it is attributable is however not always well defined. If it is under- 
taken specifically for the traffic in a particular year then it is 
attributable to that traffic. If however. it is undertaken so that dredg- 
ing can be reduced for a number of years then this cost is correspon- 
dingly attributable to the traffic in these years. If the contract 
will be renewed, then the present value of the contract is attributable 
to the traffic over the life of the contract. 
6.6. Allocation of Costs 
The overall requirement for the port to continue supplying-a particular 
facility is that the present value of the consumer's willingness to pay 
over the planning horizon is at least equal to the present value of 
the escapable cost over this time. horizon. Thus from the escapable 
cost matrix (Table 6.4) the present value of the DAC's can be 
ascertained by inserting the EC's in the escapable cost vector. 
Alternatively it may be possible in this case to ascertain the DAC's 
without computing the intermediate EC's. For example, inethe case of 
Garston, the escapable costs are also directly attributable as this is 
a single traffic. It has however been suggested that some costs are 
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attributable to particular temporal subsets of the planning horizon 
and that the user's willingness to pay may fluctuate over time. Thus 
for_thespurposes of providing data for the pricing of conservancy 
services, the DAC's can be left as a matrix (table). The port 
authority will then be required to match this matrix with each traffic's 
willingness to pay over time. 
6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to apply the method3logy outlined in the 
previous chapter for measuring marginal costs in the conservancy case. 
The approach adopted in the chapter has been: to describe the services 
and facilities; to identify the traffic by similar characteristics then 
to identify the facilities provided for the traffic; and to identify 
and attribute the escapable costs. 
Section 6.3 identified the similar characteristics-of the traffic as 
being area of destination and size (any other characteristic being 
highly correlated with these two). The Port was consequently divided 
into ten areas of destination. Even this division led to a large 
number of possible-combinations of traffic and thus methods by which 
this number could be reduced were discussed. A considerable reduction 
in the number of traffics was achieved by taking into account the 
particular case and by considering size as a subset of area of 
destination. 
One important conclusion of the identification of the facilities 
provided for the traffic (section 6.4) was that the majority of the 
facilities provided were joint to all of the traffic. Whilst a more 
detailed study may reveal that some of these facilities are joint to 
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less' than all of the. trafficr it is not believed that. such a. study 
would significantly alter this conclusion. One of the observations 
which led to this conclusion was related to an hypothesized relationship 
between vessel size and dredging in the main channel. It was suggested 
that (at the Port of Liverpool) even if an investigation was undertaken 
to test this hypothesis, the degree of uncertainty associated with its 
results wpuld severely limit the validity of any conclusions drawn 
from it. It was therefore decided to reject vessel size as a possible 
cost characteristic for traffic identification and to consider these 
dredging costs to be joint to all of the traffic. (This however does 
not exclude the use of vessel size when considering the demand side and 
the benefits accruing to larger vessels). 
Section 6.5 considered the identification of, escapable costs and also 
prempted the discussion of the allocation of the costs (Section 6.6). 
For illustrative purposes, the principles for ascertaining the escapable 
costs of the traffic proceeding to Garston were outlined. This outline 
was followed, by a discussion of a number of issues which may arise when 
undertaking the same exercise for all traffic. In particular it was 
suggested that attempting to value a channel (where capital dredging had 
been undertaken) on the cost side, would not yield meaningful results. 
The solution. adopted for this problem was to value the.: asset at its 
opportunity cost and to incorporate the consumers' evaluation of the 
asset when considering their willingness to pay. 'Finally, section 6.6 
suggested that the directly attributable costs are left in a matrix or 
tabular form so that the data can be matched with the traffic's 
willingness to pay. 
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Notes 
[1] Schiller, P., "Methods of Allocating Classes of Consumers or Load 
the Demand-Related Portion of the Standing Costs of Electricity 
Supply. "I The British Electrical and Allied Industries Research 
Association, Technical Report K/T106,1943. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MEASURING ESCAPABLE COSTS -' DOCKS 
7.1 Introduction 
The durability and spatially fixed nature of the port's assets are 
particularly noticeable in the Docks case. The implications of--these 
characteristics are that opportunity costs may be low and replacement 
costs difficult to ascertain. This chapter will outline the problems 
that may arise under these conditions and will suggest some possible 
solutions. For the purposes of exposition and given that the port 
can trade-off the facilities provided for goods, the docks will be 
separated according to these facilities, that is, the dock entrance to 
the quay wall (inclusive) and the berth to the dock gate (inclusive). 
7.2 Services and Facilities - Dock Entrance to the Quavwall 
7.2.1 The Dock Systems 
There has been in recent years a considerable contraction in the area 
over which the port handles cargo in the Liverpool North Dock System 
(fig 7.1). The M. D. H. C. Profitability Study - 1980 (hereinafter 
referred to as "the MDHC Study") suggests that there are four main 
reasons for this decline, namely; 
(i) the deepening trade recession which is particularly hitting 
deep sea exports. 
(ii) the change in U. K. trading patterns with growth in trade with 
the E. E. C. favouring East and South coast ports. 
(iii) the constraints imposed by the National Dock Labour Board 
Scheme which inhibits the ability to balance manpower. 
(iv) increases in fuel costs making diversions from Northern 
European routes extremely costly. 
184. 
Y 
U 
O 
C 
C 
2 
1 
YA 'ý 
OZ 
cYý _Z 
Z 
pJQ 
D 
¢9 
¢V 
¢ 
¢ 
Q 
U 
z 
zý 
En 
U 
0 
4J 
0 
z 
0 0 24 
C) 
.ý 
1S5. 
The scale of operation is indicated by the figures contained in 
table 7.1. This table includes the facilities at, and the tonnages 
handled for the year ended 31st December 1979 less the berth's known 
to have been withdrawn since that date. The table suggests that the 
docks fall commercially into three parts. The first part': consists 
of the Seaforth, Gladstone, Hornby, Alexandra and Langton Docks where 
containers, timber, bulk grain, liquid and general cargo are handled 
by M. D. H. C., West Coast Stevedoring (W. C. S. ) and private operators. 
The second part includes the Canada and Huskisson Docks where general 
cargo is handled by Liverpool Maritime Terminals (L. M. T. ) and bulk 
molasses and sugar by a private company. The third part is the 
Waterloo and of the dock complex, where coastwise traffic is handled. 
The Birkenhead Dock System (fig 7.2) is located on the opposite side 
of the River Mersey to the Liverpool system. The scale of the 
operation is shown in table 7.2. Inspection of this table indicates 
that the cargo transfer operation separates into broadly two areas, 
namely Vittoria Dock and Wharf, where general cargo is handled by 
the M. D. H. C. and the rest of the dock complex where bulk commodities 
are handled by single users. 
7.2.2 The Services and Facilities 
In order to facilitate a vessel's passage from the river entrance to 
the berth, two main services are provided, namely, a lock and a known 
water depth within the docks. These ser-rices require that the port 
operates and maintains the lock, and dredges, surveys and maintains 
the water level within the dock system. A general description of the 
docks including the average annual quantity of silt removed in the 
years 1979-80, and the frequency and time taken to survey each dock 
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is contained in tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
The level of Mean High Water Springs at the Port is 9.3 m above chart 
datum, the corresponding figure for Mean High Water Neaps being 7.4 in. 
Thus, given the sill levels in tables 7.1 and 7.2 (which represent the 
extreme dimensions) the maximum drafts for vessels entering the port 
at Neaps and Springs are: Gladstone 13.0 to 14.9 m; Langton 12.7 to 
14.6 m; Waterloo 12.2 to 14.1 m; North Alfred 9.4 to 11.3 m and South 
Alfred 10.6 to 12.5 in. The extreme width of the Langton Extrance is 
39.6 m and the extreme lengths and widths of the other entrance locks 
are respectively: Gladstone 326.1 mx 39.6 m; Waterloo:: 137.1 mx 
19.9 m; North Alfred 146.3 mx 30.3 m and South Alfred 182.8 mx 
24.3 in. Within the Liverpool Dock System, access to the working 
areas between Seaforth and Huskisson Docks can be gained by all but 
the largest vessels through either the Gladstone or Langton Entrances. 
(The Gladstone-Hornby Lock and the Hornby Dock having a slight bend 
which prohibits passage of these larger vessels). 
The water in the Liverpool and Birkenhead Docks is impounded at a 
level of approximately 9.7 m and 10.0 m above chart datum, respectively, 
and the sill depths are the depth below this impounded level. The 
widths of the various passages or entrances in the system are also 
shown in tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
A high level of dredging is undertaken by the Port within the docks. 
The previous chapter indicated that two Grab Hopper Dredgers perform 
this function and that all of the costs of the dredgers; including 
dredging at the entrances will be considered under the heading of the 
Docks. The two dredgers are employed continuously over the year apart 
from a six week period in July/August when one only is operational 
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(the other being drydocked). Column 6 of tables 7.1 and 7.2 shows 
that the annual average tonnage of silt removed from both Liverpool. 
and Birkenhead Docks was just over 1ý million tonnes. The same 
column further indicates the tonnages removed from each dock. In an 
attempt to standardise these tonnages, given the different water areas 
of the separate docks, a "silt depth" has been calculated (column 7) 
which assumes an average silt density of 1.3 tonnes per cubic metre 
(where "silt depth" equals tonnage divided by the product of water 
area and density). 
The surveying of the docks is performed in a ten week cycle. In this 
period of time, all of'-. the docks are surveyed, with most areas being 
surveyed twice. Two 18 foot fibreglass boats are used (one located 
in Liverpool and the other in Birkenhead) with a crew of three 
including a hydrographic surveyor. During the cycle, the Liverpool 
Docks are surveyed for approximately a month, then the crew moves over 
to Birkenhead to survey these docks for two weeks. Tables 7.1 and 7,2 
show the frequency with which each dock and entrance is surveyed 
along with the approximate time spent on each dock per survey and per 
annum (Note that the surveying at the dock entrances was considered 
under conservancy ). 
7.3 Services and Facilities - Berth to the Dock Gate 
7.3.1 The Royal Seaforth Dock 
The Royal Seaforth Dock was officially opened in July 1973 and cost 
approximately E50 m. The total land area reclaimed from the River 
Mersey for the site was 200 hectares, although some of this area would 
require further development to make it useable. Within the complex, 
there are a number of Terminals which handle specific cargoes, 
194. 
including containers, bulk grain, timber and forest products, vehicles 
and general. Table 7,3 indicates the berths used for these purposes 
and the tonnages handled during 1979. 
The Container Terminal is located on the northern side of the Dock and 
has a continuous quay length of l; QO0 metres. The quay is nominally 
divided into 4 berths. There are 5 gantry cranes (2 x 35 ton and 
3x 40 ton) on the quay and 30 straddle carriers used for moving 
containers within the-Terminal. The stacking area is 24 hectares and 
can accommodate 13,000 x 20 ft containers. Container movements from 
arrival to loading, and discharge to departure from the port are 
computer controlled by the "Container Information Control System" 
(CONICS). This system can control up to 1,300 containers at any one 
time. Behind the stacking area there are two groupage sheds (152m x 
46 m each), providing facilities for the stuffing and unstuffing of 
containers. In addition to these facilities the terminal has two 
RO/RO ramps, a heavy lift quay strengthened to 1,000 tonnes and 
additional parking facilities for trailers and export cars. 
The Timber Terminal is located on the western side of the Dock and 
has a continuous quay length of 427 metres. The quay is nominally 
divided into 3 berths. There are 4x 10 ton cranes on the quay and an 
unspecified number of fork-lifts for moving the timber to the holding 
area and onto road transport. The stacking area adjacent to the quay 
has an area of 6 hectares and there is a back-up area of 7 hectares. 
Behind the stacking area, there is a transit shed (97 mx 53 m). 
The Grain Terminal is located on the southern side of the Dock. The 
facilities provided for ships consist of a single berth in the main 
195. 
dock capable of discharging vessels up to 75,000 d. w. t. and a 183 m 
x 44 m transhipment dock for-loading barges and small coasters. The 
discharging facility consists of two marine towers which are each 
fitted with"amarine leg rated at 1,000 tons per hour, two pneumatic 
pipes (for cleaning-up. and, whilst not encouraged by the Port, 
discharging vessels less than 8,500 d. w. t. ) rated at 250 tons per 
hour each and lifting gear for a clean-up vehicle. From the marine 
towers, the grain is fed by various transfer systems, conveyor belts 
and weighing machines to the workhouse (located on the top of the 
grain silos). The grain can then be routed to either the lorry 
loading house or to the silos. In the lorry loading house, there are 
36 x 200 ton bins which can load up to 6 lorries simultaneously. The 
total silo capacity is 100,000 tons, consisting of 81 x 1,000 ton bins 
with the interspaces taking up the balance of the storage. From the 
silo, the grain can be distributed either directly to the adjacent 
mill sites or to the transhipment dock. Vessels are loaded in this 
Dock via six spouts fed from 12 transhipment bins, each of 300 tons 
capacity. 
The Meat Terminal is located next to the Grain Terminal and consists 
of a single berth. This berth is operated by West Coast Stevedoring 
(W. C. S. ). The facilities available include an undercover discharging 
operation with five mobile conveyors which transport the meat from 
the ship's hold to the shed. In the shed, the meat can be palletised 
and placed in cold storage and loaded onto road transport (there 
being sufficient capacity to load 52 Vans simultaneously). 
196. 
7.3.2 The Liverpool Dock System 
The Liverpool Dock System, has a number of specialist bulk handling 
facilities. Table 7.3 includes the molasses and vegetable oil berths 
in Gladstone; the sugar berth in Alexandra; the molasses berths in 
Canada and the sugar berth in Hüskisson. For smaller vessels, the 
bulk facilities include the bulk ores and scrap berths in Bramley 
Moore; the bulk wines and spirits in South Nelson and the bulk oils 
in Collingwood and Salisbury Docks. 
The general cargo berths at Liverpool Docks are also listed in table 
7.3. This table includes the cranes located on each quay. "Ports of 
The World, 1980" [11 lists the total crane capacity of the Port 
(including Birkenhead) as; three heavy lift floating cranes of 
capacity up to 200 tons; "180 quay cranes; one 50-ton electric crane; 
240 mobile cranes including one at 40 tons, one at 35 tons, one at 30 
tons; 360 fork-lift trucks". In the case of the quay cranes the total 
available on working berths is considerably less than the 180, 
table 7.3 listing 71 cranes of 6 tons or less at these berths. 
(Although in a number of cases information concerning the number of 
cranes at the berth was "not available"l. Most of the general cargo 
berths have transit shed facilities. 
The Docks are surrounded by a perimeter fence which encloses the 
customs area and provides security for the vessels and goods. There 
are a number of gates in the fence whereby access may be obtained 
from the public road (Regent Road) to the Docks. Generally, an 
entrance gate is associated with traffic proceeding to a particular 
dock. Within the Docks, there is a system of roads allowing vehicular 
access to each berth. In the case of the berths on the western side 
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of the docks a number of opening bridges are required to gain access. 
These bridges are located over the passages between Hornby and 
Alexandra, Alexandra and Langton, Brocklebank and Canada and Canada 
and Huskisson Docks. 
In addition to the roads, there is the surfacing of the stacking areas 
at Seaforth and the quays in general. Some sections of the Port's 
berths have also been specially strengthened to accommodate heavy 
lifts including Seaforth (S6), East Gladstone 1 and 2, Alexandra 
Knuckle 1/2 and 2/3, East Canada 1,2 and 3, North Canada 3 and 
Canada Return Berths. 
The maintenance of the facilities in the Port is undertaken by the 
Chief Engineer's Department. The main items of maintenance including 
roads, quays, river walls, sheds, hydraulic machinery, electrical 
machinery, cranes, canteens, pontoons, caissons, bridges, dock gates, 
boundary walls and fences. 
The total labour employed by the M. D. H. C. in January 1980 was 6,523. 
This comprised 992 salaried staff, 2,271 weekly paid staff and 3,260 
Registered Dock Workers. The Chief Engineer's Department and the 
Plant and Equipment Section of the Cargo Operations Division 
currently account for 42 per cent of all the salaried and weekly staff 
employed. 
7.3.3 The Birkenhead Docks 
Table 7.4 lists the main facilities and their usage at the Birkenhead 
Docks during 1979. From the table, it can be seen that the general 
cargo operations in the Docks are confined to the Vittoria Docks and 
Wharf systems. There are 12 x6 ton cranes on the Wharf, and it is 
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believed that there are at least 7 cranes on West Vittoria quay. 
Both areas have extensive transit shed facilities. 
The balance of the dock facilities are mainly for handling bulk 
commodities and are leased by single users or operators. Heavy lift 
facilities are available at Esparto Quay and West Vittoria. 
The remainder of the facilities have been either included with, or 
are similar to those available at Liverpool. The figures for total 
crane and fork-lift capacity incorporated Birkenhead and the mainten- 
ance functions of the Chief Engineer's Department extends to this 
Dock system. 
7.4 The Port's Technical Efficiency 
The methodology developed in Chapter 5 suggested that the first 
escapable cost to be identified is that of not rejecting any traffic. 
The magnitude of this cost giving an indication of. the port's 
technical efficiency, that is, the extent to which the current output 
is being produced at its least cost. If it is likely that this cost 
will be significant then it is also probable that changes in operating 
procedures and plant utilization are advisable., This in turn may 
affect any relationship which may exist between costs, facilities and 
output and consequently the identification of traffic by the facilities 
provided. In the case of the Port of Liverpool, one of the objectives 
of the M. D. H. C. Study was: 0 
"To determine the physical requirements of the Port that 
will minimise capital investment and operating costs 
whilst still maintaining the port's competitive position 
and sustaining the Dock related busineses which provide 
valuable revenues. " 
204. 
Thus, such an investigation represents an exercise similar in spirit 
to that of asking the escapable cost of not rejecting any traffic. 
The recommendations of the Study include significant changes in 
current operating procedures and berth usage. Thus a brief outline 
of the main recommendations will be considered before discussing the 
relationship between traffics, facilities and characteristics. 
The main recommendation. of the Study is, with the exception of the 
L. M. -and 
bulktraf f ics, a 'further concentration of the principle cargo 
handling activities into the Royal Seaforth, Gladstone and Vittoria 
Docks. The L. M. T. operations in Canada and Huskisson Docks are to 
be continued pending the port being able to offer alternative 
faciliites in one of the above docks. By postponining any decision 
regarding this L. M. T. traffic, the Port also maintains a degree of 
flexibility-as the capacity would be available if there was an upturn 
in trade. This contraction would also include withdrawal of all 
operations from the west side berths in Liverpool, as and when this 
becomes practical. The main reason for this withdrawal being that the 
access bridges to these berths are relatively expensive to man and 
maintain. This action would allow the port to leave most of the 
bridges permanently open or on emergency standby only. The exception 
would be the Alexandra/Langton Bridge which would be operational 24 
hours to provide access to the berths and the Gladstone and Langton 
River Entrances. The coastal traffic is to be continued at the 
Waterlook end of the North Docks as long as it "provides a positive 
contribution" or until it can be relocated at River Berths. With 
respect to maintenance and repairs of the port's assets the Study 
suggests that "charges to other Departments, älthough regarded as 
205. 
internal paper transactions, should be competitive with external 
prices". 
7.5 Traffic, Facilities and-Costs 
The services and facilities provided under the heading of the Docks 
will be separated into the two parts outlined in the introduction, 
that is, dock entrance to the quaywall and the berth to the dock gate. 
7.5.1 Dock Entrance to the Quaywall 
1. Capital Assets 
In the ex-ante case (for example, the decision to build the Seaforth 
Docks), it is in principle possible for the port to experiment with 
costs by hypothesizing different dock designs and investment or replace- 
ment dates. One procedure is for the port authority, given the expected 
demand, to design an optimal dock (which, due to the longevity of the 
asset, will require a forecast longer than the normal time horizon). 
The port could then investigate the cost savings of not accepting 
particular traffic. Consider for example the cost saving of not 
accepting the container traffic. It is likely to have been the case 
that the Seaforth complex would not have been built in 1973 if this 
traffic was not accepted. However, this does not imply that all of the 
cost of the complex is attributable to that traffic. Assuming that all 
of the other expected traffic was accepted then it would have been 
necessary in the short-run for the port to undertake alternative 
investments to accommodate the traffic (for example the grain traffic). 
In the long run it would also become necessary for the port to replace 
the existing assets and facilities. The computation of total cost 
without the container traffic will therefore include both the immed- 
206. 
iate: investments and the present values of the replacement investments. 
Thus the escapable cost of the container traffic could be substantially 
less than the cost of the Seaforth Docks. In a similar manner the 
port could investigated the cost saving in not accepting the grain, 
timber or general cargo traffic. In each of these cases, the 
characteristics discussed in chapter 4 are correlated with these 
traffic types. For example, it will tend to be the larger container 
and grain vessels which may impose size related costs on the port. 
In the ex-post case there is the range of costs which the port may 
attempt to compute. At the lower end of this range, there will tend to 
be little opportunity of finding an alternative use for the docks, 
quaywalls and locks. Thus using this measure, the opportunity cost 
would approach zero. It will however be necessary for the Port to 
undertake a number of major capital projects during the 1980's in order 
to be able to accept traffic in each of the three areas. These 
projects include (Tables 7.5 and 7.6): the damming of the. Sandon 
Entrance and the replacement of the engines at Canada; the modernisation 
at the Langton Entrance and the new middle gates at the Gladstone 
Entrance; the various projects at the Birkenhead Locks; and the gate 
repairs at the Waterloo end (although these repairs will only prolong 
the life of the gates until 1990). Given that the port has undertaken a 
study which indicates the optimum location for performing its cargo 
transfer operations, these investments are necessary so that traffic in 
general can be accepted. In other words, the port has some flexibility 
in performing these operations. 
This applies particularly to general cargo traffic where in principle 
it would be possible for some traffic handled at Liverpool to be 
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switched to Birkenhead and vice versa. The exception to this general 
observation is where a traffic requires a specific berth or a berth in 
a specific area of the port. To the extent that this would require 
the port to deviate from an optimum plan then the extra cost is 
allocable to the traffic-causing the deviation. This could for 
example arise in the case of the coastal Ro-Ro/Passenger, traffic 
which may prefer berths located as close as possible to the City of 
Liverpool. 
The upper limit of the cost range may be particularly difficult for 
the Port Authority to estimate. It was argued in chapter 5 that 
this escapable cost is related to the replacement cost-of those assets 
whose renewal is justified by demand. The concentration of the Port's 
principal deep sea cargo handling activities into Seaforth, Gladstone 
and Vittoria Docks, and the comments relating to the continuance of 
the L. M. T. operations in Canada and Huskisson Docks until alternative 
facilities can be offered would suggest that the capacity of Seaforth, 
Gladstone and Vittoria Docks is the relevant capacity when considering 
the replacement of assets for deep-sea traffic. In the case of the 
coastal traffic at the Waterloo end of the North Docks, the Port 
appears to be adopting the middle ground between opportunity cost 
(including major capital repair projects) and replacement or relocation 
costs of some of the facilities (that is, replacement of the lock gates 
in 1990 or relocation at the River Berths). 
There are a number of methods by which the port could attempt to 
estimate the upper limit of cost for the valuation formula. Table 7.7 
shows two extremes -(1 and 
4) and two intermediate methods (2 and 3). 
The historic cost (or valuation) of the Port's assets are shown in 
210. 
1. Historic. cost. 
... 
2. 
. 
"Up-dated" historic cost. 
3. Replacement cost of 
existing assets in situ. 
14. Completely new investment. I 
Table 7.7 Costs of Capacity Warranted by Demand 
Table 7.8. From the Port's accounts it would appear the "valuation" 
mainly applies to "Freehold and leasehold land and buildings". The 
headings which apply to the Docks include "Dock and harbour structures 
including excavations" and part of "Plant and Machinery" (as the 
transfer of £1,624,000 from "Capital works in progress" to "Plant and 
Machinery" was "mainly in respect of the replacement gates at the 
Gladstone Entrance"). The historic cost of Dock and harbour structures 
at 31st December, 1979 would be inappropriate for valuation purposes 
because it will include assets which will not be replaced and it does 
not reflect the current replacement cost. It may however be postible 
to "update" these historic costs by using suitable inflation indices. 
At the opposite extreme historic cost, the port could hypothesise a 
completely new investment. This investment could for example involve 
the-relocation of the Port's capacity to the seaward of the current 
Royal Seaforth Docks. It suggested that in the MDHC case such an 
approach would be purely speculative and thus it would also be 
inappropriate for valuation purposes. An alternative approach is to 
consider the cost of replacing, in its current location, the capacity 
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for which demand exists. This measure is similar to the "updated" 
historic cost and thus it may be possible for the Port to devise a 
valuation which is a compromise between the two methods (2 and 3- 
Table 7.7). None of these methods are entirely satisfactory, however 
the compromise approach provides a figure which may be generally 
accepted for the accounting requirement that total cost equals total 
revenue. 
Whilst this measure indicates the total replacement cost of the 
capital assets, there remains the problem of ascertaining the escapable 
costs of the various traffic using the port. This problem will be 
considered further after discussing the operating costs incurred 
between the lock and the quaywall. 
2. Operating Costs 
In order to accept traffic into a dock system, it will be necessary to 
maintain the locks. These costs will be incurred when traffic in 
general is serviced in the various areas of the port and will tend not 
to be specific to any particular traffic. For example, when considering 
the maintenance of water depth in a dock system the port could 
investigate the cost escapability in not dredging the access from the 
lock to specific berths or docks. Costs could then be attributed to 
specific traffic or groups of traffic in a similar manner to that 
outlined in the initial discussion of conservancy. Consideration of 
the reasons for dredging and the location of silt by "silt depth". 
indicates that this logic may not be applicable. In order to maintain 
the: -impounded water 
levels in the Dock Systems, water is pumped from 
the River into Seaforth, Canada and Alfred Docks. This process, 
combined with the entrance of River water when vessels are locked in 
and out, leads to the siltation within the docks. Thus, in principle 
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it is possible to distinguish two causes of siltation. Firstly, there 
is that which occurs in the port's attempt to maintain the impounded 
water level against natural drainage of water from the docks. This 
occurs regardless of the traffic volume. Secondly, there is that 
which occurs due to the effect of the inflow of river water when 
vessels are locked in and out. This amount of siltation is directly 
related to the traffic volume and inversely related to ship size. 
The inverse relationship arises because, for a given lock and height of 
tide, more river water will need to be pumped into the dock for a small 
ship than a large ship. 
Inspection of the "silt depth" in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 also indicates 
that some docks require more silt to be removed per unit area than 
others. Not unexpectedly, these docks correspond to those where river 
water is pumped into the docks. 
Considering the first cause of siltation, the cost of the resultant 
dredging would appear to be joint to all of the traffic using the port. 
This jointness arising in two ways. Firstly, the provision of an 
impounded water level for one traffic implies that all other traffic 
is provided with that level. Secondly there is an externality whereby 
the provision of the service for traffic not located near a pumping 
inlet (and consequently not requiring as much dredging at its berth) 
impose a cost in the provision of the service for traffic located near 
the inlet. Now, it is conceivable that the port could consider the 
cost savings of not accepting traffic at particular berths or docks 
and thereby reduce the level of dredging. In the short-run this may 
lead to some savings, however after a period of time the silt would 
spill over into other docks. In the longer-run it may be possible to 
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dam the passages between docks. This may lead to a reduction in costs 
however a further study would be required to ascertain the possible 
savings. (The Port would argue that such a study would be to no avail 
as they have a statutory obligation to maintain access to the Leeds 
and Liverpool Canal. However, it would give an indication of one of 
the costs of meeting this obligation). If one further admits the 
indivisibility of dredgers then there is-a considerable degree of 
jointness associated with these costs. 
Some of the considerations applicable to dredging are also relevant to 
surveying within the docks. For example, the surveying is required 
because of the siltation of the docks and therefore there will be the 
associated jointness. Inspection of Tables 7.1 and 7.2 further 
indicates that there are approximately 200 days per annum spent 
surveying both the Liverpool and Birkenhead Docks. This corresponds 
to the number of days a hydrographic surveyor spends on the boat 
surveying and thus represents an indivisible cost.. It should also be 
noted that the Port's Hydrographic Department undertakes surveying 
both under the headings of Conservancy and in the Docks. Thus, some 
of the costs will be joint to both of these undertakings. 
3. Traffic Identification 
Traffic could be identified according to the berth of destination 
within the port. Figure 7.3 shows an-hierarchical structure which 
identifies traffic according to this characteristic. The above 
discussion would suggest however, that whilst some of the Port's costs 
may be related to specific areas (for example, the size related costs) 
this general approach would be inappropriate. This arises because of 
the mobility of a wide range of traffic between berths. A more 
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fig 7.3 Hierarchical Structure for Traffic identification 
appropriate approach would be to consider a classification according to 
vessel type with the trades in which the vessels are engaged as subsets 
of type (see fig 8.3 - chapter 8). Thus at the broadest level, the 
port would consider, for example, the cost saving:. in. not accepting 
all general cargo vessels then the cost saving of not accepting 
particular trades. This classification is discussed further when 
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considering cargo-handling (Chapter 8). The problem arising with this 
approach is that it could lead to a very large number of computations. 
Consider for example a general cargo trade currently using the 
facilities at Vittoria. in order to ascertain the escapable cost of 
not accepting this traffic it would be necessary for the port to 
simulate the demand-patterns of the remaining traffic so that the 
optimum capacity without the Vittoria traffic can be ascertained. 
Having obtained this capacity it will be necessary for the port to 
ascertain its replacement cost for the valuation formula. This 
exercise would then have to be repeated for each traffic and 
combination of traffic. Given the exponential nature of the increase 
in combinations of traffic as the number of identified traffics 
increase it may not be feasible to undertake such an exercise. 
An alternative approach is for the port to consider the long-run cost 
of a marginal berth. This estimate could be devised whilst ascertain- 
ing the compromise measure of replacement cost.. For example, the Port 
could estimate the cost of an extra River berth, or if the date were 
available, the cost of an extra (or the last) berth when the Seaforth 
complex was constructed. This cost can then be allocated to each berth 
for which demand exists, whether it is located in Seaforth, Gladstone, 
Huskisson, Waterloo or Vittoria. Given economies of scale in berth 
construction (due to indivisibilities) it is unlikely that the sum of 
this cost over the berths for which demand exists would be sufficient 
to replace the capacity required. Thus the difference between this 
sinn and the total replacement cost will have to be considered as 
common to all the traffic. 
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7.5.2 The Berth'to the Dock Gate 
1. Traffic and Facilities 
The port, having constructed the dock system, can "fit out" the berths 
for various different types of cargo transfer operations. The degree 
of flexibility available when considering which type of cargo to 
handle at a particular berth will however be constrained by the dock 
configuration and the land area adjoining the berth (these factors 
being taken into account when planning the port or the replacement/ 
expansion of capacity). Thus, whilst an initial port plan will include 
a proposed use of the berth this decision does not rigidly bind the 
port. Flexibility is also available when the port considers the level 
of service to provide at a berth. For example, transit sheds could be 
different sizes, the quay surface could take different loadings, or 
there may be cranes of different capacities (or no cranes at all). 
Apart from these considerations the port tends, given expected demand 
levels, to "fit out" particular berths or groups of berths for specific 
cargo transfer operations. Thus, to the extent that specific vessel 
types or specific users require berths that have been fitted out by 
taking their characteristics into account, there is a relationship 
between the traffic and facilities. Some of these facilities will be 
joint to all of the traffic using the berths whilst in a number of 
cases it may be possible to ascertain the escapable costs of specific 
traffic. 
Such an approach is a facility related approach to ascertaining 
escapable costs; the method being to compute the escapable cost of each 
berth or group of berths whose renewal is warranted by demand. Whether 
the Port considers a single berth or group of berths will depend upon 
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the cargo transfer operation and the associated back-up area and 
facilities. In the case of some single "commodity" berths, the 
back-up facilities tend to be located at the berth itself. For 
example, the grain handling and storage facility at the Grain Terminal 
is linked directly to the berth. However, at the Container Terminal 
any one berth tends to be more generally associated with the container 
stacking and control facilities as a whole. In the case of a general 
cargo quay, it is usual to provide a transit shed (and cranes) for the 
whole quay. Thus, there are savings to the user because the cost of 
supplying a single shed for two berths is less than the cost of 
supplying two separate sheds. If the savings are signficant, then 
the quay can be treated, in the first instance, as the main indivisible 
unit, then the berths as subsets. At some of these general cargo 
berths, the Port may provide facilities "in excess of the facilities 
normally provided for a general cargo berth"; to the extent that these 
facilities are supplied for specific users then they are attributable 
to those users. 
In this approach the question being considered is which costs could be 
saved if the facility (berth or groups of berths) was no longer 
supplied? Whereas the question to which the Port requires an answer 
is which costs could be saved if a particular traffic or group of 
traffic was no longer accepted? However given that berths are fitted 
out for specific traffic types, these two questions are related. 
Consideration of the escapable costs of traffic would have required an 
investigation of all possible traffic and their combinations. Thus by 
examining the facilities an attempt is being made to simplify and 
reduce the number of computations required. 
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Summation of the escapable costs over these facilities will yield a 
cost which is less than the total escapable cost of the facilities 
provided between the berth and the dock gate. The difference will 
include maintenance, land and buildings, access to the berth, and 
perimeter fences. The maintenance, land and-buildings associated with 
the berth can be incorporated within the above analysis. The access to 
the berth and perimeter fences could be considered as being more 
general in nature and thus joint to all traffic using the port. They 
could also be considered as being part of the wider services provided 
at the berth. Even in this second case, they are not necessarily 
attributable to specific traffic - they will tend to increase the cost 
of the marginal berth. 
2. Escapable costs 
In the short-run, the opportunity cost of land owned or leased by the 
Port is the most difficult item to obtain. The approach adopted in 
the MDHC's annual reports is to obtain an "open market value for 
existing" or "alternative use". However, it is noted in". the accounts 
that; 
"The values of operational land could not be fully realised 
except in particular circumstances and over a long period 
of time. " [1] 
At the berth itself, the opportunity cost of the transit sheds can be 
ascertained by considering the alternative uses of warehousing, 
distribution or light industry. The Port has some experience in leasing 
these buildings at berths where cargo is no longer handled and thus can 
obtain values for their opportunity cost. Similarly, the Port's past 
experience in maintaining the buildings, quay surface, access roads and 
perimeter fences can be used to estimate the short-run maintenance 
Costs. 
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In the long-run, the replacement costs of buildings, surfacing, roads, 
fences and gates are relatively easy to ascertain. Thus, in order to 
compute the upper limit of escapbi8 costs, these, replacement 
costs can be imputed into the valuation formula. 
7.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The adoption of the full methodology for measuring escapable costs, as 
outlined in chapter 5, would lead to a particularly complex set of 
calculations. In essence, they would involve firstly estimating and 
costing the capacity which would be replaced. Secondly, it would be 
necessary to withdraw each identified traffic and combination of 
traffic from this demand and re-estimate and cost the capacity 
required. Given the nature of this problem and the difficulties in 
estimating replacement costs some simplification is necessary in order 
to make the problem manageable. 
The main difference between the facilities provided between the lock 
entrance and the quaywall, and the berth and the dock, gate is that 
berths tend to be fitted out for particular cargo transfer operations 
whilst the lock to quaywall (apart possibly from some size related 
costs) tend to be provided for traffic in general. Thus, a suggested 
approach for the berth to the dock gate is to consider a coarse set of 
traffic according to the facilities provided, but differentiating these 
according to vessel type. This would require the port to estimate the 
aggregate demands for relevant berth types including container, grain 
and general cargo; then to estimate and cost the capacity that would 
not be required if these facilities'were not provided. The resulting 
estimate being the escapable costs of each of these traffics in 
aggregate. Where possible (for example with general cargo) the port 
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can then attempt to estimate the escapable cost of a basic marginal 
berth. This cost is then attributable jointly to the traffic 
requiring a berth of the relevant type. If a specific traffic 
requires facilities in excess of those at a basic marginal berth then 
the cost of these facilities can be attributed to that traffic. 
The difference between the sum of the marginal berth cost over all 
berths of a particular type and the escapable cost of this berth type 
in aggregate is common to all vessels of this type. Similarly the 
difference between the sum of the escapable costs of the aggregate 
berth types and the total escpable costs of the Docks are common to 
all traffic. Treating these costs as being common (as distinct from 
being joint) does to a certain extent leave the allocation of the 
common costs to the discretion of the Port Authority. 
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Notes 
[1] Riethmuller, J. (edl, "Ports of the World 1980", Benn Publications 
Ltd, London, 1980. 
[2] The Mersey Docks and Harbour Company, Annual report and accounts 
for the year ended 31st December 1979, p 16. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MEASURING ESCAPABLE COSTS - CARGO HANDLING 
8.1 Introduction 
The approach adopted in this chapter will be to consider the constitu- 
ent elements of the cargo handling revenue rates (price). These rates 
are heavily based on the direct labour costs and thus the development 
and construction of the labour schedules will be considered in some 
detail. The chapter will then consider the escapable costs in both the 
short- and long-run, and the problems that may arise when attempting 
to measure these costs. 
8.2 Cargo Handling Operations 
There are four distinct processes involved in the cargo handling 
operation (fig 8.1). 
`Discharging 
(Stevedoring) 
Master Porterage 
ä 
Loading (Stevedorincr) 
Wharfinging 
fig 8.1 Cargo Handling Operations 
These processes are performed by Registered Dock Workers (RDw) with 
staff employed in a supervisory and clerical capacity. 
The functions of each process include; 
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(i) Wharfinger: 
(a) Receives cargo to be loaded. 
(b) Measures and checks cargo against documents. 
(c) Issues Wharfinger's receipts for cargo. 
(d) Stows cargo in the shed or on the quay. 
(e) Instructs hatch checkers as to the manner in which tallies 
are to be carried out. 
(f) Compiles the ship's cargo plan, and provides the infor- 
mation for the shipowner's Bills of lading. 
The labour employed consists of a receiving quay foreman (in 
charge of the whole process) and a receiver, a plant driver and 
two porters in multiples of 2,3,4 or 5 according to the volume 
of cargo being received. The office side on average consists of 
one plan man, one man attending vehicle drivers' notes, one 
tonnage man, one man returning shipping notes and perhaps one to 
two men assisting where required. 
This operation is to the shipowner's account. 
(ii) Loading (Stevedoring) 
These men used to be called "Master Stevedores" and their 
function is to: 
(a) Move the cargo from-the shed to the ship's side. 
(b) Load the cargo into the ship. 
(c) Stow the cargo in the ship's hold. 
For a ship using derricks rigged in "Union Purchase", there are 
twenty men employed directly; a ship's'hatch foreman who 
supervises the loading (stevedoring) operation, four deckhands, 
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eight holdsmen and one checker at the ship, and five quaymen and 
a mobile crane driver on the quay and in the shed. The 
operation is again to the shipowner's account. 
(iii) Discharging (Stevedoring): 
These men used to be called "Master Lumpers" and their function 
is to discharge the cargo to the point of landing it on the 
quay. With "Union Purchase" gear, there are approximately 
fourteen and a half men employed viz. a ship's hatch foreman, 
four deckhands, eight holdsmen, one landing man and half a 
checker (i. e. his earnings are split on a 50/50 basis between 
the ship and quay). The operation is to the shipowner's 
account. 
(iv) Master Porterage: 
The function of the Master Porter is to: 
(a) Land the cargo on the quay. 
(b) Select the cargo by mark (so that the cargo can be 
delivered direct to the consignee's vehicles or when the 
consignee arrives to collect the cargo it can be easily 
located). 
(c) Stow the cargo in the transit shed. 
(d) Deliver the cargo to the consignee. 
These operations are supervised by a quay foreman, who has a 
hatch foreman (at the ship's side) and delivery foreman 
(delivering cargo to the consignee) assisting him. The direct 
labour employed consists on average of fourteen and a half men 
involved in the processes of landing, selecting and stowing; 
eight porters, two electric truck drivers, one mobile crane or 
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fork-lift truck driver, one landing man and half a checker. All 
these men's earnings except for half of their bonus payments are 
to the consignee's account. Half of the bonus payments are 
allocated to the discharging stevedores (that is, the shipowner's 
account) and the other half to master porterage (that is, the 
consignee's account). The origin of this practice is that under 
the old payment scheme (see below) "quay awards" were debited to 
the ship, and these awards represented half the new bonus. For 
the process of delivery, the number of men involved varies 
according to the number of consignees:. requiring their cargo. 
However on average, five-men-are employed;. ýtwo. porters,.. one 
checker, one-crane driver and the delivery foreman. The process 
is to the consignee's account. 
The historical development of the Master Porter arose, from a 
unique seririce which the Port of Liverpool offers to consignees 
(although now it is only offered on a small scale). This 
service was that the port offered its facilities as a "market 
place" for the sale and trade of goods and commodities ex-ship 
or ex-quay. It was the Master Porters who performed this 
operation. 
8.3 The Costs of Labour 
On the 12th October 1974, a new scheme of bonuses was brought into 
effect. This scheme was an attempt by the port to group all the 
various scheduled and discretionary payments to labour into a single 
scheduled rate. The new schedule was successful in the discharging 
tafiff, however, there are still additional scheduled payments in the 
receiving, loading and delivery operations. The scheme is basically 
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an averaging of previous payments, these payments recognising the 
disutility to the dockworker of handling certain types of cargo and 
therefore indirectly the costs to the port. In the following sections, 
three areas will be investigated. Firstly the old payments scheme, 
secondly the reasons for change and thirdly the new scheme and how it 
was developed. 
8.3.1 The pre-October 1974 Labour Tariff 
Under this scheme, labour engaged in loading and discharging received 
various different types of payment, some of which were according to a 
specific schedule and others which were determined by ship side negotia- 
tions. These payments included: 
(i) Basic Rates of Pay 
This is the basic rate of pay which the RDW receives regardless 
of the capacity in which he is employed (that is, from General 
Dock Worker to Hatchboss this is the basic rate). The rate is 
quoted per hour, half day and day and depends upon the shift in 
which the work is performed. The shifts worked at Liverpool 
are: 
Monday to Friday: 
Day - 0800 to 1200 and 1300 to 1700 
Evening - 1700 to 2300 
Night - 2300 to 0600 
Saturday: 
Day - 0800 to 1200 
Night - 2300 to 0600 
Sunday: 
Day - 0800 to 1100 and 1300 to 1600 
Night - 2300 to 0600 
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different basic rates being paid for each shift (the rates are 
the same for both periods in the day shiftsl. 
(ii)- Occupational Differentials 
When a RDW is allocated to a ship, he is also employed to 
perform a particular job (for example, deckhand, stevedore, 
crane driver, checker, hatchboss etc. ). An "occupational 
differential" is then paid in addition to his basic rate for 
performing this job. This payment also varies according to the 
shift (see above) and in the case of deckhands according to the 
season - summer or winter. 
(iii) Commodity Differentials and Award Payments 
From about 1964, there existed in the Port an award scheme under 
which payments to labour were made to cover: 
(a) Impedance - this was mainly related to the cargo stow. 
Thus for example if cargo was stowed in such a manner that 
it was difficult to discharge (that is, reduced labour 
productivity) then an impedance claim would be made. 
(b) Infestation - these claims were usually made where the 
vessel's hold had not been swept clear of a previous cargo 
(for example asbestos). 
(c) Other - these were claims of a miscellaneous nature. 
Examples include trucking cotton bales over cobbles and 
stowages which were over dunnaged. 
(d) Dirty cargoes - this applied to cargoes which were partic- 
ularly dirty . 
These claims were settled by ship-side negotiations. 
In addition, there was a set schedule of commodity differentials 
which was a list comprising the commodities which were known to 
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merit extra payment due to their dirty or obnoxious nature and 
other unique characteristics. Two lists were in existence, one 
for discharging and delivery and one for loading and wharfing- 
ing. 
in mid-1968, the 
their respective 
The remainder of 
awards and the ci 
October 1974. 
(iv) Bonus Payments 
"dirty cargo awards" were incorporated into 
"Discharging" and "Loading Bonus Schemes". 
the scheme for impedance, infestation, other 
Dmmodity differentials were retained until 
This modified scheme came into existence in mid-1968 and 
applied to discharging and loading. Bonus payments were laid 
down in a schedule and quoted on a per man per ton basis. They 
were broadly related to the inverse of the net productivity 
(that is, the higher the productivity, the lower the bonus and 
vice versa). 
There were various rules to be applied when determining the 
bonus including the following: 
(a) That the bonus was the same in overtime hours as it was in 
normal hours. it applied to cargo workers employed in the 
hold, on deck, on the quay, in craft, and to crane drivers 
and checkers engaged at a vessel. Ancillary staff such as 
porters, coopers and stitchers on delivery and receiving 
were not included in the scheme. . 
(b) In order to calculate the net productivity, the total 
tonnage of cargo handled during the-period was divided by 
the net hours. If the men worked from normal hours into 
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overtime the tonnage handled was averaged over the whole 
period. 
(c) When determining the tonnage of cargo handled, the addi-- 
tional operation of weighing affected the bonus payments. 
If beam scales were used, 35 per cent was to be added to 
the bonus payments and if cargo was weighed by steel yard 
on raised platform scales, 15 per cent was added. Both of 
these methods are slower and therefore affect the gang's 
net productivity. 
(d) An additional allowance was made (flat rate per man per 
tonne) for handling polypropylene wrapped bales and bags. 
The main reason for this was that this type of wrapping 
does not stow readily (that is the slippery nature of the 
bag causes stowages to slip during handling and stack- 
piling). A secondary reason is that bag hooks cannot be 
used. 
Incorporated in the discharging bonus schedule, was a dirt list. 
As mentioned above, this was quoted separately for other cargo- 
handling operations. 
(v) Booster Payments 
This scheme was linked to the Bonus Payments and therefore only 
applied to. discharging. It was in effect a productivity 
incentive payment. There are two ways in which such a scheme 
can be developed: 
(a) Standard net productivities can be agreed for each 
commodity, the dock worker's basic pay then being linked 
to say 70 per cent of this standard. An incentive payment 
is then made as follows: 
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Percentage of standard Incentive payment 
: perförmance (. per, man.. per hourl 
Up to 70 2p 
71 to 80 2ýp 
81 to 90 3p 
91 to 100 3ýp 
101 to 110 4p 
111 to 120 4/p 
121 and over 5p 
This method has the disadvantage that it involves 
considerable clerical time to calculate the payment. 
(b) The principle of a bonus scheme is that the total "bonus" 
payment for achieving standard productivity is the same 
for all commodities, that is; 
Bonus rate Basic Bonus 
x TPNGH* = 
(E/man/tonne) (E/man/hr) 
= constant (K) 
The actual bonus paid then depends upon the extent to which 
actual productivity exceeds this standard. That is= 
Actual Bonus (£/man/hr) 
=Rx TPNGH 
Rxax TPNGH* 
= Q(R x TPNGH*) 
=QK 
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where R= Bonus rate (£/man/tonne) 
TPNGH = Actual productivity 
TPNGH* = Standard productivity 
a= (TPNGH - TPNGH*)/TPNGH* 
= Proportion of standard performance. 
Thus, the actual bonus can be ascertained by knowing the 
proportion of standard performance. 
The extra incentive payment (booster) can then be intro- 
duced by adding a percentage to the actual bonus, that is; 
Actual Bonus + Booster 
=aK (1 + p) 
where p= percentage addition. 
The percentage addition used by the Port was an increasing 
step function, Table 8.1 showing an example where the basic 
bonus is 10 pence (that is, K= 10). 
Table 8.1 Booster Payment Scheme 
Actual Bonus 
Payment (per 
man per hour) 
Up to lop 
over-lop to 15p 
Over 15p to 20p 
Over 20p to 25p 
Over 25p 
Bonus plus Productivity 
Percentage Booster Payment increase 
Addition (per man per above 
hour) standard 
- lop - 
10 Up to 16/p 50% at 15p 
20 18p to 24p 100% at 20p 
30 26p to 32/p 150% at 25p 
40 3.5p and over over 150% 
233. 
The advantage of formulating the problem in this manner is 
that the scheme is applicable to all commodities. Thus, 
once the port has calculated the actual bonus the booster 
payment can be ascertained without reference to the 
commodity. 
Example 
Gang works 8 a. m. to 5. -p. m. with two hours detention. The 
commodity discharged has a bonus rate of £0.0125 per man per 
tonne. During the period 125 t are discharged 
' Bonus payment per man 
Bonus rate x Tonnage 
.. Net hours 
per hour 0.0125 x 125 
6 
= £0.26. 
Fron the Port's actual tables, the booster for 26p was 
100 per cent. 
.. Booster payment per man = 26p 
per hour 
(vi) Overtime Payments 
For any work performed outside normal hours (0800 to 1700 Monday 
to Friday excluding statutory holidays) RDW's receive overtime 
payments. These consist of a higher basic rate of pay and higher 
occupational differentials (for those RDW's who normally receive 
occupational differentials). Thus, for example, a hatch boss 
receives over double (2.2 times) his normal basic pay and half 
as much again as an occupational differential on the Saturday 
night shift. 
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Bonus, booster and commodity payments remain the same in 
overtime hours. 
8.3.2. Reasons for Change 
The changes which occurred in October 1974 were primarily in the 
loading and discharging schedules. The four main reasons which 
contributed towards the need for change were: 
(i) Management's concern with the very high incidence of strikes 
and disputes. 
(ii) Management's concern with the escalation of impedance awards. 
(iii) Dissimilarities' between rates in the existing system and the 
lack of uniformity in their application. 
(iv) Requests from superintendents to be relieved of arbitration 
duties in regard to award payments. 
An hypothesis to explain the large number of different payments which 
evolved and the anomalies in the system is that labour evolved their 
own "schedule" of what they considered "reasonable payment" for 
handling each commodity. If the scheduled rates of payment were 
inadequate then they demanded other payments to compensate for this 
inadequacy. Hypothetical examples of how-this situation could arise 
include: 
(i) If the standard productivity was well in excess of that actually 
being attained, so that the men could not conceivably reach a 
level of bonus where the booster became applicable, then this 
"loss" of booster could be compensated for by either relying on 
the guaranteed basic payment and not putting any "effort" into 
the work or by claiming impedance payments. 
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(ii) Where the specific circumstances of the ship or stow dictated 
that the standard productivity could not be achieved (although 
for a "normal" ship and stow it could be) then an impedance 
award would be claimed. 
(iii) Where it was thought that the scheduled dirt allowances did not 
adequately remunerate the men then compensation would again be 
claimed in an award payment. 
The escalation of impedance awards were most likely explained by an 
attempt by the men to maximise their income. 
8.3.3 The post-October 1974 Labour Tariff 
The principles developed in this tariff are those which are'currently 
applied. This new scheme incorporates the outstanding award payments 
into the discharging bonus schedule or the loading bonus schedule, 
however the loading and delivery "dirt lists" were retained. A scheme 
based on productivity was also introduced for ancillary dockworkers 
(on Receiving and Delivery operations). 
The aims and objectives as stated in one of the preliminary papers on 
the sch ne were that it should: 
(i) be a comprehensive scheme incorporating the old bonus and 
booster schedules, all award payments, and all dirt allowances. 
(ii) encourage improved productivity in the port. 
(iii) be simple, clear and easy to administer. 
(iv) have explicit methods of dealing with "exceptional circum- 
stances". 
(v) be robust and proof against. exploitation. 
(vi) be acceptable to the payboard. 
(vii) be consistent with the commercial aims of the port. 
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(viii) not jeopardise any future change in the scheme. 
(ix) be fair and capable of being negotiated with RDW representa-. 
ives 
(x) be capable of being monitored. 
The method used, was to conduct a stratified sample of vessels loaded 
and discharged between January and September 1973. All principal 
trades were sampled, with not less than five vessels per trade. The 
earnings of RDW's in this sample were analysed in terms of basic, 
piecework (bonus, booster and dirt allowances) and awards. Awards 
being later broken down into impedance, infestation and others. 
In essence, the methodology was as follows: 
(i) find the total hourly earnings of the dock worker (in excess 
of his basic pay and occupational differentials) for each 
commodity. 
(ii) group these into seven different rates of "earnings per net 
man hour" (ENMH). 
(iii) obtain a consensus of views on standard productivities - 
"tonnes per net gang hour" (TPNGH) - for each commodity. 
(iv) calculate the new bonus from the formula: 
Bonus = 
ENMH 
TPNGH 
thus arriving at a rate per man per tonne. 
One of the major concerns of the port was that the new schedule should 
be fair to labour and capable of negotiation. In other words, it was 
Bonus = 
ENMH 
TPNGH 
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absolutely essential to be able to demonstrate that no RDW would be 
worse off (receive less total earnings) under the new scheme than under 
the old scheme: 
For the discharging schedule, the methodölogy actually used was as 
follows: 
(i) The 51 different bonus rates ranged from O. 32p to 4.92p per man 
per ton. These were multiplied by the productivity to obtain 
the bonus earnings per man per hour, that is 
Bonus x productivity = constant (bonus earnings per man 
per hour) 
To these were added the booster payments. It was found that 
the average booster payment percentage addition was 60 per cent 
so instead of using the "stepped" booster a "linear" booster 
was found for each commodity, as shown in figure 8.2. 
(ii) A weighted average of these payments (bohus and booster) was 
then calculated for all commodities. Similarly a weighted 
average of award payments was obtained yielding the following 
results (pence per man per hour):.. 
Bonus and booster average 38p 
Award payments average 
3ý 
Total ENMH above wages and differentials 72p 
Less weighted average of dirt allowances 
Non-dirt basic rate 69p 
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Fig-8.2 Stepped and Linear Booster 
(iii) The actual ENMH were compared with this average and it was 
found that there were 31 actual rates which ranged between 20 
per cent and 76 per cent above the average. It was decided to 
reduce these to six categories, viz. +25%, +35%, +45%, +55%, 
+65% and +75%. 
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u. D 1. o 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 
Productivity as a multiple of standard 
(iv) Further calculations adjusted these to seven ENMH; one non-dirt 
at 69p, and six dirt rates at 73p, 80p, 88p, 94p, £1.02p and 
£1.09p. 
(v) A consensus of views was obtained on the standard TPNGH and the 
new bonus rates calculated from the formulae: 
S 
ENMH 
New Bonus Rate = Standard TPNGH 
the rate being expressed in £ per man per tonne. 
The-tariff developed contains approximately 330 listed cargoes which 
are differentiated according to the commodity, packaging or weight of 
individual units. 
The approach adopted, when considering the loading schedule was to 
group commodities into eleven categories. For the first nine 
categories the bonus rate increases. The last two categories are for 
full cargoes of metals and loose rubber tyres. Whilst there are a 
number of listed commodities in each category, the broad structure 
indicates that either the weight of an individual unit decreases or 
the stowage factor increases with the category number (Table 8.2). 
One reason why it has been possible to devise a much smaller list than 
was the case with discharging is that the "Flat Payment Dirt 
Allowances" have been retained for loading. This lists approximately 
130 commodities and the rate is paid per man per deadweight tonne. 
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Table 8.2 Labour Loading Schedule Categories 
Category 
Bags 
(kg/bag) 
Drums 
(kg/drum) 
Stowage Factor 
(m3/tonne) 
1 > 51 > 51 < 1.133 
2 > 14 to 51 > 18 to 51 > 1.133 to 1.982 
3 < 14 - > 1.982 to 5.663 
4 - < 18 - 
5 - - - 
6 - - > 5.663 to 8.495 
7 - - > 8.495 to 11.327 
8 - - > 11.327 to 14.158 
9 - - > 14.158 
Labour which was not engaged in loading and discharging, that is, 
labour engaged*on delivery, receiving and other ancillary operations 
prior to the 1974 changes received the basic rate of pay, occupational 
differentials and the dirt allowance (in accordance with a scheduled 
dirt list). However in October 1974, a Port Productivity Scheme was 
introduced in addition to these payments. The scheme is based upon 
the total tonnage handled in general cargo and groupage operations and 
upon the total gross hours worked. The tonnage to be included is 
contained in an appendix to the schedule. The payment is computed as 
follows: 
The average weekly productivity is found from the formula: 
Total Weekly Tonnage 
Total of Ancillary Workers Gross Hours 
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The resulting figure is called the Port Index and has the standard 
value of 1.24. If the actual exceeds the standard then the hourly 
payment of the ancillary worker is found from the following table: 
Tons per man per 
gross hour 
(Port index) 
Payments per '. 
gross man hour 
(pence) 
1.24 40.0 
1.3 42.4 
1.4 46.4 
1.5 50.4 
1.6 54.4 
1.7 58.4 
1.8 62.4 
1.9 66.4 
2.0 70.4 
2.1 74.4 
2.2 78.4 
If the weekly performance falls below 1.24, then a payment of 37p per 
gross man hour is guaranteed. 
The table is developed from the principle that, in addition to the 
40 pence per hour for attäiriing the Port Index, ancillary workers will 
be paid at the rate of 40p per tonne (pro rate for each part of a 
tonne) by which performance in the week exceeds the index. In other 
words: - 
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Payment per gross = 40 + 40 (Actual ti Standard) 
man hour 
= 40 [1 + (Actual ti Standard)] 
Example: Assume that the total weekly tonnage was 14,000 t and that 
total gross hours of ancillary workers was 10,000 hours. 
Total weekly tonnage 
= 
14,000 
Actual Index = Total gross hours 10,000 
= 1.4 
.. Payment per gross = 
40[l + (1.4 - 1.24)] 
man hour 
= 46.4p 
8.4 Establishing the Revenue Rate (Price) 
The basic method of establishing a revenue rate (price) is to mark-up 
on direct labour costs and to charge separately for any extras on a 
cost-plus basis. Thus the price charged has the following components: 
(i) Wages of the RDW. 
(ii) Occupational differentials. 
(iii) Commodity differentials - including loading and discharging 
"Bonus Schemes" and the loading "Dirt List". 
(iv) Other "Awards": the only "Awards" which remain in the Port are 
for: 
(a) cargo which has been damaged by fire and salvage cargo. 
(b) "abnormal abnormalities". 
(v) Mark-up: The function of the mark-up is to recover the over- 
head costs associated with the provision of the cargo-handling 
process. These costs include: 
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Wage Related Costs: 
1. Fall back pay. 
2. Holiday pay. 
3. Sick pay. 
4. National Insurance. 
5. National Dock Labour Board Levy. 
6. Inter Employer Surcharge. 
7. Transport of Registered Dock Workers. 
8. Port Labour Transfer. 
9. Amenities. 
District/Terminal Office Costs: 
10. Salaries. 
11. National Insurance. 
12. Telephones. 
13. Transport. 
14. Domestic fuel. 
15. Sundries. 
16. Wages. 
Miscellaneous: 
17. Insurance. 
18. Security. 
19. Electricity. 
20. Claims. 
21. Damages. 
22. Cleaning berths. 
23. Engineer's costs. 
24. Miscellaneous costs. 
25. Berth Allocation fees. 
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--Quayside Plant 
26. Mobile cranes (up to six tonnes capacity). 
27. Fork lift trucks (up to six tonnes capacity). 
The Quoted Revenue Rate is then found from the following accounting 
equation: 
- Occupational Commodity 
Revenue Rate = Wages ++ (1 +a 
Differentials Differentials 
These five components represent the basic price quoted in the Port's 
schedules of cargo handling, the separate charges for extras include 
the following: 
(vi) Extra plant: Included in the mark-up, is an allowance for 
"minimum" or "normal" plant used between the berth and the 'shed, 
however plant in excess of this is charged for separately on 
an "at cost" basis. At the ship, extra plant includes such 
items as: 
(a) Mobile cranes over 6 tonnes S. W. L. 
(b) Floating cranes. 
(c) Quayside cranes. 
(d) Plant employed aboard ship in stowage (e. g. fork-life trucks). 
whilst on the quay it includes: 
(a) Mobile cranes or fork-lift trucks used in "long-runs" for 
loading operations. 
(b) Mobile cranes used in "top stowing" cargo in the transit 
shed for discharging operations. 
For the next three components (overtime, detentions and extra labour) 
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the Port has a "Table of Premium Charges". This table is constructed 
on a cost-plus basis, with the mark-up being less than that for the 
revenue rate. 
(vii) Overtime Payments: As outlined above, higher payments are made 
for work performed outside normal hours (that is, higher basic 
rates of pay and occupational differentials). For the 
purposes of establishing a price which will recover these 
costs and make a contribution to overheads, the port marks-up 
on the average direct costs of providing the service. Thus 
the accounting equation is: 
Premium charge 
_ (Average gang cost)(1 + a) 
for overtime 
where the average gang cost is derived from the number of men 
scheduled for the commodity and the average overtime payments 
including occupational differentials. 
(viii) Detentions: On the cost side, labour is guaranteed a minimum 
bonus earnings level on a daily basis if no delays or 
detentions occur. If delays occur due to causes other than 
weather (for example, a breakdown of the ship's gear) a 
lower minimum payment is guaranteed. If delays occur due to 
weather an even lower per hour payment is made for the 
duration of the interruption. 
The accounting equation for detentions therefore becomes: 
Premium for (Average gang cost 
detentions + average detention payment)(1 + a) 
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(ix) Extra Labour: There are two schedules quoted for extra 
labour, that at "premium charges" and that at "rates". The 
"premium charges" are calculated in a similar manner to 
overtime and detentions, Extra labour att_! rates" is calculated in 
a similar manner except that the mark-up is greater. 
Premium charges are used in the majority of cases, however in 
special cases where it is felt that the user should make a 
higher contribution to overheads, extra labour at "rates" is 
charged. This may occur for example when extra labour is 
required to discharge and reload cargo which is over stowing 
Liverpool cargo. 
(x) Rechargeables: This is a charge to recover the cost of plant 
and equipment which the ship uses and has been debited to 
cargo handling. Examples of these charges include canteen 
facilities, cargo watching services, Her Majesty's Customs 
charges and floating cranes. 
(xi) Sundries: These are charged in a similar manner to extra 
plant, that is on an "at cost" basis. Sundries include items 
such as: shed lights, protective clothing, coopersmats etc. 
In order to compute the revenue rates, the following elements are 
required: 
(i) Number of men in. gangi, 
(ii) The standard manning for the commodity and circumstances. 
(iii) The hourly rate of pay per man - including differentials. 
(iv) The standard net productivity per commodity. 
(v) The bonus payment and flat rate dirt allowances (where 
appropriate) per man per tonne. 
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(vi) The extras, overtime, detentions and sundries incurred by the 
vessel. 
(vii) The mark-up to apply in each case. 
Table 8.3 shows a pro-forma calculation of the quoted and total 
revenue rates per tonne. 
Standard manning x respective rates incl. differentials 
Q XX (£/t) Standard net productivity 
Bonus rate x standard manning = XX (£/t) 
Total direct costs - XX (£/t) 
Percentage addition for overheads XX (£/t) 
Quoted revenue rate per tonne/unit XXX (£/t) 
Extra plant XX (£/t) 
Premium charges for - Overtime XX (£/t) 
- Detentions XX (£/t) 
- Extra Labour XX (£/t) 
Extra Labour at rates XX (£/t) 
Sundries and Rechargeables XX (£/t) 
Total Revenue per tonne/unit xxx (£/t) 
Table 8.3 Pro-forma for Computing the Revenue Rate 
8.5 Traffic 
A broad classification of traffic by similar characteristics could 
incorporate a coastal/deep-sea distinction; vessel type; either the 
trade/liner conference in which the vessel is engaged or the 
commodity carried; and (where appropriate) vessel size (for example, 
large tankers and other tankers). Fig. 8.3 shows such a structure for 
the deep-sea traffic. 
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At the vessel type level, the port provides cargo handling services 
and facilities which are different in nature for each of these types. 
These facilities were outlined in chapter 7 when considering the 
Docks. Thus for example the cargo handling facilities provided at the 
grain terminal are different from the container cranes, straddlö 
carriers, CONICS control system and groupage facilities at the container 
terminal. Similarly the facilities provided for handling bulk sugar 
are different from the quayside cranes and fork-lifts provided for 
general cargo operations. Therefore, some öf: the facilities provided 
are specific to vessel types. There are however a number of services 
and facilities (for example, labour) which are provided for more 
general use within the port. These factors have varying degrees of 
mobility around the port and thus are not generally associated with a 
specific traffic. There are also varying degrees of service mobility 
within vessel types, for example, there is in principle no reason why 
the trade using the berths at Huskisson could not be transferred to 
say Vittoria. Thus when considering general cargo vessels the 
relevant services and facilities will in some cases be those provided 
for the incremental traffic. 
8.6 Escapable Costs in the Short-Run 
In the short-run, there are a number of costs which could be escaped 
if a particular traffic was not accepted. These costs will therefore 
be directly-relevant to the pricing of marginal units. As discussed 
above, the labour tariff consists of the basic wage, occupational 
differentials, bonus payments and in the case of some operations a dirt 
allowance. Once an RDW is allocated to a ship, he receives the 
occupational differential and is also guaranteed a minimum daily bonus 
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payment (provided that any delays or detentions are beyond the men's 
control). The actual bonus payment will depend upon the gang's 
performance, and in the discharging case the dirt category into which 
the commodity falls. For loading, delivery and receiving the extra 
dirt allowances are paid. In the discharging schedule the bonus plus 
occupational differentials represent a not insignificant proportion 
of the total revenue rate. For example, in the rate for Mixed General 
Merchandise, Brest to Elbe and the Far East the percentage is 
approximately fifteen, this figure not being atypical. Within the 
overhead costs (included in the mark-up) there are also some costs 
which are relevant to the marginal unit. For example, given that the 
employer's national insurance contribution is a proportional tax, the 
employer will have to pay national insurance on the bonus plus 
occupational differential. The fuel or electricity costs of "normal" 
plant will similarly be relevant to the marginal unit as will any 
consumable items or cleaning of protective clothing. 
In addition to the traffic's basic requirements further costs are 
incurred for extra plant and rechargeables, and if labour works 
outside the weekday shifts (0800 to 1200 and 1300 to 1700 hours) 
overtime costs are incurred. The fuel used for this plant and the 
extra overtime payments are all short-run escapable costs. With 
respect to rechargeables, the extent to which they are escapable costs 
in the short-run depends upon whether they are an internal paper 
transaction or an external transaction. In the case of Custom's 
charges they are short-run escapable, however in the case of internal 
transactions the non-fuel costs may not be short-run escapable. 
Some of these costs are jointly attributable to the commodities 
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handled during a shift and include the occupational differentials, 
basic bonus, overtime, sundry consumables and fuel for the normal 
plant. Other costs are attributable to specific commodities handled, 
for example, the bonus in excess of the basic bonus and in some cases 
the fuel and overtime required for extra plant. 
The above comments apply to deep-sea general cargo handling, however, 
the principles are equally applicable to the container, Ro-Ro and 
bulk handling operations. 
8.7 Escapable Costs in the Long-Run 
In the long-run it will be possible for the port to introduce 
"voluntary severance schemes" and not to replace labour when natural 
wastage occurs. Similarly there is the option of not replacing cranes, 
fork-lifts and other plant. Thus, these costs are escapable in the 
long-run. 
A decision not to accept a particular traffic in the long-run will 
also have repercussions which extend beyond the provision of fork- 
lifts, cranes and labour. For example, not accepting the traffic may 
imply: lower wage related costs (holiday and sick pay, levies and 
surcharges); lower supervisory, administrative and management costs 
(salaries, wages, national insurance, telephones and transport); 
lower levels of maintenance staff and stocks of repairs; less 
garaging facilities for fork-lifts; and a lower level of miscellaneous 
items (insurance, security and cleaning of bertha). Thus, these 
costs must also be considered as being escapable in the long-run. 
The opportunity costs (lower limit) of these assets could be low. For 
example, the port authority will have little opportunity to employ 
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RDW's in capacities other than dock work. Similarly, it may be 
difficult for the port to use the quaycranes other than for discharging 
ships. It may however be possible to find employment for some of the 
mobile plant and equipment. For example the port may be able to lease 
or hire out fork-lift trucks and mobile cranes. If these opportunities 
are available on a short-term basis (for example, hiring out the 
cranes for a day) then these costs become short-run escapable costs and 
an opportunity cost equal to that charged by outside plant hire firms 
(given a competitive market) is relevant. If it is only possible to 
lease the equipment then the outside rate is again relevant however 
the decision is long-run in nature. 
The escapable-costs (upper limit) are in principle easier to 
ascertain than in the docks case. Given a crane or fork-lift with 
specific characteristics then the port could obtain from the 
manufacturers a replacement cost and therefore a required input for 
the valuation formula. If the asset would be replaced with one of 
different specifications then the replacement cost of this asset can 
equally well be included in the valuation formula. In the long-run 
the escapable cost of labour? will be the basic time rate of pay. 
8.8 The Escapable Cost Matrix 
The A matrix for calculating the directly attributable costs applicable 
to the traffic identified in table 8.3 is shown in table 8.4. Three 
important features are omitted from this matrix when compared with the 
theoretical model of chapter S. The first is that a number of trades 
have not been included. This is for the purposes of exposition only. - 
they can be included in the full matrix. The second feature relates 
to the relative absence of joint traffics. For example the traffic 
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Table 8.4 An Escapable Cost Matrix for Cargo Handling 
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"Trade/Conference" represents the cost. that could be saved if the 
Elbe-Brest and Far East and Iberian and Indian traffic was jointly 
not accepted. However the combinations, say, Iberia and India or 
Iberia and Grain have not been included. The implication of these 
omissions is that some costs will be computed as being joint to more 
traffic than they ought to be. Consider, for example, an hypothetical 
case where all ships take one day to load and discharge. A traffic X 
consists of a ship every second day and a traffic Y consists of a 
ship on the alternate days. The cost saving in not accepting either 
traffic separately will be the short-run escapable costs outlifted 
above. in the long -run the cost savings are likely to be small as 
the same level of cranes, fork-lifts and labour will be required even 
if one of these traffics is not accepted. However, if both of them 
are not accepted then these long-run costs could be saved. The 
matrix in table 8.4 would therefore suggest a low escapable cost for 
X and Y separately, and the costs which are specifically attributable 
to X and Y jointly will be'kassed on to the more general category of 
"Trade/Conference". Thus, the traffic falling under the heading of 
"Trade/Conference"-should be asked, to jointly pay for facilities and 
services which are allocable specifically to X and Y. 
The third omission is that it may be possible to consider increments 
of traffic within a particular trade/conference. This possibility 
will arise in the case of the larger volume trades and would allow 
the port to obtain a cost which is closer to long-run marginal cost 
than the long-run incremental cost obtained when considering the 
whole trade. 
The more important omission therefore is that of not including the 
255. 
various combinations of traffic. In an attempt to resolve this 
problem, it would be necessary to compute the escapable costs of all 
the combinations of traffic. Taking for example the end leaves of 
the diagram in fig 8.3 there are eleven traffics and therefore 2048 
different combinations. Given that this list of traffic is incomplete 
the number of combinations would rapidly become unmanageable. 
Compounding this problem further is the computation of the escapable 
cost of each of these combinations of traffic. Given the mobility of 
some of the factor inputs, a flexibility in the location where the 
service is performed and the servicing pattern for vessels (including 
arrival patterns, queueing, service times, and delivery and receiving 
of goods from the docks) it would be necessary to ascertain the 
optimum level of resources to employ every time a traffic was deleted 
from the list in order to compute its escapable cost. Thus in 
addition to the large number of escapable costs the port would also 
have a complex simulation problem to solve. 
Whilst it may be possible to reduce the number of computations by 
considering the circumstances Of a particular case, it is unlikely 
that the order of magnitude of these reductions could approach that 
achieved for conservancy. 
it may however be possible to isolate some of the cost items and 
legitimately attribute them to groups of traffic. In section 8.5 
it was noted that some facilities were provided for specific cargo 
handling operations. It has also been noted that two contributing 
factors to the above computational problems are mobility of some 
factor inputs and flexibility in the location where the service is 
performed. Thus, it would appear appropriate to separate the factor 
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inputs into those which are provided for specific traffic or groups of 
traffic and those which are more general in nature (that is, mobile 
between traffic). This separation can occur at both the aggregate 
level and within groups of traffic. 
When considering traffic in aggregate the main factor in the more 
general category is labour. Assuming perfect mobility of labour then 
the port would compute the labour force required to meet the total 
expected demand. The basic rate times the labour force would then be 
considered as representing the ceiling of total labour costs 
(excluding the short-run labour costs discussed above) to be recovered 
from port users. It is however to be noted that this cost is "joint 
to more traffic than it need be". Thus it is a common cost (that is, 
not joint due to indivisibility) and it-represents an upper bound for 
cost recovery. If there are constraints on the mobility of labour, 
then the costs may be attributable to subsets of traffic but within 
the subset they are common to all traffic. For example, the MDHC 
Study suggests the establishment of three labour control centres: one 
at Vittoria to handle Birkenhead general cargo; one at Gladstone to 
handle general cargo and timber; and one at Seaforth to handle grain 
and containers. However again within these subsets the costs are only 
common. 
The factors in the more specific category depend upon the cargo 
handling operation or particular traffic. Thus the facilities at the 
container terminal, grain terminal and general cargo berths (excluding 
labour as appropriate) will be common to their respective traffic. 
Within these groups of traffic, there may be some costs which are 
either specific to a particular traffic or joint (in the indivisible 
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sense) to groups of traffic. Before these costs can be attributed to 
their respective traffic it will be necessary-for the port to ascertain 
whether the facilities are provided as substitutes for, or in addition 
to the facilities provided generally for all the traffic in the group. 
if they are additional then they are correctly attributable to the 
traffic and the "common" -. costs 
less these specific costs are common to 
all traffic. If they are substitutes, then the traffic involved should 
be treated separately and should not be required to contribute to the 
common costs. 
Consideration of these smaller groups, with similar characteristics, 
may also make it possible to simulate the escapable costs of particular 
traffic and combinations of traffic. For-example the port could 
compute these costs at the container terminal by considering the 
conferences using the terminal as separate traffic and general users 
as a single traffic. The discussion of the traffic in aggregate is, 
however also applicable to this case. That is, as the number of 
different traffics increase the number of computations and simulations 
of escapable cost increases rapidly. 
8.9 Summary and Conclusions 
Sections 8.2,8.3, and 8.4 above outlined the method by which the MDHC 
computes the revenue rate (price) for handling general cargo. This 
rate incorporates a complex set of payments to labour which partially 
consolidate various award payments, dirt allowances, productivity 
payments and occupational differentials. These payments represent a 
not insignificant proportion of the present revenue rate (typically 15 
per cent) and are directly attributable, in the short-run, to either 
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the commodities handled during the shift or to specific commodities. 
In other words, if the traffic was not accepted then these costs would 
not be incurred. Thus, they are allocable either to a commodity or 
the commodities handled during the shift and represent part of the 
minimum price'that the traffic should pay. If labour works overtime 
then an overtime premium is payable,. these costs are similarly 
escapable in the short-run. In addition, there are other payments 
which the port considers as being overheads but which are escapable in 
the short-run. These include fuel costs and the percentage increases 
on-the above costs represented by national insurance (both employer's 
and employee's contribution) and other proportional levies. These 
costs should then be added to the above in order to obtain the 
minimum price. 
The long-run costs may be more difficult for the port to allocate to 
specific traffic or groups of traffic. The basic question which 
arises relates to whether it is feasible to adopt the model outlined 
in chapter 5. If the port has only a small number of different 
traffics then it is possible, in principle, to ascertain the escapable 
costs for the vector or matrix. Under these circumstances the 
procedure is similar to that discussed under conservancy. Thus, the 
port would estimate demand over ä planning horizon then ascertain the 
level of services and facilities necessary to meet this demand. 
Certain of the factor inputs will be in existence at the beginning of 
the planning horizon and thus the port has the problem of ascertaining 
the opportunity costs or valuation to obtain the lower and upper 
limits respectively for cost recovery. However, as these assets or 
contracts become due for renewal their costs become escapable and 
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therefore allocable to the traffic over the relevant time horizon. 
This applies not only to physical assets such as cranes and fork-lifts, 
but also to labour, where the "severance schemes"-can be introduced. 
Having computed these costs for the traffic in aggregate over the 
planning horizon the port can ascertain the escapable costs of not 
accepting all the appropriate combinations of traffic (that is, it may 
not be necessary to consider all possible combinations of traffic). 
Due to the servicing patterns for vessels this exercise will most 
likely involve a model which simulates the port's traffic. This 
exercise then provides the data for the escapable cost matrix from 
which the costs which are directly attributable to the respective 
traffic can be computed. These costs are then either specific or 
joint to defined traffic. The port's remaining problem being to 
ascertain the respective traffic's willingness to pay for the services. 
in the MDHC case it was suggested however that such a comprehensive 
approach may not be feasible. This arose because firstly, it was not 
believed that the degree of simplification obtained in. the conservancy 
case could be duplicated (In that case, the simplification was 
obtained because the costs were largely independent of the traffic); 
secondly, the number of computations of escapable cost (and therefore 
simulations of costs without particular traffics) would consequently 
become unmanageable. Therefore the approach adopted was to consider 
selected traffic and combinations of traffic. These were broadly 
outlined in the tree diagram in table 8.3. In practice, there would 
be more end-points in the diagram - these can be incorporated as 
required. Even this diagram may involve considerable computational 
difficulties (in particular, the simulations required) and thus, it 
may be necessary to contract:. further back along the-tree and consider 
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only vessel type. The approach adopted under these circumstances is 
similar to that outlined in the case where all the escapable costs can 
be ascertained. The main difference arises in the interpretation of 
the resulting costs. The directly attributable costs obtained from 
the escapable costs and the A matrix are still directly attributable 
to their respective traffic; however they are common to this traffic 
and consequently using willingness to pay as the criteria for alloca- 
ting costs within any identified traffic group could lead to cross- 
subsidisation with respect to the (uniddntified) escapable costs. 
The advantage of undertaking the computation is that the port knows 
the total costs ällocable to a selective number of traffics; the 
problem that remains is one of allocating the common costs. 
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CHAPTER 9 
MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR COMPANY (MDHC) 
CHARGING SCHEDULES 
9.1 Conservancy 
In 1979, revenue from conservancy dues represented 4.5 per cent of the 
Port's total operating revenue of E66m (Table 9.1). On the cost side, 
operating expenditure on conservancy was 3 per cent of the Port's 
total operating expenditure of E60m, and if cargo handling is excluded 
then conservancy represents 8.3 per cent. Within the total:. figure of 
E1.8m, contract dredging is the largest single item of conservancy at 
approximately E700,000. In addition, the MDHC makes a provision for 
depreciation of fixed assets and Allocates interest charges totalling 
E400,000. 
The current pricing practice adopted by the MDHC with respect to 
conservancy charges is to levy a flat rate per gross registered ton 
(grt) with different rates being charged according to the vessel's 
origin or destination. Two origins/destinations are distinguished; 
the first being broadly defined as the'United Kingdom and Ireland, and- 
the second as "all other areas". In terms of the rate, "all other 
areas" pay approximately three times the rate for the U. K. and 
Ireland., In the case of vessels loading or discharging petroleum at 
Tranmere the conservancy charge is incorporated with berth charges. 
Information on charges for container vessels being subject to inquiry 
to the Port's Senior Commercial Officer. 
There are a number of arguments that the Port could submit in support 
of this pricing system. Given an accounting requirement that total 
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Table 9.1 Profit and Loss Account 
OPERATING REVENUE 
Dues - on Ships 
- on Goods 
- on Passengers 
Cargo Handling 
Cranes and Plant 
Warehousing and Storage 
Sundry Services and Facilities 
Rents 
Other Income 
Total Op. ratinq Revenue 
Dock Undertaking 
Total and 
Cargo Handling 
1979 1978 1979 1978 
8'000 £'000 E'000 2'000 
Conservancy Pilot Boats 
1979 1978 1979 1978 
£ 000 E'ooo £'000 £'ooo 
11,729 12,155 8,731 9,205 3,003 2,9S4 
13.4il 14.371 13,461 14,371 -- 
132 13L 132 131 -- 
25,322 26,637 22,324 23,7o7 3,003 2,954 
35,973 32,958 33,973 32,958 -- 
227 210 545 458 52 1 
299 333 298 333 
1,370 1.227 228 lei 1,150 1,150 
2.079 1,859 2,079 1,976 
994 1,174 1,086 1,300 
66,263 64.418 62.533 60,913 3,05S 2,95S 1,150 1,150 
OPERATING EXPENDITURE 
Operating and Maintenance 10.743 11,312 9,482 9,654 743 977 ass 784 
Dredging 1,910 I. SO7 1#107 979 711 632 
Cargo Handling 38,264 34,310 38,392 34,685 - - 
General Administrative Cha gas 3,670 3,321 
Lowy - National Ports Council 191 173 
Police Expenses 1.070 872 
1 
8,549 7. SlO 340 330 171 133 
L*Cal Rates 871 836 
Superannuation and Allowances 3,259 2,755 
Total operating Expenditure 59,878 55,086 $2,828 1.796 
- 
1,939 1,026 219 
OPERATING PROFIT 6,38S 9,332 3,003 6,085 
; 
. 259 1.016 124 231 
DEPRECIATION 3.419 3,670 2,969 3.373 274 162 177 135 
INTEREST 4,793 4,420 4,724 4,406 126 59 (57) (45 
(1, OSS)/PROFIT BEPME EXCEPTIONAL-ITEM (1.1327) 1,242 (2.690) 306 859 795 4 141 
VOLUNTARY SEVERANCE (5,635) (2,712 (5,635 (2,712 - 
(LOSS) /PROFIT NEFORE TAXATION AND - 
EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS (7,462) (1,470) (8,325) (2,406) 859 795 4 141 
source: MDBC, Annual report and accounts for the year ended 31st December 1979 
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I 
revenue equals total cost, the Port could attempt to meet the require- 
ment by estimating total expected expenditure and total expected 
traf f ic (in terms of grt) , divide the one by the other to obtain an 
average cost and set price equal to this amount. However, on the 
cost side the Port may argue that in the longer run, it is the larger 
ships which impose the higher costs on the Port. Thus, even if the 
immediately escapable costs are not related to ship size, the Port may 
argue that they are pricing according to long-run costs. On the demand 
side, it could be argued that as voyage length increases, the propor- 
tion of port costs in total transport costs decreases. Thus, as 
voyage length decreases the price elasticity of demand for port 
services increases (The factors influencing the price elasticity of 
demand for a factor of production will be discussed further in 
Chapter 10 (Section 10.3)). Therefore, larger ships on longer 
voyages have a greater ability to pay. The cross-elasticities of one 
port for another and the port for other means of transport will also 
tend to be higher for the smaller coastal vessels than the deep-sea 
vessels. This arises because firstly there are a number of ports in 
the North West of the United Kingdom capable of handling these smaller 
vessels, and secondly, within the United Kingdom, the possibility of 
the commodities being carried by other means of transport. Thus the 
coastal vessels have a lesser willingness to pay. The port may also 
take into account that a coastal vessel can make many more entries 
into the port during a fixed period of time than vessels with longer 
route lengths. Thus, the port may be considering the willingness to 
pay of the coastal traffic over a period of time when setting a lower 
price for this traffic. 
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Once the port has determined the relative prices of coastal and deep 
sea traf f ic the procedure for ascertaining the absolute prices is 
straightforward. 
Let, R = total revenue 
C = total cost 
AC = average total cost 
Q = total traffic volume- 
P = price 
a = relative price of deep sea to coastal traffic 
= proportion of coastal traffic in total grt 
W) - proportion of deep sea traffic in grt 
subscript C= coastal traffic 
subscript D= deep sea traffic 
then, RC+ RD=C 
PCx QC +PDxQD AC xQ 
ic !D ( 
-) Q 
P+( 
)P 
AC 
CQD 
wPC+ (1 - W)P D 
AC 
and given that, 
therefore, 
and 
P 
pD , PDPC 
C 
w PC + a(1 - w) PC = AC 
PC (w +a- aw) = AC 
PC (w +a- aw) 
AC 
_a PD (w +a- aw) 
AC 
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Thus for example, if coastal traffic represents one-third of the 
total traffic (in grt) and the deep-sea rate is three times the 
coastal rate, then the price for coastal traffic is 3/7ths of the 
average total cost and the deep-sea rate is 9/7ths of the average 
total cost. 
The two major advantages of this pricing system are the ease of 
calculation and administration of the rate. Once the port has 
determined the relative prices they can easily compute the rates. 
Similarly there are only two rates, based on a measure which is 
relatively easy to ascertain and check (grt being available in Lloyds 
Register of Ships--and vessels with dual tonnage pay on the higher 
grt) and therefore the system is easy to adminster. The Port may also 
claim that the system works in that its application has ensured that 
on the conservancy account (Table 9.1) the accounting requirement has 
been met. However this claim raises the question of the cost measure 
which is used by the Port. In adopting normal accounting practice 
the operating and maintenance expenditure of E745,000 incurred under 
the heading of conservancy will include wages and salaties, maintenance 
and all those items "used up" in the accounting period. The dredging' 
expenditure of E711,000 mainly represents contract dredging of the 
main channel and the E340,000 represents an apportionment of the 
Port's general expenses to the conservancy account. In addition 
there are the depreciation and interest charges of E400,000. Consi- 
dering firstly the operating and maintenance expenditure; chapter 6 
indicated that apart from the buoys that are left on station for two 
years, and labour, these costs are incurred over a time horizon of a 
calendar year or less. For example, the buoys are lifted. annually 
in order to overhaul the buoy and flasher unit and to refil the gas 
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bottles. Similarly, fuel and other consumable stores costs are 
incurred in surveying the approach channels and River, these costs 
usually being incurred over a time horizon which is less thin a year, 
depending upon the frequency of survey. Due to the contractual' 
agreements with labour their basic pay is not immediately escapable 
however their overtime payments are escapable. Thus, by including 
all labour costs in operating expenditure the port is using the upper 
limit of escapble costs. Secondly, chapter 6 suggested that 
the basic contract dredging costs are joint to the remaining life of 
the contract. More specifically, "the present value of contract 
payments for the standard dredger'over the remaining life of the 
contract less the present value of a settlement which would allow the 
port to withdraw from the contract" (section 6.5.21. Any payments in 
excess of the annual contract costs for the standard dredger are 
attributable to the traffic over one or more years, depending upon 
the reason for the dredging. In the longer-rrun the discounted value 
of the contracted payments at the date of signing the contract are- 
allocable to the traffic over the life of the contract. Thus the 
port is again using the upper limit of escapable costs and 
allocating the contract payments to the years in which the cash flows 
occur- Whilst this approach may be sensible from an accounting point 
of view, given the nature of the contractual relationship, all that 
is required is that over the life of the contract the traffic is 
willing to pay. Thus, if for example demand fluctuates over time 
then some years may pay more than the actual cash outflow and in 
other years they may pay less. Thirdly, tlere is the depreciation 
which is allocated to the conservancy account. The accounting 
practice of the Port is to write off fixed assets (excluding land and 
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capital work- in-progre s s) in equal annual instalments over their 
estimated remaining economic life. The accounts are prepared on the 
historic cost basis, modified to include the revaltation of certain 
fixed assets (revaluation appearing to apply mainly to land and 
bilildings). This approach is clearly at variance with both the 
opportunity cost principle or valuation formula. The main assets 
provided under the conservancy heading include the Port Radar Station, 
the buoys, "Vigilant", the buoy store, surveying boats and Hi-Fix 
navigation system. Given a planning horizon of, say, ten years then 
if the asset will not be replaced the escapable cost Ilower limit) is, 
EC = OC(O) - 
OC(1O) 
(1+r)10 
and if the assetý. -; zill be replaced the escapable cost (tpper limit) is, 
EC = V(O) - 
V(IO)1- 
(1+r)10 
where, EC ='escapable cost. 
OC(i) = opportunity cost of the asset in year i. 
VM = valuation of the asset in year i. 
This escapable cost is attributable to all the relevant traffic over 
this time horizon; there being no economic reason why it should be 
attributed to the traffic in equal annual instalments. Fourthly, 
the apportionment of E340,000 of general expenses are (assuming that 
they are a residual after computing the escapable costs of the 
various services provided by theport) either fixed or joint to all 
traffic and thus again there is no economic reason why they should be 
attributed specifically to conservancy. 
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The discussion of section 6.4.6 suggested that most of the facilities 
provided under the heading of conservancy were joint to all of the 
traffic using the Port. The exception being the buoys in the Garston 
and Eastham, channels, and possibly part: of the buoy store and one 
survey launch. In addition, there were some current factor inputs- 
attributable to various areas of the port. 
Faced with the problem of jointness of costs over time, the Port has 
adopted the standard accounting practice of allocating these costs 
equally to each year, this device being employed for both assets and 
contracts. Similarly, when faced with the: problem of jointness across 
traffic the Port has allocated costs equally to each grt of traffic 
during the year (with some allowance being made for coastal traffic). 
The more generally based rule is that under both circumstances the 
traffic should pay according to their willingness to pay. However 
this raises the questions of equity between similar classes of traffic, 
and how the Port isto ascertain the willingness to pay of different 
traffic, The above discussion suggested that the distinction between 
coastal and deep-sea traffic did take the two trafficls, -. Willingness 
to pay into account. However it does raise the question of whether 
the relative prices of these two traffics reflect history or willing- 
ness to pay, and-morergenerally the question of using-grtýas a 
charging base for all vessel types. (The charging base will be 
discussed im more detail in chapter 10). 
In chapter 1, three silbsidiary objectives of a pricing system were 
defined. Thus, to what extent does the conservancy schedule meet 
these objectives? The first objective was to promote-the efficient 
and full use by shippers, shipowners and others of the port's 
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facilities. In the MDEC case, the short-run escapable cost of an 
extra ship transit through the conservancy area approaches zero. Thus, 
the optimum price for this transit approaches zero. The effect of the 
current tariff will therefore be that traffic which was willing to pay 
a price greater than or equal to the escapable cost but less than the- 
price currently charged will not be accepted. Under these circum- 
stances, the Port can either investigate the extent to which demand is 
distorted by employing the current tariff or attempt to devise 
alternative tariffs. Given that a large proportion of the Port's 
traffic is represented by a small number of large users some form of 
block tariff maybedevised which has a price approaching zero for a 
traffic's last transit.; through the port. There will remain however 
the small volume and one-off traffic which could not be included I. 
within such a system. Given an accounting requirement, the pricing 
systems for such traffic may be limited to average cost pricing or 
price discrimination. 
The second objective was to avoid cross-subsidisation with respect to 
escapable costs. The methodology of chapter 6 attempted to identify 
the costs which were attributable to specific traffic in both the 
short- and long-run. However, as most of the facilities, are..; Joint to 
41-1ýbf.. theýtraffic using, the Port (section 6.4.6), it is unlikely that 
cross-rsubsidisation will occur. The area where it may be hypothesized 
that cross-subsidisation could occur is in the maintenance dredging of 
the main channel. However in section 6.4.3 it was suggested that 
there is no substantive information to support the hypothesis that it 
is the deeper draft vessels which impose higher dredging costs on the 
port. The third objective was to encourage the Port to develop and 
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improve facilities which are justified by demand. In. principle, the 
pricing system should signal to the Port: whether the current 
provisionof buoys, including the characteristics of the lights and 
spacing of the buoys, is sufficient; whether the vessel's knowledge 
of water depths is adequate; whether the information provided by the 
Port Radar Station is ddequate; and whether the depths in the channels 
are warranted by demand. 
If one takes the extreme view that port services are demanded j6intly 
then these services consist of a fixed proportions vector; 
P= (C, B, H, G) 
where P= port services 
C= conservancy services 
B= berthing services Ilock entrance to quay-wall) 
H= cargo handling services 
G= goods services (berth to dock gate) 
(with each service consisting of further services and facilities, for 
example, the above list of services provided under conservancy). In 
practice however the user of port services can trade-off these 
services, that is, rank different vectors and thus the vector is not 
one of fixed proportions. If the goods in this bundle were not to a 
certain extent complementary then the signal received by the Port in 
reaction to the price would be excess demand, excess supply or 
equilibrium. Thus the port could react by expanding, contracting, 
replacing or not replacing capacity. Under these circumstances, the 
users are in a position to signal their requirements to the Port 
because they are free to choose whether or not to consume and if they 
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do consume, their equilibrium quantity. In the case of port services 
however some element of choice is removed and thus the signals 
received by the port will be imperfect. For example, the Port may 
provide a partictlar level of conservancy services and relate their 
price to dscapable-costs. This level may-ýbe greater than that 
required by the traffichowever, given the total bundle of port 
services, the traffic may be willing to pay the required price. if 
the consumption of conservancy services was voluntary then the port 
would receive a signal in the form of excess supply and the required 
adjustments could be made. However, the conservancy will exhibit one 
of the characteristics of a public good, that is, consumption is not 
voluntary and the Port will believe that they are providing the 
correct level of capacity. 
In practice, the Port views the provision of some of the conservancy 
facilities as being an attempt to maintain at least a minimum 
standard for the safe navigation of vessels into and out of the Port. 
The assessment of these requirements tend to be based on rules 
developed by the Port or the subjective assessments of the Pilots. 
For example, the spacing of buoys in the main channel was based an an. 
assumed minimurb visibility of one quarter of a mile. Similarly, the 
frequency of survey of the various areas of the port will be 
determined by past knowledge of siltation rates and changes in the 
regime of the River. None of these "rules" are binding on the Port. 
For example, if the buoy spacing was increased to more than the current 
1.1 km then this may imply that vessel movements were reduced or 
stopped on those days when reduced visibility occurred. Thus the 
benefits of the current spacing include reduced delays to ships and 
cargoes, and improved safety of life and property (including pollution 
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damage). Against these'-incremental benefits are set the incremental 
costs of the current buoy spacing compared with. an alternative 
increased spacing. Whilst the port may not have undertaken these 
calculations, the current spacing represents an implidit subjective 
assessment of these factors. Thus, in order to ascertain whether they 
should develop and improve facilities (or even to reduce the facility), 
it may be necessary for the port to obtain signals other than those 
obtained directly from the price system. These would have to be 
obtained by estimating the benefits to traffic in the provision of 
different levels of service (that is the traffic's willingness to pay) 
or consultation with user bodies. One of the underlying assumptions 
of this objective is that the facilities have been correctly costed. 
The relevant cost measure for these purposes is the upper limit of 
escapable cost. 
9.2 Berth Charges 
The presentation of the schedule of charges on vessels is constructed 
so that conservancy and berth charges appear in the same table. 
s(: )wever, 'whilst the conservancy charges only distinguish two classes of 
vessel, berth charges include seven classes for "vessels discharging 
or discharging/loading" and six classes for "vessels loading only" 
with a rate per grt per day and a minimum and maximum. 
"Vessels loading only" pay between 64 and 82 per cent of the'rate for 
I'vessels discharging or discharging/loading", except for vessels 
trading in the area broadly defined as the United Kingdom and Ireland 
who pay the same rate for both operations. The argument for the 
difference is that a reduced rate for loading only assists the United 
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Kingdom's. exports. 
The class of voyage/vessel distinction essentially breaks down into 
the two origin/destinations of the conservancy charge (that is, 
"United Kingdom and Ireland" and "all other areas") with one coastal 
and four deep-sea exceptions. The basic daily rate for deep-sea 
traffic is one and a half times the basic coastal rate. For coastal 
traffic the exception is grain vessels (lower rate) . The four deep- 
sea exceptions are Europe-Finisterre to North Cape (lower rate) - 
grain vessels (lower rate), open shelter deck/modified tonnage vessels 
(higher rate) and timber vessels (highest rate). The higher rates for 
modified tonnage and timber vessels results from the change over from 
nrt to grt as a charging base. the grt is crudely the total volume 
enclosed by the ship, not including certain "exempted" spaces divided 
by 100 if measured in cubic feet (2.83 if in cubic metres). The nrt 
is then the grt less certain non-earning "deducted" spaces (for 
example, engine room spaces, crew accommodation). 
When the Port used nrt as a charging base, all cargo carried in spaces 
which were not included in the vessel's nrt (including cargo in open 
shelter decks and on deck) were measured and charged at the nrt rate. 
In, ýthe case of timber vessels, deck cargo represents a not insignifi- 
cant proportion of total cargo which is not included in grt. Thus, - 
in order to make allowance for this the Port now charges 33 per cent 
more for these vessels. In theý. case of open shelter deck and 
modified tonnage vessels, the space between the uppermost complete 
deck and the second deck is not included in the calculation of grt and 
the port has similarly increased the daily charge on such vessels. 
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The grain exception appears both for foreign and coastal vessels 
(both lower than the standard rate) . The reason for this would appear- 
to be a marketing exercise to attract grain vessels to Liverpool. 
The last distinction in the standard berth charge tarif f is the 
minimum and maximum. If these are converted into days then coastal 
vessels (including grain) pay for a minimum of 1.5 days and a maximum 
of 3.75 days. The deep-sea vessels "discharging or discharging/ 
loading pay a minimum of two days, however their maxima vary. For 
"all other vessels" the maximum is 5.5 days, modified tonnage vessels 
5.6 days, timber vessel 5 days and grain vessels 4 days without 
separation and 5 days with separation. The. i4iftima for "vessels 
loading only" are also two days, apart from coastal grain vessels for 
which the minimum is one day. The maxima for these vessels are 
similar to the above. A notdable exception is the European vessels 
whii: h have a maximum of just under three days when discharging or 
discharging/loading and just under four days when loading only. 
There are a number of possible interpretations of these minimum and 
maximum rates. One interpretation is that the structure represents 
a system of penalty rates. In other words, the port believes that 
time is important in that one vessel at the berth excludes any other 
vessel. For this to be the case, coastal and foreign vessels would 
have to spend at least 11 and 2 days respectively at the berth, there 
would not be a maximum and for it to be a true penalty rate it would 
have to increase after the=inimum. Thus, it would appear unlikely 
that the tariff has been designed specifically as a penalty rate 
(although it does provide some incentive for a vessel to move off the 
berth if it completes the cargo transfer operation before the 
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maximum). 
A second interpretation is that the schedule is a form of block tariff 
applied for every entry into the Port. In the case of the conservancy 
charge, the vessel only makes one arrival and departure, however with 
berth utilization, time at the berth can vary, thus giving the port a 
degree of flexibility in devising the tariff. Thus, if the ship 
enters the port to load or discharge cargo it pays, in the first 
instance, an amount equal to two days, regardless of whether they are 
used or not. They then pay the daily rate for the third and fourth 
day (coastal) and the third, fourth and fifth day (deep-sea) and 
finally nothing for any further days if cargo continues to be worked. 
The advantages of such a system are firstly-that it recognises that 
there are demand constraints to the total level of the charge. In 
setting their charges the port pays particular attention to its 
"imPortanto customers (particularly the deep-sea general cargo vessels) 
who will probably spend on average 5 days working cargo. By placing 
a maxim=, this reduces the uncertainty to the ship in that it at 
least knows the maximum it will pay. Secondly, the tariff recognises 
that given no congestion the SRMC of the vessel staying on the berth 
approaches zero, and thirdly it does provide an incentive to the 
marginal user who does not require 4/5 days, to move off the berth. 
In addition to the main berth charges, the port has a schedule of 
"Special Berth Charges". These charges include; 
Vessels arriving in ballast, etc. and using the graving docks 
only - rate per grt which includes conservancy. 
(ii) Vessels. lightening cargo in the River - rate per grt per day 
for foreign vessels. 
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(iii) Vessels lying idle because of non-availability of dock labour, 
discharging/loading berths, adverse weather or repairing, 
(a) For vessels intending to work cargo (Saturdays, Sundays 
and Public Holidays excluded). 
(b) For vessels lying idle (Saturdays, Sundays and Public 
Holidays included) 
- rate per grt per day. 
Uv) Bunkering ex the Company's Works - rate per tonne of bunkers 
shipped for vessels which have not previously paid berth 
charges. 
(v) Vessels using River Oil Terminals - rate per tonne of oil 
discharged/loaded which Includes conservancy. 
The two more noteworthy special berth charges are for vessels lying 
idle and vessels using the River Oil Terminals. In the first case, 
there is no time penalty for vessels lying idl&-, and in the--. second 
case the charging base is the actual quantity of cargo loaded or 
discharged. 
Given the similarities in the construction of the conservancy and 
berth charge schedules, some of the co=ents concerning conservancy 
charges will also be applicable to berth charges. 
The revenue from berth charges in 1979 amounted, to approximately 
E8.7m. However from Table 9.1 it is not possible to separate the 
costs of providing facilities for ships from cargo handling and the- 
facilities between the berth and the dock gate. Thus, it is not 
clear whether an accounting requirement is met under this heading. 
The arguments on the demand side in support of the lower rate for 
coastal traffic including: the proportion of port costs in landed 
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price ;- cross elasticities; and the greater number of entries 
made by coastal vessels would all appear appropriate to berth 
charges. Similarly, the comments relating to the ease of calculation 
and administration of the charge are applicable. 
The question of the cost measure used by the port in ascertaining 
total cost also arises in the berth case. The three main facilities 
provided between the lock and the quaywall are the locks, dock and- 
the quaywall. In order that these facilities can be used, they are 
maintained (including the maintenance of the impounded water level, 
and the dredging and surveying of the locks and docks) and in the 
case of the locks, they require to be operated. Thus, given an 
uncongested system the short-rrun escapable costs of an extra ship 
(grt) approaches zero. Excluding the facilities and labour, a number 
of operating and maintenance costs will be incurred over a time 
horizon of a calendar year or less. Most of these costs tend to be 
attributable to their respective time horizons and not specific 
traffic. The exception relates to whether it can-be demonstrated 
that larger vessels impose higher maintenance costs (both use related 
and Stochastic) on the port. 
The allocation of depreciation to vessels is again at variance with 
the opportunity cost principle or valuation formula. The alternative 
employment of locks, docks and quaywalls tend to be considerably 
restricted and thus the opportunity cost measure may approach zero. 
At the other end of the spectrum, it may be particularly difficult to 
obtain a "replacement cost" for the valuation formula. Thus in the 
MDHC case a *compromise measure" was suggested which-f-incorporated the 
estimated replacement cost of the facilities in situ, and an updated 
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historic cost of the assets for which demand exists. Whilst estimating 
this cost, it may be possible for the port to estimate the cost saving 
of not accepting particular vessel types, for example, container 
vessels, grain vessels and general cargo vessels. It may also be 
possible to estimate the costs of a marginal berth and any size 
related costs. In a port which is expanding-or replacing assets it 
will be considerably easier to obtain estimates of these costs, 
particularly that of a marginal berth. 
The discussion of chapter 7 suggested that a number of the operating 
and maintenance costs (including dredging and surveying) were joint to 
all traffic. Similarly, it may be difficult to isolate the costs of 
facilities to be attributed directly to specific traffic or groups of 
traffic. Thus when faced with these difficulties, the port has again 
averaged over traffic and over time, with an allowance being made for 
coastal traffic. However, apart from this averaging, there remain the 
questions of the use of grt as a base for the charge and the relative 
prices of coastal and deep-sea vessels. In particular the relative 
berth charges would suggest that coastal traffic has two-thirds of 
the. ability (or willingness) to pay of the deep-sea traffic whereas 
the conservancy charges suggest that they only have one-third of the 
ability (or iirillingness) to pay. 
The cocments relating to the extent to which the current pricing 
system meets the objectives outlined in chapter 1 are similar to the 
conservancy case. Firstly, the use of an average cost-based tariff 
will tend to deter the ina ginal user, although the use of a maximum 
charge may moderate the effect. This will however depend upon the 
number of days that a marginal vessel would spend loading and/or 
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discharging at the Port. If this vessel would spend less than the 
maximum, time, then the tariff would not have this modifying effect. 
Secondly, given the degree of jointness in the cost of providing 
facilities for deep-sea traffic it is unlikely that any significant 
cross.:. subsidisation with respect to escapable costs will occur. The 
area where it =ay be hypothesized that cross-rsubsididation could occur 
in the long -run is with respect to size related costs of locks and 
quaywalls. This hypothesis would have to: -be investigated further 
when attempting to ascertain the replacement costs for the valuation 
formula. The location and facilities provided for coastal traffic 
may be different from those provided for deep-sea traffic, thus there 
may be a case for treating this traffic separately. For example, if it 
was decided to relocate this traffic at River berths in 1990, it could 
be the case that they have a prior claim on the berth or that River 
berths are unsuitable for the deep-sea vessels. Thirdlk, the system 
should encourage the port to develop and improve facilities which are 
justified by demand. For example, in the case of the coastal traffic 
which may be transferred to the River berths, the price that they are 
Paying should be signalling whether the--necessary improvements and 
developments should be underthken. Similarly, the price being paid by 
container traffic should be signalling whether investment (or 
disinvestment) in the facilities for these vessels should be under, - 
taken. However, any signal which the port receives is conditional 
upon the charges levied for other services. For example, if the 
coastal traffic is willing to pay for the improvements then given the 
prices of the other services there is a conditional signal to the 
port to undertake the improvements. 
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9.3 Charges on Goods 
The schedule of charges on goods classifies co=odities according to 
the "Brussels Nomenclature for the Classification of Goods in Customs 
Tariffs 1955". The charge is on a per tonne basis, with separate 
rates for goods imported from and exported to a forei4n place. 
In addition there is a separate schedule for coastal traffic which 
does not use any c=modity classification. 
In the 1976 foreign traffic schedule there are 131 different commodi- 
ties or groups of co=odities listed (more recent schedules having 
a similar structure). For imports, there were twelve different rates 
and for exports there are four different rates (Table 9.2). 
Table 9.2 Frequency of Charges on Goods - Import and Export (E/tonne) 
import Export 
Rate Frequency Rate Frequency 
o. 32 4- 0.47 7 
0.70 2 0.70 2 
0.83 10 1.28 18 
2.00 2 3.29 20 
2.16 1 
2.27 19 
2.78 1 
2.90 1 
3. oS 14 
3.84 10 
5.04 7 
6.3o 44 
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Thus, the import traffic has a wider range of rates than export 
traffic and in general the rate for an imported commodity is higher 
than the corresponding export rate. 
The owner of the goods is liable for the charges, and goods which 
remain an the dock quays for more than three days are lidble for 
payment of "Quay Rentu or "Special Rent". 
'"he coastal schedule contains a general rate for all commodities and 
twenty listed cc=odities or groups of commodities which are exceptions 
to the general category. Nine of the exceptions pay a rate which is 
half of the general rate, four pay a rate which is a quarter of the 
general rate, live animals pay a rate per animal and the balance are 
exempt from goods charges. The coastal rates are in general consider- 
ably less than the foreign rate (the general rate being 68p). 
There are. a number of exemptions for goods in transit and goods 
discharged coastwise and then loaded foreign and vice versa. The 
general purpose of these exemptions is to ensure that goods do not 
pay twice but at the same time requiring that the revenue that the 
Port receives is the higher of the two rates. 
The discussion in chapter 4 (section 4.6.2) outlined the main supply 
and demand characteristics of goods. On the supply (cost) side the 
characteristics included the physical dimensions, the size of the 
individual unit, the awkwardness of the unit, special properties of 
the goods and the time for which the service is required. The Port 
attempts to incorporate the time'for which the service is required 
into the Quay Rents. With respect to the other cost items, it is 
difficult to ascertain the extent to which the tariff is cost based. 
I 
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The schedule does not take into account the size of individual units 
handled except for not including the w(Bight of containers or pallets 
in the gross weight used for computing the charge. Similarly, whilst 
awkward units of goods with special properties may incur higher rate$i 
it is difficult to classify them according to these characteristics 
from the published tariff. One hypothesis that may be investigated 
however is a relationship between the rate and the physical dimension 
of stowage factor. Table 9.3 contains the rates, stowage factors and 
unit values for some of the commodities in the foreign charges on 
goods schedule. (The reason for the iiicomplete list being due to 
problems in matching the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) with the 
Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) (1j). Platting the 
stowage factor (specific volume) against the rate, figure 9.1, there 
is clearly no relationship between these variables. Thus, this data 
does not support the hypothesis of a relationship between the rate 
and stowage factor. 
On the demand side, section 4.6.2 suggested that the characteristics 
of the goods included unit value, size of consignment, volume of trade 
flow, origin/destination and the nature of the transit through the 
Port. The origin/destination of the commodity is reflected in the 
lower rate paid by coastal traffic. The arguments submitted in 
Support of this distinction are similar to conservancy and berth 
charges, and include the proportion of port costs in'-landed price and 
cross elasticities. The use of the argument that a single coastal 
vessel may make many more entries into the port may not however be 
valid when considering goods. The nature of a good's transit 
through the Port is incorporated in the exceptions to the schedule 
whereby the good only pays once. The hypothesized relationship 
283. 
Table 9.3 MDHC Charges on Goods (Imports) 
s=l I Cc odity 
01 Live ani-als 
02 Meat etc. 
03 Fish, crustacea and 
molluscs 
04 Dairy Produce etc. 
05 Products of animal origin 
07 Edible vegetables 
0801/12 All dried fruit; nuts 
shelled or not 
09 Coffee, tea, mat6 and 
spices 
10 Cereals (excl. breakfast 
cereals) 
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous 
fruit etc. 
13 Raw vegetable materials 
etc. 
15 Animal and vegetable fats 
and oils 
1501/2 Lard and tallow 
17 Sugars and sugar confec- 
tionary (ex. molasses) 
1703 Molasses 
18 Cocoa and cocoa prepara- 
tions 
1601 Cocoa beans in bags 
22 Beverages, spirits and 
vinegar 
24 Tobacco 
26 Metallic ores, slag and & 
2601 Iron ore and bauxite 
29 Organic chemicals 
30 Pharmaceutical Products 
Stowage 
Factor 
cu. ft. /tonne) 
Unit 
Value 
(E/tonne) 
Rate 
(E/tonne) 
- 339.35 6.30 
70 625.42 3.05 
60 920.78 3.05 
66 339.69 3.05 
- 300.45 2.27 
131.32 2.27 
as 594.79 3.84 
80 507.69 3.05 
so 81.14 0.70 
74 139.06 0.70 
- 183.64 3.05 
so 261.20 2.90 
82 240.06 2.16 
54 143.39 2.27 
- 35.58 0.83 
80 572.67 3.05 
80 661.22 2. oo 
64 59.83 6.30 
112 950.54 2.78 
- 17.40 0.83 
9.85 0.32 
- 370.79 6.30 
52 1,701.70 6.30 
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Table 9.3 (continued) 
BTN Commodity 
Stowage 
Factor 
(cu. ft. /tonne) 
Unit 
Value 
/tonne) 
Rate 
(E/tonne) 
33 Essential oils etc; 
Perfumery etc. 52 4,197.66 6.30 
38 Misc. chemical products 51 313.67 3.05 
39 Artififical resins and 
plastic materials etc. 51 527.51 6.30 
40 Rubber, synthetic rubber 
etc. 72 362.15 3.84 
41 Rawhides, skins (excl. ) 
furskins) and leather 104 407.52 3.84 
42 Articles of leather 102 1,368.77 6.30 
44 wood and articles of 
wood etc. 90 114.56 0.83 
48 Paper and paperboard etc. 90 342.13 2.27 
49 Printed books, newspapers, 
pictures etc. - 1,107.65 6.30 
51 Man-made fibres 
(continuous) 104 981.80 6.30 
53 wool-and other animal hair 104 903.00 2.27 
55 Cotton 104 554.08 2.27 
58 Carpets, mats, matting and 
tapestries etc. 104 914.10 3.84 
64 Footwear - 1202.55 6.30 
70 Glass and glassware 73 300.27 6.30 
7301/13 Pigiron, scrap, billets, 
bars, coil etc. 34/39 143.30 0.83 
74 Copper and articles 
thereof 35 899.14 2.27 
75 Nickel and articles 
thereof 35 2,282.11 6.30 
76 Aluminium and articles 
thereof 35 499.91 2.27 
78 Lead and articles thereof 35 250.98 2.27 
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Table 9.3 (continued) 
BTN Commodity 
Stowage 
Factor 
(cu. ft. /tonne') 
Unit 
Value 
(E/tonne) 
Rate 
(E/tonne) 
so Tin and articles thereof 35 3,339.05 5.04 
81 other base metals 35 1,723.74 6.30 
82 Tools, implements, cutlery 
etc. 52 1,871.20 3.84 
84 Boilers, machinery, 
mechanical appliances 
etc. 100 1,681.09 5.04 
85 Electrical machinery and 
equipment etc. 78 1,681.87 5.04 
89 Ships, boats and floating 
structures - 16,804.39 6.30 
92 Musical instruments etc. 106 3,126.48 6.30 
94 Furniture and parts 
thereof 106 836.13 6.30 
97 Toys, games and sports 
requisites 106 1,672.15 6.30 
98 Misc. manuf. articles 106 1,134.03 6.30 
Source: see note Ell 
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Rate (E per tonne) 
between the rate and unit value is that the higher the unit value the 
greater the ability of the commodity to absorb higher port charges. 
In figure 9.2 the logarithm base 10 of the unit value is plotted 
against the rate using the data in table 9.3. Apart from the five 
outlying commodities with a low unit value and rate of E6.39, it 
would appear that the rate increases as the unit value increases. 
The least squares regression line fitted to all the data is; 
2 
Rate = -2.37 + 1.00 ln UV (r = 0.4427) 
Thus the logarithm base 10 of unit value explains 44.27 per cent of 
the variation in the data, a result which partially supports the 
hypothesis. If the five outlying observations are removed from the 
data then the regression line becomes; 
Rate = -4.01 + 1.22 ln UV (r 
2=P. 6523) 
wýLich explains 65.23 per cent of the variation in the data. These 
five co=odities are; 
Commodity 
Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
Glass and glassware 
Live animals 
organic chemicals 
Artificial resins and plastic materials etc. 
Unit Value (E/tonne) 
59.83 
300.27 
339.35 
370.79 
527.51 
in the case of spirits, glass and live animals, it could be argued that 
they require special care and thus impose extra costs on the port 
(that is, cost factors may partially explain these particular rates). 
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In the case of organic chemicals and artificial resins, one explana- 
tion could be that with technological change the-.. unit value of these 
commodities has fallen however the rate charged'. by: the part has not 
been subsequently lowered. One must however be particularly 
cautious of such an interpretation as the same comment could be made 
about other commodities that have not been excluded from the analysis. 
There would however appear to be some evidence to support the hypothe- 
sis that charges on goods are to some extent related to demand. But, 
as was noted in section 4.6.2., high value goods can impose higher 
costs on the port. 
The goods schedule is more complex than both the conservancy and berth 
schedules. Thus in principle the rates are not as easy to compute 
and administer. In practice however the rate has been computed by 
applying "across the board" percentage increases. For example, the 
rates in the schedule operative from lst-January. -1981 are approximately 
76 per cent higher than the rates in the-si: hedule operative from lst 
January 1976. Thus computation of the rate has been relatively easy. 
Similarly, given that the structure of the schedule has not changed 
for some time the Port has considerable experience in its use and 
therefore its administration is relatively easy. 
The revenue from dues on goods in 1979 was just under E13.5m; 54 per 
cent more than the revenue from dues on ships. Again, however, it is 
not possible to separate the Port's measure of the costs incurred in 
the provision of the services associated with charges on goods, as 
these are consolidated under the heading of Dock Undertaking and Cargo 
Handling in the Profit and Loss Account (Table 9.1). The main 
facilities associated with this charge included the surfacing of the 
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of the berth and back-up area, transit sheds, access t6 the berth 
and perimeter fences. In addition, it will be necessary for the Port 
to maintain these facilities. Ift. general, these costs will be 
allocable to time horizons which are greater than the accounting 
period of one year. However, the Port again uses the accounting rule 
of allocating historic cost equally to each of the remaining years of 
the asset's econ6mic life. The discussion of chapter 7 suggested 
that the opportunity and replacement costs may be easier to measure 
for these facilities. Thus the lower and upper limits of escapable 
costs may be ascertained. Chapter 7 also suggested that berths tend 
to be "fitted out" for different cargo handling operations and there- 
fore the Port could identify traffic according to vessel type or the 
cargo transfer facilities required. The--procedure outlined was to 
estimate the aggregate demand for each berth type including container, ' 
grain and general cargo; then to estimate the incremental cost (or 
escapable cost) of providing the basic facilities for this traffic. 
If a specific traffic requires facilities in excess of the basic 
facilities then their costs are attributable to that traffic. In order' 
to reduce the number of computations of escapable costs, it was also . 
suggested that the Port attempts to estimate the escapable cost of the 
marginal basic berth. This'cost is then attributable jointly to the 
traffic requiring a berth of the relevant type. 
The view taken by the Port with respect to the. different commodity/ 
vessel types would appear to follow a container, grain, general cargo 
and timber division of traffic. The main schedule for foreign goods 
charges does include cereals and wood- However, in the case of grain 
a separate publication is issued by the Port which lists all of the 
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charges for vessels and goods -using the Royal Seaforth Grain Terminal. 
The rates for both of these commodity groups are lower than the 
majority of foreign rates - the grain rates are similar to the coastal 
rates and the timber rates are only s1tghtly higher. Similar comments 
apply to some of the dry and liquid bulk commodities handled at the 
pott. The rates for containers and container vessels tend to be 
confidential with information concerning charges being available on 
request from the Senior Commercial officer. 
In the case of the facilities provided. '. between the berth and the dock 
gate the Port has "resolved" the problem of jointness in costs over 
time by allocating the costs equally to each year. When faced with 
jointness across traffic, a different approach to the averaging process 
in the conservancy and berth charges is used. In.. -ptinciple the Port 
would appear to be adoptingthe theoretical solutions suggested iný 
chapters 2 and 3, that is, given that the facilities are supplied 
jointly the only requirement is that traffic in aggregate should be 
willing to pay. Thus, the port charges each traffic according to its 
willingness to pay subject to the traffic in aggregate paying the 
costs which the Port has allocated (equally) to each year. In 
practice however it is unlikely that the existing schedule reflects 
the traffic. 's relative willingness to pay as the relative prices have 
not changed over time. 
The extent to which this pricing system meets the objectives outlined 
in chapter 1 tend to be slightly different from conservancy and 
berth charges. Section 3.4.2. suggested that Judicious application of 
imperfect price discrimination can lead to greater output than a single 
price monopolist. It may therefore be the case that the level of 
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output is greater under price discrimination than if the Port used 
average cost pricing. However, given that the short-run escapable 
cost of an uncongested berth approaches zero there will be traffic 
which is not willing to pay the scheduled charge, but is willing to 
make some contribution to longer-run costs, which will not be accepted. 
Thus-again the-'Port would need to investigate the distortionary 
effects of the tariff or attempt to devise an alternative tariff 
structure. The extent to which cross subsidisationý with respect 
t, o escapable cost may occur in the current schedule is not "clear. 
However if the Port adopts the above procedure of identifying escapable 
cost accordinj to berth type then any cross subsidation can be 
minimised. 
The signals with respect to the provision of these services and 
facilities will again be conditional upon the prices of the other 
services and facilities provided by the Port. In this case however 
the user may'have a choice between the services which he receives. 
For example the Port may be able to offer berths which have been 
"fitted out" to different standards and therefore excess supply or 
demand for different standards of berth would provide &. more positive. 
signal to the port when considering whether to develop and improve 
the facilities. The signal is again however imperfect as it is still 
conditional upon the other charges levied by the port. 
9.4 Cargo Handling 
In 1979, the Port's operating revenue and expenditure on the cargo 
handling account were approximately E36. Om and E38.4m respectively. 
Thus using the Port's cost measures a loss was made before taking 
into account the h1location of general expenses, depreciation and 
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interest. These figures represent 57.5 and 66.7 per cent of total 
operating revenue and expenditure respectively. and thus cargo handling 
is an important component of the Port's total expenditure. A large 
proportion of the total expenditure is represented by labour costs, 
however the exact Proportion is not available from the Port's 
published accounts. 
Chapter 8 outlined the four distinct processes in the cargo handling 
operation. The structure of each of the charging schedules are 
different and thus the following sections will consider loading, 
discharging, master porterage and wharfinging-, -. separately. 
9.4.1 Loading Stevedoring 
The loading schedule is a relatively simple schedule with separate 
rates being quoted for seven different categories of commodity. of 
these seven categories there are five "general" and two "specific" 
I 
rates. Categories 1 to 5 are the general rates, category 6 is for 
"full cargoes of metals, in-pieces, 5 tonnes or over" and category 7 
is for containers over 17 m3 (600 ft 
3 
). The categories are broadly 
based upon the unit weight or stowage factor of the commodity. 
Category 1 has the highest unit weights and the lowest stowage factors. 
Examples of commodities which appear in several categories are shown 
in table 9.4. The schedule also recognises "palletised cargoes loaded 
during any 8 hour period or longer with a reduced manning", which are 
subject to an allowance of 15 per cent off the appropriate tonnage 
rate. 
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9.4.2 Discharging Stevedoring 
The discharging schedule contains 146 listed commodities or"-, groups of 
commodities with 91 different rates ranging from E2.76 to E23.56 per 
tonne (schedule effective from 25th April 1977). The. unweighted mean 
of these rates is E9.32 and the standard deviation is E3.05. Figure 
9.3 shows the frequency distribution of the rates. The schedule 
contains four major-"not otherwise specified" (n. o. s-) xatet; -which 
include, 
. Cylinders, Drums, Barrels, Casks and Hogsheads. 
. Bales, Bundles and Reels 
- up to and including 152 kg 
- over 152 kg. 
. Bags 
. Cases, Cartons, Crates and unpacked Machinery 
- up to and including 16 kg 
- over 16 kg. 
Where two weights are indicate, the heavier weight has the lower rate. 
Within the remaining 140 "exceptions", there is some division according 
to unit weight, number of units per tonne and origin of cargo. The 
commodities where these distinctions are made include, 
(a) by unit weight 
. Fresh fruit and vegetables in packages, n. o. s. 
- up to and including 9 kg 
- over 9 kg and including 16 kg 
over 16 kg and including 32 kg 
over 32 kg. 
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. Hides and skins 
- dry bundles up to and including . 254 kg 
- dry bundles over 254 kg 
. Metals, n. o. s. 
- up to and including 27 kg 
- over 27 kg and. including 305 kg 
- over 305 kg and including 1,000 kg 
- over 1,000 kg. 
In all cases the heavier unit weight has a lower rate per tonne. 
(b) by the number of units per tonne 
. Timber, if the total shipment of pieces and bundles averagesi 
- over 1,000 kg per piece 
-1 piece and including 20 pieces per tonne 
- over 20 pieces and including 60 pieces per tonne 
- over 60 pieces and including 100 pieces per tonne 
- over 100 pieces per tonne. 
Where, the greatertthe number of pieces per tonne, the higher the 
rate. 
(c) By origin; 
. Mixed general cargo 
- ex Elbe to Brest Range (cases, cartons, crates, bundles and 
baskets) 
- ex Far East 
- cartons 
- grates 
- ex Iberian Peninsular 
. Cargoes originating from 
- India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
I 
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- discharged at Sandon Dock 
- discharged elsewhere. 
9.4.3 Master. Porterace 
The master porterage schedule is composed of twelve categories of 
commodities mainly according to their method of packaging. in this 
respect, the structure of the schedule is similar to loading stevedor- 
ing. However within each category there are up to 22 different rates 
so that the similarity to loading is only in the formal presentation 
df the schedule. Within five of the categories there is a "general 
classification" (n. o. s. ) then a list of exceptions. In the general 
class, commodities are defined according to their unit weight or 
origin. The schedule allows rebates on various commodities, these 
rebates depending upon the total weight of the consignment and the 
method of delivery- A description of each category is as followsl 
(a) Cases, cartons, crates and baskets 
General classification 
by unit weight, 
up to and including 10 kg 
10 kg and including 15 kg 
- 15 kg and including 30 kg 
30 kg and including 1 tonne 
1 tonne and including 5 tonnes 
by origin, 
- from Far East 
- from Iberian Peninsular 
- from Elbe to Brest range. 
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(b) Bales, bundles and reels 
General classification 
by unit weight, 
- up to and including 135 kg 
- 135 kg and including 320 kg 
- over 320 kg 
(d) Drums, barrels, casks and cylinders 
General classification 
by unit weight, 
- up to and including 45 kg 
- 45 kg and including 90 kg 
- 90 kg and including 180 kg 
- 180 kg and including 320 kg 
- over 320 kg 
Empty drums, barrels, casks and cylinders are charged the general 
rate plus 50 per cent, 
(d) Bags 
General classification 
by unit weight, 
- up to and including 30 kg 
- 30 kg and including 55 kg 
- over 55 kg. 
exceptions, 
The dirty cargoes ý- carbon black, yellow oxide, red oxide and 
umber - as well as having a rate per tonne also incur a time 
rate for every hour or part thereof (with a minimum of four 
hours) which they are worked. 
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(e) Metals 
General classification, 
by unit weight, 
gp to and including 225 kg' 
over 225 kg 
Frozen Cargoes 
Three specific rates, two of which depend on whether the cargo is 
to be sorted or not. 
(g) Miscellaneous 
(h) Heavy lifts over 5 tonnes 
Two rates, depending on whether the cargo is delivered direct or 
landed on the quay. In addition to the rate, the cost of 
mechanical appliances and extra labour is charged. 
(i) Palletised or pre-slung cargo 
Unit weight, 
- units less than 750 kg charged under the general classification 
of the commodity composing the unit 
- over 750 kg to and iAcluding I tonnes 
- over 1 tonne to and including 5 tonnes 
Containers delivered direct at berths other than container 
terminal (over 600 cu ft) 
Rate per unit, with an additional charge for mechanical 
appliances and a minimum charge per hatch per working period 
jk) Bulk cargoes 
(k) Timber 
The category is divided into softwood and hardwood at the first 
level and then logs or loose and bundles at the second level. 
The loose and bundles have three rates depending upon unit weight 
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- up to 500 kg 
- 500 kg and -ncluding 1,000 kg 
over 1,000 kg 
The rebates for the total weight of the consignment range from 5 per 
cent to 20 per cent. They are made for goods in categories (a) to (e) 
above and forifour specific commodities. The rebates for method of 
delivery are for direct delivery across the quay and direct delivery. 
9.4.4 Wharfinging_ 
The wharfinging schedule does not contain any listed commodities: it 
consists solely of time rates for labour and mobile plant. Three types 
of labour are distinguished - staff, labour and clerical - and a rate 
per man is quoted for each of the shifts worked at the Port, (see 
section 8.3.1), public holidays and extra hours. In addition there is- 
an "overtime excess cost" which is again quoted for the same types of 
labout and shifts or hours. The rates for company owned mbbile plant 
are quoted on an hourly basis with different (increasing) rates 
applying to fork-lift trucks and mobile cranes as capacity increases. 
The rates for bogies, fork-lifts and mobile cranes exclude the driver. ' 
For most of this plant the driver rates are the standard labour rates, 
however for 30 and 40--ton cranes there are separate (higher) driver 
rates with two driversto be charged. Plant hired by the MDHC is 
charged for at cost plus the cost of the driver's personalAnjury 
insurance and reasonable overheads in relation to the hiring. 
302. 
9.4.5 The Cargo Handling Schedules 
In support of these-cargo handling schedules, the port would argue that 
they are all c6st based. Apart from wharfinging the broad method of 
establishing the published revenue rate (price) is to mark-up on direct 
labour costs and to charge separately for extras. Chapter 8 outlined 
the main elements of the revenue rate: as beings 
(i) The basic wages of Registered Dock Workers (RDW). This is a 
standard rate regardless of the capacity in which the RDW is 
employed. 
(ii) occupational differentials. When an RDW is allocated to a ship, 
he is also employed to perform a particular job (for example, 
deckhand, stevedore, crane driver, checker etc. ), each of these 
jobs receiving an occupational differential in addition to the 
basic rate. 
(iii) Standard manning. The port has a schedule of standard mannings 
for discharging different commodities. 
(iv) Standard productivity. The port has estimated from the 
experience of their supervisory staff standard productivities. - 
(tonnes per net gang hour - TPNGH). 
(v) Bonus rate. Again the port has a schedule which for every 
commodity shows the Bonus Payment per man per tonne. 
(vi) The Mark-up. The function of the mark-up is to recover the 
wage related costs, the district/terminal office costs, various 
miscellaneous costs and the costs of agreed quayside plant 
(mainly fork lifts and cranes transferring cargo from the ship's 
side to the transit shed). 
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In the case of discharging (stevedoring) the revenue rate was 
initially computed from the formula, 
m TWi /NH 
REV = 
i=l 
+bM++ a) 
_TPNGH 
2 
where, REV = revenue rate (E/t) 
Wi= wage plus occupational differential of man i, per 
shif tM 
NH = net hours worked during a shift 
TPNGH = productivity - tonnes per net gang hour 
b= bonus plus (where appropriate) dirt allowance 
(E/man/tonne) 
M= ship manning plus half of the checker, 
N= shore manning Jhalf of bonus payments to the master 
porters are to the shipowner's account) 
Cc = mark-up 
In a second round, slight adjustments were made to incorporate 
"other" supply and demand factors. 
Section 4.6.2 outlined the various supply and demand characteristics 
of goods. On the supply side, the characteristics which impose costs 
on the port include; 
(i) Those which affect the rate at which cargo is handled, Due to 
institutional arrangements, the Port incurs its basic labour 
costs on a temporal basis but charges on a weight basis. Thus, 
the faster that a cargo is discharged (tonnes per hour) the 
lower the cost per tonne. The handling rates of a particular 
commodity will depend upon, 
304. 
(a) A measure of the relationship between weight and volume. 
For example, a greater tonnage of copper bars could be 
discharged per unit time than say bales of cork. 
(b) The size of the unit (for example, cartons, pallets and 
containers). Ceteris paribus, the larger the unit size, 
the faster the rate at which the cargo can be handled. 
(c) The size of the consigrunent. By the process of specialii- 
sation, productivities on large consignments of homogeneous 
commodities may be greater than the productivities obtained 
on small consigments of the same commodity. 
(d) The "awkwardness of the unit"' (for example steel construc- 
tional pieces). 
(e) The location of the co=odity within the ship. Co=odities 
such as explosives, high value commodities and refrigerated 
cargoes tend to be stowed in lockers. This usually requires 
manual handling which in turn reduces the rate of discharge 
(this may however be compensated for at higher cost - by 
larger gang sizes). 
(f) The "dirty" nature of the co=odity. On the cost side, 
labour is paid a higher rate for handling such cargoes. This 
extra payment contains two elements: a payment to compensate 
labour for the disutility of handling such commodities 
(which is separate from productivity considerations); and 
a productivity related cost which recognises that extra time 
must be spent cleanitg the ship's hold - which reduces the 
rate for handling the cargo. 
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Those which require the port to, provide extra facilities (for 
example, labour, mobile plant and floating cranes). Some of 
these facilities are charged for separately and thus they do 
not enter into the revenue rate. One,. exception is the standard 
manning which varies between commodities. Thus some commodities 
impose different costs on the port according to their required 
manning. 
On the demand 
_side, 
the characteristics which will influence the 
user's willingness to pay. indlude; 
(JL The unit value of the commodity. The higher the unit value# 
the more easily the charge can be absorbed. 
(ii) The volume of trade flow in the commodity and the size of the 
consignment. Reduced rates may be offered to shippers 
presenting large quantities of cargo to the port in order to 
retain at-attract such traffic. 
(iii) Origin or destination of the cargo. In the case of conservancy 
and berth charges it was suggested that as voyage length 
increases the proportion of port costs in total transport costs 
decreases and thus the commodities from the more distant ports 
may have a greater ability to pay. From the. published rates 
this would appear not to be the case. Two more plausible 
explanations are that either the commodities from the named 
countries or areas are relatively homogeneous or the rates are 
an attempt by the Port to retAin or attract the trade. 
The Port however would explain these factors in terms of costs. High 
unit value commodities require more care in handling and therefore 
impose higher costs; high volume trade flows imply that economies of 
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scale can be realised which reduces costsT and the co=odities by 
origin may be homogeneous or the commodity structure stable and thus 
the Port is able to quote a single rate based on the average product- 
ivity for the trade. 
The Port suggests that the costs of handling cargo are incurred 6n 
both a temporal and tonnage basis. Thus they could attempt to price 
on either basis.. The discharging, master porterage and loading 
schedules are tonnage based and the wharfinging sdhedule is time based. 
Given that the port adopts standard values for some of the variables 
used in computiftg -the rate and 
that some averaging of costs is under- 
taken, the impact of the cost of deviations from these standards and 
averages will be different depending upon whether the rate is tonnage 
or time based. 
For the purposes of exposition, the discharging revenue rate can be 
simplified by assuming an average wage per man per shift of m 
F, /M) and ignoring the allocation of half of the bonus payment 
to the shore labour then, 
Price/ý: onne =[ 
ý'*M 
+ b-M] (1 + a) i5i-. TPNGH 
The price/hr = price/tonne x TPGGH, where TPGGH = tonnes per gross 
gang hour. Thus, 
Price/hour 
T4. m 
TPGGH +bM TPGGH 
NH. TPNGH 'I (1 
But the total tonnage handled during a shift = NH. TPNGH = GH. TPGGH, 
(ii) 
where GH = gross hours per shift, and therefore TPGGH = 
EH- TPNGH, thus GH P 
Price/hour 
ýI. M, 
+ b. M. 
NII 
. TPNGH + GH GH 
TPGGH +bM 
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The price per shift = Price/hr x GH, thus, 
I 
Price/shift = [W. M + b. TPNGH. NH. Ml(l'+ a) 
and'-the price per man per shift = (Price/shift) + M, thus, 
Price/man/shift = ET4 + b. TPNGH. NHI(I + a) 
Alternatively, since b. TPNGH* =K 
Price/man/shift 71 + K. NH. 
TPNGH 
] 
(1 + a) C 3: Va) TPNGH* 
In equation I -, the first expression in square brackets (ý. M) / 
(NH. TPNGH) is the time related cost and the second expression (b. M) is 
the tonnage related cost. For each commodity the Port knows the 
manning levels (M) and can therefore compute W, similarly the value of 
b is obtained from the Port's labour schedules. In order to determine 
the rate, it is also necessary for the Port to estimate the net hours 
per shift (NH) and to assess the standard productivity for the 
commodity. It is assumed fbr example that in the two shifts 0800-1200 
and 1300-1700 hours there are six net hours. The magnitude of a 
typical productivity is 12 TPNGH. Thus in equation Ip NU is set 
equal to NH* and TPNGH to TPNGH*. The effect of fixing these variables 
is that any improvement in-productivity per shift above the standard 
(NH*. TPNGH*) increases the Port's "profit" per tonne and any deterior- 
ation in productivity decreases the "profit" per tonne. Differentia- 
ting equation I with respect to the TPNGH (2j, 
3 Price/tonne ý. m I (I 
3 TPNGH iF 
( 
TPNGH 
2 
)] 
thus if W. M = E162.40, NH =6 hours, TPNGH = 12 and a=1.75 then, 
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3 Price/tonne 
= -0.52. 3 TPNGH 
Thus from a fixed price/tonne. of E8.50 (assuming b=0.057.5, M= 14.5 
and the other variables in equation I taking the above values) a one 
unit increase in the TPNGH increases the Port's "profit" per tonne 
by 52 pence per tonne. 
Expressing this as an elasticity 
n=- proportion of wages plus occupational differentials 
in direct labour costs 
= -0.73 
so that, at the standard productivity, a one per cent increase in the 
TPNGH leads to a 0.73 per cent increase in the Port's "profit" per 
tonne. Conversely, a decrease in productivity decreases the Port's 
profit per tonne by a similar amount. ý 
Thus, with the tonnage based schedule, the direct benefits of increased 
productivity are passed on to the port and conversely, the cost of 
decreased productivity must be absorbed by the port. 
Similarly, differentiating equation I with respect to the NH [4] 
Price/tonne 12)1(1 
3 NH =- -WN; 
ýMH 
( 
NH 
and using the same values of the variables 
3 Price/tonne 1.03 
3 NH 
Thus a six minute increase, say, in the net hours above the standard 
increases the Port's "profit" by 10.3 pence per tonne. The elasticity 
is the same as the productivity case. 
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1rhus, again the impact of the benefit of net hours in excess of the 
standard lies with the Port whilst the cost of net hours below the 
standard must be absorbed by the port. 
The alternative base for the charge is the temporal basis used for 
wharfinging. Equations IV or IVa demonstrate how the discharging 
revenue rate could be converted into a per man per shift rate. This 
would again require the Port to estimate or assess NH and TPNGH, and 
some averaging of W and K would be required if the rate was to be 
applicable to all commodities. This arises because the manning levels 
vary between commodities and thus the average wage per shift may 
change due to the wage and occupational differential structure within 
a gang. Similarly there are six values of K (69,73,88,94,102 and 
109 pence per man per hour) representing the six dirt categories. 
Assuming that these problems can-be overcome (as they have in the 
wharfinging schedule) then, 
Price/man/shift = [ý + 
i. NH*](1 + a) 
If W= E11.20, K=0.69p, NH* =6 and a=1.75, then 
Price/man/shift = E42.19. 
The effect of fixing these variables is that any improvement in the 
productivity per shift above the standard decreases the Port's "profit" 
per man per shift and vice versa. Differentiating equation IVa, with 
respect to TPNGH [5j, 
3 Price/man/shift K aH" 
a) a TPNGH Fp 
add using the same values of the variables, 
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3 Price/man/shift 
= 0.95 3 TPNGH 
Thus, a unit increase in the TPNGH decreases the Port's "profit" per 
man per shift by 95 pence and conversely a unit increase in the TPNGH 
increases the Port's "profit" per man per shift by a similar amount, 
Expressing this as an elasticity (61, 
e= proportion of bonus in direct labour costs 
= 0.27 
so that, at the standard productivity, a one per cent increase in the 
TPNGH leads to a 0.27 per cent decrease in the Port's "profit" per 
man per shift. 
Thus, the direct benefits of increased productivity accrue to the 
consumer and conversely the cost of decreased productivity is passed 
on to the consumer. During overtime hours, this effect will be even 
less as the overtime rates are quoted on a temporal basis. 
This analysis assumes that the Port is using the "correct" measure 
for costs. The above discussion would suggest that labour costs form 
a major part of the current revenue rate, however, given the 
contractual agreements with, and the excess capacity of labour, the 
short-run escapable cost excludes the fall-back pay of registered dock 
workers. Section 8.6 suggested that some of these short-run escapable 
costs are jointly attributable to the commodities handled during a 
shift (including sundry consumables, fuel for normal-plant, occupa- 
tional differentials, basic bonus, overtime, and the national 
insurance - both employer and employee-contributions. and other 
compulsory levies based on these labour related costs) whilst, others 
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are attributable to specific commodities (including fuel and overtime 
for extra plant, the bonus in excess of the basic bonus, and the 
national insurance and levies based on the labour related costs). 
Thus, these costs represent the lower limit of escapable cost. 
With respect to the direct labour costs, the Port is implicitly using 
the long-run escapable cost of the labour which is warranted by demand, 
the excess labour being incorporated in the mark-up. 
The costs of the extra plant and equipment are again depreciated in 
equal annual instalments over the asset's life and further averaging 
is undertaken within a year whereby the annual instalment is converted 
into an hourly charge. 
Thus, when faced with jointness over time the Port allocates costs 
equally to each year. Labour costs are treated as an operating 
expenditure and are therefore allocated to the year in which the cash 
flows occur. When faced with jointness of costs over the commodities 
handled, the Port has allocated the costs in proportion to the direct 
labour costs of handling the commodity. It has been suggested that 
some of the costs included in the mark-up will be related to the direct. 
labour costs and thus the pricing system may be "better than" average 
cost pricing. However, the pricing system assumes constant long-run 
elasticities Isection 3.4.3) and thus ability to pay. It could 
however be the case that commodities with higher direct labour costs 
(for example, "dirty" co=odities) have a lesser ability to pay that 
part of the mark-up which covers the joint costs. 
The comments relating to the extent to which the cargo handling tariffs 
lead to an efficient utilisation of existing assets are similar to the 
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other tariffs. In this case, the short-run escapable costs do not 
approach zero, however, there is still a divergence between these 
costs and the price charged by the Port. Thus, again traf f ic which 
is willing to pay the escapable cost but less than the price computed 
by the Port will not be accepted. 
The schedule devised by the Port represents a comprehensive attempt 
to allocate both short- and long-run escapable costs to the traffic 
imposing the cost. Thus, it would appear that any cross-subsidisation 
with respect to escapable cost will be minimal. 
The conditional signal that the Port has been receiving in the cargo 
handling operation is that for over a decade there has been excess 
labour. As a result the number of RDW's on the Liverpool Port 
Register has fallen from approximately 11,000 in January 1970 to 
5,149 in December 1979. 
9.5 Summary and Cc clusions 
In the four tariffs discussed above the Port uses a number of different 
pricing systems ranging from average cost through full-cost to price 
discrimination, with some elements of a block tariff being exhibited. 
The conservancy schedule used average cost pricing combined with 
discrimination between coastal and deep-sea traffic. The berth 
charges extended the conservancy schedule by introducing an exception 
to the coastal rate (grain) and a number of exceptions to the deep-sea 
rates. Two of these exceptions would appear to be adjustments to the 
vessel's g. r. t. (modified tonnage and timber vessels) and the grain 
exception (as in the coastal case) being an attempt to attract traffic 
to the Port. The ýariff is then divided into vessels loading only, 
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and vessels discharging and loading. A lower rate is quoted for the 
former ostensibly to support United Kingdom exports. A further 
feature of the schedule is the minimum and maximum rates that the 
traffic is required to pay which it was suggested is a form of block 
tariff. The goods schedule distinguishes between coastal and foreign 
traffic with the rates for the former being much lower. It would 
appear that this tariff is using price discrimination, as there was 
some evidence of a relationship between unit value and the rate. The 
cargo handling schedules use full-cost pricing. by marking up on the 
direct labour costs. The basis for the charge is either tonnage or 
time. ' The degree of complexity within the tonnage based schedules 
varies between loading stevedoring with seven rates, master porterage 
with twelve categories of commodities distinguished by packaging 
(with a number of different rates within each category) and discharging 
stevedoring with 91 different rates. In additionovertime rates are 
quoted on a time-basis as are"the rates for extra plant. Wharfinging 
is a time based scheduleý, which contains rates for staff, labour and 
clerical workers which depend upon the day of the week land public 
holidays) and shift worked. - 
The degree of complexity in the tariffs is therefore subject to 
considerable variation, and consequently computation and administration 
by the port. In practice, once the schedules have been established 
their structure becomes ossified and changes are effected by across 
the board percentage increases in rates. For example, the 1981 goods 
charges are 76 per cent higher than the same 1976 charges and the 1960 
cargo handling tariffs (loading and discharging) are 52 per cent 
higher than the 1977 tariffs. Thus, it has been relatively easy to 
administer the systems. 
314. 
The discussion of the costs used to compute each of these schedules 
suggested that, particularly in the case of capital assets, the 
approach adopted by the Port -is at variance with both the opportunity 
cost principle or valuation formula. Theý Port uses historic cost, 
whereas it was suggested that in the case where the assets will not be 
replaced, the lower limit of escapable cost over the planning horizon 
is the difference in opportunity cost (suitably discounted) at the 
beginning and end of the horizon. Similarly, if the asset is to be 
replaced, the upper limit is ascertained by taking the valuation of 
the asset at the beginning and end of the horizon. Whilst the 
historic cost may lie within this range it may be inappropriate if 
replacement is being contemplated. 
The problem of jointness in costs over time is approached by"writing 
off"the historic costs in equal annual instalments over their 
estimated remaining economic lives. Thus, the Port's solution is to 
average the costs over time. Whilst this represents an approach to 
the problem, the only requirement is that the traffic over the life of 
the asset is willing to pay, which does not necessarily imply 
averaging the costs. The problem of jointness over traffic was 
approached by averaging and price discrimination. Howevert given the 
joint nature of these costs, the only requirement is again that the 
traffic jointly pays so that averaging is only one solution. 
I 
The question of the charging base used by the Port has been raised in 
a number of contexts. In the conservancy and berth charge schedules 
gross registered tonnage is used as a base. However it is not clear 
whether this base is "equitable" between ship types. In the cargo 
handling schedule, both tonnage and time were used as bases. However 
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the "optimum" choice of base is again not clear. The charging base 
will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
This chapter has also considered the extent to which the charging 
schedules meet the objectives outlined in chapter 1. In terms of 
their own cost definitions, the accounting requirement of the Port has 
only been met in two of the last five years (1975-1979 inclusive) . 
However, given the cost measures used by the Port it is difficult to 
assess the significance of this observation. 
In general, the short-run escapable cost of the facilities provided 
by the port are less than the price currently charged and in some 
cases they approach zero. The implication of this observation is that 
traffic willing to pay at least this cost but not the price will not 
be accepted. Thus the systems may not lead to an efficient utilisation 
of the Port's existing assets. Section 9.1 suggested that under these 
circumstances the Port can either investigate the extent to which 
demand is distorted or attempt to devise alternative tariffs. A block 
tariff was suggested for large regular users, however the problem of 
the small one-off user remains. 
The extent to which cross subsidisation with respect to escapable 
costs occurs in the conservancy and berth tariffs would appear to be 
minimal as there is a large degree of jointness in the costs incurred 
in providing the facilities. In the goods schedule it is not clear 
whether cross subsidisation is occurringhowever identification of 
traffic according to berth type would minimise its extent. The cargo 
handling schedule attempts to allocate all of the labour related costs 
and thus the extent of cross subsidisation is likely to be minimal. 
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The discussion in this chapter has also suggested that the investment/ 
replacement signals provided to the Port from the pricing systems are 
conditional. Thus*, they are inefficient with respect to encouraging 
the Port to maintain and develop assets which are of value of the Port. 
In the conservancy case for example, an "excess profit" on the 
conservancy account does not necessarily- imply that these facilities 
should be improved. Conversely if a "loss" is incurred on this 
account it does not necessarily imply that the facilities should be 
downgraded. Under these circumstances, it will be necessary for the 
port to obtain alternative signals, section 9.1 suggesting 
consultation with port user bodies and assessment, using cost-benefit 
analysis. 
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Notes 
[11 The sources of the statistics in.. Table 9.3 were; 
(i) Rates: MDHC, "Charges on Vessels and Goods" Operative from 
1 January 1976. 
(ii) Stowage Factors: Arthur D. Little Ltd., "Containerisation 
on the North Atlantic", Report prepared for the 
NPC, November 1967. 
(iii) Unit Values: EMSO, "Annual Statement of Overseas Trade of 
the United Kingdom", Vol V, 1975. 
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Setting TPNGH = TPNGH*, then 
TI 
=- proportion of wages plus occupational 
differential per man per shift in direct 
labour cost per man per shift. 
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Setting TPNGH = TPNGH*, then 
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+ K. NH 
= proportion of bonus per man per shift in direct 
labour cost per man per shift. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE CHARGING BASE AND TARIFF STRUCTURE 
10.1 Introduction 
The discussion of the escapable costs has indicated that in some cases 
costs may be attributed to a traffic or groups of traffic. There 
remains however the questions of how the tariff is to be structured 
and which base, is to be used for charging thIs traffic. Chapter 2 
(The Port's Pricing and Investment Problem) suggested that where there 
exists jointness in costs the only requirement is that the traffic 
should be jointly willing to pay. Willingness to pay however is 
contrained by considerations of equity - the Acts of Parliament 
relating to each port usually requiring "no discrimination between 
users in like circumstances" 111. The point where the charge initially 
bears (the impact of the charge) is also of importance to the port as 
it will influence their negotiating strength. This chapter will 
therefore discuss the issues of the charging base; the factors 
influencing the traffic's willingness-to payl equity considerationsl' 
and the effects on the port of the impact of a charge. 
10.2 The Charging Base 
10.2.1 Introduction 
The outline of port tariffs and charging bases Chapter 1 (section 1.1) 
and the dicussion of the MDHC tariffs indicated that there are a 
number of bases used by ports for charging purposes. Chapter 4 
(Port Costs and Traffic Characteristics) further listed the various 
characteristics of ships and goods, some of which could be used as a 
charging base. A number of these characteristics (particularly on the 
cost side) are however related to the structure of the tariff. For 
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example, if a relationship could be demonstrated between cost and size 
then this may suggest a progressive tariff. Given that there are a 
number of possible bases, one approach is to devise an output based 
schedule. In order to use such a base, it is necessary to ascertain 
its meaning in the port context. 
10.2.2 Port Services and Output 
The main function of the port is to provide the services and facilities 
whereby goods can be transferred from one mode of transport (ship) to 
another (barge, road or rail) and vice versa. Thus at the highest 
level of aggregation of the services and facilities provided by the 
port either the tonnage or volume of the goods passing through the port 
would appear to be an appropriate measure of the output and therefore 
basis for charging purposes. 
In general however, commodities (that is, well defined goods and 
services) are characterised by a description of their physical 
properties, their location and their date of delivery (Debreu [21). 
In Debreuls discussion, the period of time over which the economic 
activity is undertaken is divided into equal discrete "elementary 
intervals" such that, for the purposes of the analysis, any instants 
within an interval are indistinguishable. Similarly the location of 
economic activity is divided into "elementary regions". In considering 
economic services the concept of a commodity is introduced by providing 
five examples including; labour, a truck, a hotel room, a warehouse 
and transportation. Labour is described by the task performed, and 
when the date (the elementary interval at which the service is 
performed .. measured from the present instant) and location (elementary 
region) are included the service is a well defined commodity. "The 
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. quantity of such a sex-vice 
is expressed by the time during which it 
is rendered. The "use of a hotel room" is described by a list of 
the facilities available to the occupant. "Its quantity is an 
integral number of days. " In the case: 6f.. a warehouse, time is 
included in the description of the commodity and not as a measure of 
quantity. Thus, the warehouse is described as being refrigerated 
or not, the security offered, etcetera. The temporal specification 
requires several dates and "its quantity is explcessed, for example, 
by a real number of cubic feet. " Transportation services are 
described by the mode of transport (rail, roAd, air, water, pipelines, 
power lines etcetera) and any other specification necessary to 
describe the service. The temporal specification will require several 
dates and the, spatial sp9cification at". least two locations. "Their 
quantities are expressed for goods, for exampley by the wdi4ht or 
volume transported. " 
Thus, for a commodity to be "well defined" it must have its physical,, 
temporal and spatial characteristic specified. if any one of these 
characteristics change then a different commodity results. A 
noticeable feature of these five examples is also the measure of the 
quantity used in each case, with time being suggested for labour, the 
truck and the hotel room, cubic feet for the warehouse and tonnage 
or volume for transport. 
Whilst a coarse specification of port services may suggest tonnage or 
volume as a measure of quantity, closer examination of the main 
constituent elements of the port services vector would suggest that 
the port is providing different types of commodities (services) which 
have different measures of quantity. The elements of the port services 
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vector consisted of conservancy, berth, cargo handling and goods 
services. A specification of conservancy services would include in 
the MDHC case a description of the lights and buoys, the channel 
depth (including the accuracy of the reported depth) and the services 
provided by the Port Radar Station. The temporal specification may need 
to be taken into account as will the state of the tide. The spatial 
specification is Liverpool and Birkenhead (with further elementary 
regions being specified if conservancy of the whole River is being 
considered) . The relevant quantity in this case would appear to be 
the number of ships. The berth services would appear to be similar 
to Debreuls example of the warehouse. Thus, the specification would 
include the type of berth (that is, the cargo handling operation 
performed at the berth), the date and number of elementary time 
intervals required to perform the service (that is, the duration of 
the service) and if necessary, where the service is performed within 
the port (for example, the short-sea passenger traffic may prefer a 
location closer to the city centre). If the analogy with the ware- 
house is reasonable, then the quantity will be a. measure of the size 
of vessel that can be accommodated at the berth, for example, length. 
It should also be noted that a temporal dimension is included in the 
specification as, for example, the: berth service for a vessel for two 
days is a different commodity from the berth service for the same 
vessel for three days. The cargo handling service would appear to 
include elements of both Debreuls labour and truck services. Thus for 
the labour, -jts description 
includes the tasks performed (loading and 
discharging stevedoring, wharfinging and master porterage), the date 
and location. In the case of labour, it may be necessary to consider 
the blementary time intervals as being the shifts worked at the port 
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(which are of unequal length) . The desctiption of the plant and 
equipment will include the task performed by the machines, the 
condition of the machine, a date and location. In both cases the 
measure of quantity is expressed in terms of the time worked. On the 
other hand, it could be suggested that the cargo-handling service 
more closely resembles transportation services. Thus, it would be 
specified by the cargo handling operation (container, grain etcetera) , 
the date and location. Under these circumstances, the quantity measure 
is the tonnage, volume or number of units (in the case of containers) . 
The facilities provided under the heading of goods include the transit 
sheds, access roads and perimeter fences. Thus, specification of this 
service includes a description of the transit facil- 
ties, .. access roads, the date or dates between which. the service is 
rendered and the location. The quantity will therefore include a- 
measure of the area or volume of the transit facilities and also the 
number of vehicles transporting the goods to and from the berth. 
Thus, the relevant quantity measures for each of these-services would 
appear to be: conservancy - number of ships; berth - length; cargo 
handling - time worked, tonnage, volume or number of unitsi and goods 
area or volume and number of vehicles. In the cases where the 
duration of the service is included in the-ýspecification . 
(berth and 
transit facilities) it may be possible to remove this from the temporal 
specification, replace it with a single date and express quantity as 
a composite measure which includes the linear, square or cubic 
dimension and the number of elementary time intervals for which the 
service is rendered (in a similar manner to the hotel room). 
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It should be noted that these measures do not necessarily relate-to 
the costs incurred by the port (although in the long-run they pay), 
They are submitted as measures of quantity and therefore represent 
units upon which a charge could be based and schedule structured. 
10.2.3 Bases for Conservancy and Berths Charges 
A charge based solely upon a vessel's entry into the port would tend 
to be commercially unacceptable as, apart from cost conbiderations, 
it would be claimed that the larger vessels have a greater ability to 
pay on a per entry basis. Thus some structuring of the schedale may 
be required (according to size) or the base changed. The base which 
is widely used is the g. r. t., however it is not clear whether this is 
"equitable" between users of the port's facilities. The two main 
measures of vessel size are registered tonnage and deadweight. Both 
gross and net tonnage are measures of volume. Gross tonnage is found 
by calcUating the total permanently enclosed spaces of the ship, not 
including certain exempt spacesand dividing by 100. The net tonnage 
is the gross tonnage with certain "deducted spaces" subtracted. The 
philosophy behind the n. r. t. is that cargo cannot be carried in the 
deducted spaces and thusthe measure reflects the potential carrying 
(earning) capacity of the ship in volume terms. Briefly, the 
exemptions and deductions include; 
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Total volume of enclosed spaces, 
not including; 
1. Double bottoms for water ballast 
2. Poop, Bridge and Foc'sle 
3. Wheelhouse, galley, pantries and hospitals 
4. Hatchways 
equals Gross Registered Tonnage 
less deducted spaces; 
1. Steering jear compartment 
2. Chartroom, radio-room 
3. Bosun's store 
4. Water ballast other than double bottoms 
5. Master's and crew accommodation 
6. Propelling power allowance 
equals Net Registered Tonnage. 
Deadweight (dwt) is a measure of weight and represents the difference 
between the ship's displacement at loaded and light drafts. it is 
therefore a measure of the ship's capacity to carry: cargo, crew, 
passengers, stores, fresh water, feed water and bunkers. 
Table 10.1 shows the MDHC's examination of the alternative physical 
dimensions of the ship which could be used as bases for dues on ships. - 
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In orderto further investigate the relationships between these 
dimensions a survey of vessels entering the Mersey during May 1977 wasý 
undertaken. The names of the vessels entering the Port were obtained 
from the Journal of Commerce and the vessel type, g. r. t., n. r. t., dwt, 
length, breadth, depth and summer draft were obtained from Lloyd's 
Register of Shipping. The sample consisted of 633 vessels (some 
making multiple entries into the Port during the month) and included 
338 general cargo vessels (145 to. 28,293 dwt) , 168 tankers 1691 to 
227,912 dwt) , 50 container vessels 
(1,043 to 32,753 dwt) , 15 bulk 
carriers (14,860 to 77,774 dwt) and 62 miscellaneous vessels, including 
naval, fishing, Ro-Ro and ore carrying vessels. 
Investigation of the relationships between the ship dimensions for each 
of the four main vessel types suggested that they are highly correlated. 
Table 10.2 contains the correlation matrices for each of these vessel 
types. A natural logarithm transformation of the vessel dimensions 
yielded higher correlation coefficients (although, further investi- 
gation does suggest that the log transformation is too powerful). - 
The corresponding correlation matrices for the transformed data are 
also included in table 10.2. 
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Table 10.2 - Correlation Matrices of Vessel Dimensions 
General Cargo - Untransformed Data 
GRT NRT DWT LTH BTH DFT 
GRT 1.0000 
NRT 0.9910 1.0000 
DWT 0.9412 0.9570 1.0000 
LTH 0.9332 0.9150 0.9169 1.0000 
BTH 0.9306 0.9186 0.9193 0.9794 1.0000 
DFT 0.9243 0.9139 0.9358 0.9633 0.9685 1.0000 
(a)(ii) General Cargo - Transformed Data 
LGRT LNRT LDWT LLTH 
--LBTH LDFT 
LGRT 1.0000 y-Z r -. 
LNRT 0.9933 1.0000 
LDWT 0.9722 -0.9808 1.0000 
LLTH 0.9678 o. 9682 0.9755 1.0000 
LBTH 0,69581 0.9649 ýO. 9750 -0.9780 1.0000 
LDFT 0.9761 0.9777 0.9816 0.9623 0.9654 1.0000 
(b)(i) Tanker - Untransformed Data 
GRT NRT Dwr LTH BTH DFT 
GRT 1.0000 
NRT 0.9920 1.0000 
DWT 0.9959 0.9948 1.0000 
LTH 0.8792 0.8417 0.8495 1.0000 
BTH 0.9275 0.8956 0.9059 0.9730 1.0000 
DFT 0.9004 0.8709 0.8756 0.9859 0.9752 1.0000 
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Table 10.2 (continued) 
(b)(ii) Tanker - Tranformed Data 
LGRT LNRT LDWr 
LGRT 1.0000 
LNRT 0.9927 lX000 
LDWT 0.9922 0.9960 1.0000 
LLTH 0.9825 0.9878 0.9891 
LBTH 0.9691 0.9742 0.9791 
LDFT 0.9890 0.9896 0.9881 
(c)(i) Container - Untransformed Data 
GRT NRT DWT 
GRT 1.0000 
NRT 0.9966 1.0000 
DWT 0.9665 0.9589 1.0000 
LTH 0.9209 0.9064 0.9753 
BTH 0.9105 0.8916 0.9654 
DFT 0.8961 0.8932 0.9389 
(c)(ii) Container - Transformed Data 
LGRT LNRT LDWr 
LGRT 1.0000 
LNRT 0.9939 1.0000 
IDwr 0.9839 0.9849 1.0000 
LLTH 0.9649 0.9516 0.9756 
LBTH 0.9163 0.8969 0.9386 
LDFT 0.9804 0.9770 0.9719 
LLTH LBTH LDFT 
1.0000 
0.9706 1.0000 
0.9772.0.9647 1.0000 
LTH BTH DET 
1.0000 
0.9741 1.0000 
0.9523 0.9104-,. 1.0000 
LLTH LBTH LDwr 
1.0000 
0.9760 1.0000 
0.9349 0.8861 1.0000 
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Table 10.2 (continued) 
d(i) Bulk - Untransformed Data 
CRT NRT DWT LTH BTH 
GRT 1.0000 
NRT 0.9800 1.0000 
DWT 0.9826 0.9840 1.0000 
LTH 0.9775 0.9772 0.9819 1.0000 
BTH 0.9600 0.9664 0.9529 0.9582 1.0000 
DFT 0.9233 0.9297 0.9502 0.9478 0.8793 
(d)(ii) Bulk - Tran: ýfo=ed Data 
LGRT LNRT LDWT LLTH LBTH 
LGRT 1.0000 
LNRT 0.9850 1.0000 
LDWr 0.9922 0.9886 1.0000 
LLTH 0.9839 0.9677 0.9810 1.0000 
LBTH 0.9784 0.9758 0.9778 0.9577 1.0000 
LDFT 0.9407 0.9370 0.9528 0.9420 0.8950 
Notes: GRT = Gross Registered Tonnage 
NRT = Net Registered Tonnage 
DWT = Deadweight 
LTH = Length Overall 
BTH = Extreme Breadth 
DFT = Summer Draft 
L prefix = Natural logarithm transformation of Data 
DFT 
1.0000 
LDFT 
1.0000 
334. 
The relationships between the dwt and g. r. t. of these four vessel 
types are shown by the regressions of the iintransformed dwt's on 
g. r. t. in Table 10.3 
Table 10.3 Regressions of the Untransfdrmed dwt's on g. r. t. 
General cargo: 
2 
dwt = 518.1 + 1.2255 g. r. t. R. 0.8859 
(128.1) (0.0240) SEE - 1371.5 
Tanker: 
2 dwt = -1845.2 + 2.0065 g. r. t. R 0.9919 
(315.0) (0.0141) SEE 3709.4 
Container: 
dwt 1438.9 0.8890 g. r. t. R2 - 0.9342 
(368.8) (0.0341) SEE - 2007.7 
Bulk: 
2 dwt = -1873.7 + 1.7812 g. r. t. R. 0.9655 
(2370.7) (0.0933) SEE - 3832.5 
Bracketed numbers are standard errors. 
335. 
To illustrate the differences between using dwt or g. r. t. as a 
charging base, consider vessels of, say, 19,000 and 2.0,000 g. r. t,., and 
let the due be E1.00 per g. r. t. Table 10.4 then shows the correspon- 
ding dwt and due per dwt for these four vessel types. 
Table 10.4 Dues per dwt for given g. r. t. (Untransformed data) 
10,000 g. r. t 20,000 g. r. t. 
Vessel type 
dwt 
I 
E/dwt dwt 
I 
E/dwt 
General 12,773 0.78 25,028 0.80 
Tanker 18,220 0.55 38,285 0.52 
Container 10,329 0.97 19,219 1.04 
Bulk 15,938 0.63 33,75o 0.59 
Thus, a charge based upon g. r. t. which does not distinguish between 
vessel type tends to favour tankers and bulk carriers at the expense 
of general cargo and container vessels when the charge is considered in 
terms of dwt. If it is further admitted that tanker and bulk cargoes 
tend to be weight based and general and container cargoes tend to be 
volume based then'g. r. t. is an even more favourable base for the 
tankers and bulk carriers (in terms of the actual weight of cargo 
lifted). in the case of bulk carriers, it could be argued that the 
unit values of the commodities carried in these vessels is less than 
those for container and general cargo and thus the bulk carrier has a 
lesser ability to pay. 
Due to the negative constants in the tanker and bulk carrier case, the 
charge per deadweight decreases with size and due to the positive 
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constants in the general and contAiner equations their charge per 
deadweight increases with size. 
A similar analysis using the transformed data yields the results 
shown in tables 10.5 and'10.6. 
Table 10.5 Regressions of the Transformed dwtIs on g. r. t. 
General cargo: 
ldwt = 1.1499 + 0.9017 lgrt R2.0.9452 
(o. 0893) (0.0118) SEE = 0.2643 
Tanker: 
ldwt = 0.5875 
(0.0778) 
+ 0.9891 lgrt 
(0.00964) 
2 
R. 0.9845 
SEE -, 0.1281 
Container: 
ldwt = 1.6853 
1^ 11-7017% 
0.8272 lgrt 2 R. 0.9681 
SEE - 0.1830 
Bulk: 
2 ldwt = -0.2445 + 1.0762 lgrt R. 0.9845 
(0.3721) (0.0374) SEE - 0.0683 
All variables are natural logarithms. 
Bracketed numbers are standard errors. 
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Table 10.6 Dues per dwt for given g. r. t. (Transformed data) 
10,000 g. r. t. 20,000 g. r. t. 
. --dwt 
I 
E/dwt dw tI E/dwt 
General 12,770 0.78 23. -1$58. 0.84 
Tanker 16,276 0.61 32,307 0.62 
Container 10,983 0.91 19,486 1.03 
Bulk 15,798 0.63 33,311 0.60 
Thus, there are no marked differences in the dues per dwt when using 
the transformed and untransformed data. 
The discussion of the quantity for berth services suggested that a 
measure of the size of vessel which can be accommodated at the berth 
is the relevant measure. Both length and g. r. t. are used and thus 
the question of "equity" between users arises again. The relation- 
ships between length and g. r. t. for the four vessel types are shown 
in table 10.7. 
Again, to illustrate the differences between using length or g. r. t. 
as a charging base the dues per unit length are compared between 
vessel type and size for vessels of 10,000 and 20,000 g. r. t. and a 
rate of E1.00 per g. r. t. (Table 10.8). 
Whilst the rank order changes for the two vessel sizes the least 
favourably treated vessel for both sizes is the tanker. When 
comparing sizes for each vessel type the general cargo vessel is least 
sensitive to changes in g. r. t. (this arises because it is the most 
sensitive to changes in g. r. t. - table 10.7). Thus a flat rate per 
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Table lo. 7 Regressions of the Untransformed lengths on g. r. t. 
General cargo: 
2 
length = 59.8 + 0.009450 g. r. t. R. 0.8709 
(1.059) (0.0001985) SEE - 14.77 
Tanker: 
length = 89.3 
(2.491) 
Container: 
length = 80.8 
(3.747) 
Bulk: 
length = 129.8 
(4.411) 
2 
0.002650 g. r. t. R00.7730 
(0.0001115) SEE - 29.34 
2 
0.005662 g. r. t. R. 0.8480 
(0.0003460) SEE - 20.40 
2 
0.002900 g. r. t. R 0.9555 
(0.0001737) SEE 7.13 
Bracketed numbers are standard errors. 
Table 10.8 Dues per unit length for given g. r. t. (Untransformed data) 
10,000 g. r. t. 20,000 g. r. t. 
,;; -(M-)T 
E/lth ith (m) E/lth 
General 154.3 64.81 248.8 80.39 
Tanker 115.8 86.36 142.3 140.55 
Container 137.4 72.77 194. o 103.07 
Bulk 158.8 62.97 187.8 106.50 
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g. r. t. will be a progressive tariff per unit length Ibecause length 
is a linear measure and g. r. t. is a cubic measure) however for 
different vessel types the rate per unit length will vary. 
Given the non-linear nature of this relationship tables 10.9 and 10.10 
examine the corresponding models.: for the transformed data. 
Table 10.9 Regressions of the Transformed lengths on g. r. t. 
General cargo: 
llength = 1.953 + 0.3341 lg. r. t. R2.0.9366 
(0.0357) (0.00474) SEE - 0.1058 
Tanker: 
2 Ilength = 2.134 + 0.3131 lg. r. t. R. 0.9653 
(0.0372) (0.00461) SEE - 0.0852 
Container: 
llength = 2.089 + 0.3207 R2.0.931o 
(0.1038) (0.0126) SEE - 0.1063 
Bulk 
2 llength = 1.949 + 0.3340 lg. r. t. R 0.9681 
(0.1673) (0.0168) SEE 0.0307 
All variablds are in natural logarithms. 
Bracketed numbers are standard errors. 
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Table 10.10 Dues per unit length for given g. r. t. (Transformed data) 
Vessel 
10,000 g. r. t. 20,000 g. r. t. 
type lth (m) E/lth lth (m) E/lth 
General 153.0 65.36-7 192.8 103.73 
Tanker 151.1 66.18 187.7 106.55 
Containe 154.9 64.56 193.5 103.36 
Bulk 152.2 65.70 191.9 104.22 
Thus, for a given g. r. t. the differences of the untransformed data are 
not present. The mon-linear relationship is reflected in the pro- 
gressive nature of the tariff. The elasticity of the due per unit 
2 
length with respect to g. r. t. is approximately X3rds (3]. That is, 
a one per cent increase in g. r. t. increases the due per unit length 
2 
by '73rds of one per cent, regardless of the vessel type. 
10.2.4 Bases---*for Cargo Handling and Goods 
The two main alternative quantity measures for cargo handling are 
time and units of the commodity (that is tonnage, volume or number of 
units of the commodity). Section 9.4.5 investigated time and tonnage 
based charges at the Port of Liverpool and the results of the 
investigation are surnmarised in table 10.11. 
The two main observations from that analysis relate to the sign and- 
magnitude of the results. If the port sets a rate based upon a 
standard productivity (TPNGH) then the benefit of a productivity in 
excess of the standard accrues to the user - in the case of a time 
based charge and to the port if the charge is tonnage based. This 
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Table 10.11 The Sensitivity of Time and Tonnage Based Cargo 
Handling Charges 
Time Based Tonnage Based 
a P/m/S a P/T 
3 TPNGH 
E: 
a TPNGH TI 
0.95 
1 
0.27 -0.52 -0.73 
1 
where P/T = Price/tonne; P/M/S = Price/man/shift 
TPNGH = Tonnes per Net Gang Hour 
n= Elasticity of P/T with respect to TPNGH 
C= Elasticity of P/M/S with respect to TPNGH 
arises because the cost of factor inputs are related to both time and 
tonnage. Thus in the time based case the port will have to pay more 
per man per shift if a greater than standard productivity is achieved. 
However the revenue rate per man per shift is fixed so that the port 
is rqquired to absorb. the increased cost. In the tonnage based case 
the port will have to pay labour less per tonne as the fixed wage per 
man per shift is spread over the higher than standard tonnage. Thus, 
given a fixed revenue rate per tonne the "profit" from increased 
productivity accrues to the port. 
The magnitudes of the elasticities would suggest that a time based 
schedule is less sensitive (by a factor of approximately three) to 
deviations from the standard productivity than a tonnage based 
schedule. This arises because the-Ltonnage based costs represent a 
smaller proportion of direct labour costs. (Note that the time based 
elasticity, e, is calculated from the tonnage based labour costs). 
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Consider, for example, the port's revenue per shift when the tariff is 
time and tonnage based. From equation III (section 9.4.5) , with 
Tq = E11.20; m= 14.5 men; b= EO. 0575/man/tonne; NH =6 hoursl 
TPNGH* = 12; and a=1.75, then 
Revenue/shift = [ý. M + b. NH. TPNGH. Ml(l + a) 
= E611.68 
if the tariff was time based then this is the revenue which the port 
would receive regardless of the productivity. If however the actual 
productivity was, say, 13 TPNGH then (substituting 13 instead of 12 
in the above equation) the port should have charged E625,44. Thus the 
port has to absorb E13.76 of the increased "costs" (Note that this is 
approximately equal to 
a P/M/S 
XM 3 TPNGH 
If the tariff was tonnage based then from equation I (section 9.4.5) 
Price/tonne = 
ýI. m + bM + 
[NH. 
TPNGH* 
= E8.50. 
So that if the actual productivity was 13 TPNGH (= 78 tonnes per gang 
per shift) then the port's actual revenue per shift would be E662.66 
(E8.50 x 78) whereas E625.44 should have been charged. Thus the port's 
"profit" increases by E37.44 (Note that this is approximately equal 
to 
3 P/T 
X TPNGH* ). Given the impact and magnitude of the costs and a TPNGH 
benefits the port then has to decide upon the appropriate charging 
base. 
if the charge was tonnage based, then it could be argued that this 
would'provide an incentive to the port to achieve productivities in 
excess of the standard (and provide a positive disincentive to 
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productivities -below the standard) . Whilst the shipowner would pay 
more per shift for an increased productivity,. hie would. also benefit 
by being able to complete discharging or loading in a shorter period 
of time. If on the other hand, the charge was time based then there 
is a disincentive for the port to achieve productivities in excess of 
the standard. The shipowner may also argue that such a charge is 
sensitive to a factor (nam ly the productivity) over which he has no 
control. Fdr example, if the port is experiencing I'labour difficulties" 
then it is the shipowner who bears the cost of the resulting low 
productivities. If however, the reason for a reduced productivity is 
"bad stowage" then it may not be unreasonable for the ship to pay. 
Thus, a time based schedule does provide an incentive to the shipowner 
to stow the cargo in such a manner that rapid discharge is facilitated. 
The balance of these arguments would appear to favour a tonnage based 
charge. However, given that a time based charge is less sensitive to 
changes in productivity it does merit furtherýconsideration by the 
port. 
The quantity measures relevant to the services provided under the 
heading of goods included area or volume and the number of vehicles. 
In the case of a container terminal, the homogeneous nature of the 
"commodity" would suggest that the twenty foot equivalent unit (TEU) 
may be a suitable unit of quantity. If the temporal dimension was 
removed from the description of the service then the charging base 
can incorporate both the area occupied by the container and the time 
that it is in the stacking area. In the case of other homogeneous 
commodities the quantity measure which is used by the Port for transit 
facilities is the tonne (for example, the capacity of the grain silos). 
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The tonne is also the base which is used extensively for the heterogen- 
eous general cargo. Clearly,. tonnage is a measure df quantity for 
transit facilities, however, with general cargo its use tends to 
favour those commodities with high stowage. factors (volume per unit 
weight) .A similar problem exists for the ship carrying these 
commodities and as a result the shipowner (or linei: conference) 
reservesthe right to charge on either basis. 
The access provided for road vehicles is subject to similar consider- 
ations to those of access for ships (that is, conservancy). Following 
the logic of that case, the port could charge each vehicle for an 
entry into the port. If this was not acceptable because of different 
vehicle sizes then a measure of the vehicle's gross weight, carrying 
capacity or other relevant physical characteristics. In practice, 
ports tend not to charge vehidles, thus the charging base moves back to 
the goods. 
10.3 Willingness to Pay 
Whilst the assessment of a specific traffic's willingness to pay a 
particular charge is related to demand, and thus beyond the scope of 
this thesis, there are a number of demand based considerations which 
are of general applicability. 
Apart from the demand for cruise liners, the demand for shipping, 
services, and thus port services is a derived demand. In other words, 
it is not required for its own sake, it is demanded because there 
exists a demand to change the spatial location of commodities. 
Marshall [41 discussed four "conditions under which a check to the 
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supply" of a factor of production "may cause a very great rise in its 
price" (that is, the conditions under which the demand for the f actor 
are inelastic). These conditions include; 
1. "the factor itself should be essential, or 
nearly essential to the production of the 
commodity, no good substitute being available 
at a moderate price" 
2. "the commodity in the production of which it 
is a necessary factor should be one for which 
the demand is stiff and inelastic" 
3. "only a small part of the expenses of production 
of the commodity should consist of the price 
of this factor" 
4. "even a small check to the amount demanded 
should cause a considerable fall in the 
supply prices of other factors of production" 
Layard and Walters [5] restate these conditions as; 
"within an industry# the (absolute) elasticity of 
demand for a factor i (C varies directly 
with; 
1. The (absolute)elasticity of demand for the 
product the factor produces (ITIDI) (2 above). 
2. The share of the factor in the cost of 
production (v i) 
(3 above). 
3. The elasticity of supply of the other factor 
(nS) (4 above). 
4. The elasticity of substitution between the 
factor in question and the other factor (S ij) 
(1 above)". 
Layard and Walters decompose the elasticity (e ii 
)into an output effect 
(with constant factor proportions and a substitution effect (with 
output remaining constant and factor proportions changing). The first 
three conditions are analysed in terms of the output effect then the 
substitution effect is introduced when considering the fourth condition. 
Thus, given constant factor proportions (that is, no substitution 
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ef f ect) , the relationship between the f irst three f actors is (6] 1 
SD 
s- 
Ti 'n 
TID v 
The interesting cases embodied in this formulation can be examined by 
investigating the limiting cases. Rearranging the equation, by 
dividing the numerator and denominator of the expression in brackets by 
S 
TI 
Ti 
-1- 
(1 -vi)n /T1 
- 
SDS Thus, as nV1 11 . The condition under which in is 
that the prices of other factors are fixed. Thus for example, if one 
is considering import and export elasticities in the -range (-2 jol 1 and 
given that port costs may only represent a small proportion of the total 
through transport costs, then the elasticities of demand for port ý 
services will tend to be very low. This formulation also demonstrates 
the relationship between elasticity and unit value of the commodity (7]. 
Let tI be the port costs incurred by the commodity and pi be the c. i. f. 
price of the commodity. Then v, = ti/pi, and 
tiD 
Pi 
I 
Thus, ceteris paribus, as the unit value of the commodity (c. i. f. 
price) increases, the elasticity of demand for port services decreases 
(that is, it becomes less sensitive to price changes). 
At the other extreme, as nS ->- 0, C ii -* 0. ns can 
be interpreted as 
either the supply of other factors or the supply of the commodity 
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itself. In this second case, the commodity is considered as being a 
factor input in the exporting country which is combined with transport 
services to produce the output in the importing country - the place 
where the demand elasticity is relevant. Thus, if the supply is 
inelastic then so also is the demand for the factor. 
If the elasticity of substitution is admitted into the analysis then 
it can be shown that the substitution effect is equal to (8] , 
(1 vi )s ij 
where, 
S ij = percentage change in factor proportions resulting from a 
unit percentage change in relative factor prices. 
Thus,. assuming perfectly elastic supply of the other factor input# and 
combining the output effect with this substitution effect, 
v TI vs i ij 
or Ir:. jjl= vjln'l +a- vj)sjj 
This formulation suggests that there is a direct Positive relationship 
between c ii and vi 
if and only if In 
Di 
> S,,. That is, for a given 
Tj D and 
S,,, if; 
I'iil* , I'iil 
then, 
vi *In DI+a-vi *) S ij > Vi'7'Dl + (1 -vi )s ij 
or, 
vi *(I TI DI-s ij 
)>vi (IT, 
DI-s ij 
) 
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and since 0<v<1, for this condition to hold, v>v and 
(in 
DS ij 
> 0. The formulation also suggests that long-run 
elasticities may be greater than short-run elasticities. In the short 
run, it may not be possible to change factor proportions and thus the 
I 
value of S ij will be low. In the 
long-run however it may be 
possible for ships or goods to substitute other ports, and for techno- 
logical change ot occur (for example, substitution of the capital 
intensive container and Ro-Ro vessels for the labour intensive general 
cargo ships). The discussion of the reasons for a lower rate for 
coastal vessels could possibly be explained in terms of these smaller 
vessels having higher short-run elasticities of substitution than the 
deep-sea vessels. 
Thus, the elasticity of demand for the factor will vary directly with 
the share of port costs in the c. i. f. price (assuming that InDI ý. S ij 
the price elasticity of demand for the commodity handled and the supply 
elasticity of other factors (including -the commodity). The relation- 
ship involving the share also suggests that the demand elasticity 
will vary inversely with the unit value of the commodity. 
Whilst these factors may give the port authority a qualitative indica- 
tion of the elasticity of demand for the port's services, there 
remains the problem of obtaining quantitative estimates of their 
values. Batchelor and Bowe 191 estimated the relative price elastici- 
ties of UK imports and exports for 44 and 48 commodity groupings 
respectively. Their estimates, together with the unit values (10] for 
each commodity group are shown in Tables 10.12 and 10.13. The 
positive signs of some of the elasticities and the observation that 
over half of the estimates are not significantly different from zero 
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Table 10.12 United Kingdom Import Elasticities and Unit Values (Port 
of Liverpool) 
Commodity SITC(R) 
Unit 
Valuqe 
Price 
Elasticity 
Food and Live Animals 
Live animals 01,941 339 
Raw meat Oil 575 --1.60 
Meat preparations' 012,013 905 -1.42 
Dairy produce 02 340 0.29* 
Fish and preparations 03 921 -0.20* 
Wheat 041 86 0.05* 
Maize 044 67 -2.37 
other milled cereals 042,043,045 114 -2.85 
Milled cerals and preparations 046-048 604 -0.88 
Fresh fruitý 051 539 -0.31* 
Vegetables 054 123 -0.87 
Fruit and vegetable preparations r. 05 264 0.01* 
Sugar and preparations 06 126 0.21* 
Animal feeding stuffs 08 87 -1.06* 
Beverages 11 60 0.49 
Tobacco 12 951 1.07 
Other Food 07,09 418 -O. S3* 
Basic materials 
Textile fibres and waste 26 692 -0.59* 
Crude fertilisers 271 - -0.69* 
Crude minerals r. 27 32 -0.17* 
Iron ore 28i 10 -0.21* 
Other ores and scrap r. 28 220 -0.48* 
Oil-seeds and nuts 22. 139 -1.23 
Crude rubber 23 362 -0.05* 
Wood, lumber and cork 24 102 -0.58* 
Pulp and waste paper 25 159 -0.05* 
Animal and vegetable oils and fat 263 -0.03* 
other basic materials 
1 
21,29 284 -0.36* 
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Table, lCX. 12 (continued) 
Commodity SITC(R) Unit Value 
Price 
Elasticity 
Chemicals 
Chemical fertilisers 56 - -1.13 
Plastics 58 418 -0.57 
Organic chemicals 512 371 -9.23 
inorganic chemicals r. 51 ex 515 - -12.19 
other chemicals 515,52_-5,57,59 256 0.34* 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 
Non-electrical machinery 71. 11581 -2.70 
Electrical machinery 72 1,, 882 -0.14* 
Transport equipment 73 1,439 -0.94* 
miscellaneous manufacturers 
Wood and cork manufacturers 63 195 -1.13 
Paper andproducts 64 342 -0.46* 
Textiles 65 1,225 -1.18 
Cement 661.2 - -0.95* 
other mineral manufactures r. 66 166 -0.04* 
Iron and steel 67 151 -0.67* 
Non-ferrous metals 68 865 -0.17* 
Metal manufactures.. n. e. s. 69,951,961 853 0.19* 
other manufactures 61,62,8,911 1,875 -2.32 
Source: See [91, [101 
Not significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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Table 10.13 United Kingdom Export Elasticities and Unit Values (Port 
-- - of Liverpool) 
Commodity SITC(R) 
Unit 
Value 
Price 
Elasticity 
Food and Live Animals 
Meat and dairy produce 01,02 330 ý-l. 36 
Fish and preparation 03 617 -1.16 
Milled cereals and preparations 046-048. 504 -0.05* 
Fruit and vegetables 05 230 -1.26 
Sugar and preparations 06 323 0.37* 
Spirits 112.4 751 -3.03 
Tobacco, food, n. e. s. 07,09,12 549 -0.02* 
Live animals 001,941 4,005 -2. oo 
Unmilled cereals 041-045 - -0.76* 
Animal feeding stuffs 08 lea -0.74* 
Beverages n. e. s. 11 ex 112.4 144 -1.06*: 
Basic Materials 
Textile fibres and waste 26 634 -O. S9* 
Clay 276.21 37 -0.45* 
Salt 276.3 '. 13 -0.30* 
Crude minerals n. e. s. r. 27 - 
Stone, sand and gravel 273 
Other basic materials 21-25,29,4 28o -0.38* 
Ores and scrap 28 692 -0.75* 
Chemicals 
organic-chemicals 512 425 -0.68* 
Caustic soda 513.62 - -0.53* 
Soda ash 514.28 92 0.31* 
Inorganic chemicals n. e. s. r513,514 127 -1.16 
Mineral tar etc. 52 102 -1.14 
Dye stuffs etc. 53 723 -0.89 
Essential oils etc. 55 401 -0.92 
Plastics 58 487 -1.64 
other chemicals 54,57,59 732 -0.46 
Chemical fertilisers 156 94 1 -0.75* 
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Table 10.13 (continued) 
Commodity SITC(R) Unit 
Value 
Price 
Elasticity 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 
Non-electrical-machinery 
Power generating 711 1,980 -4.10* 
Agricultural 712 788 -1.39* 
Metal working 715 985 -3.10* 
Other 714,717-9 1P551 -4.20 
Electrical machinery 
Power generating 722 1,627 -0.38* 
Other r. 72 1,266 -1.63* 
Road vehicles n. e. s. 732.2-5,. 7,. 9 930 2.13* 
Vehicle parts n. e. s. 732.8 1,118 -0.97* 
other vehicles and parts 731,3,4.92, 260 -10.97 
5.93 
Motor cars 732.1,. 6 IjO77 -2.66* 
Miscellaneous Manufactures 
Wood and cork manufactures. 63 - -1.39* 
Textiles 65 1,607 -1.18 
Cement 661.2 - -5.30 
Glass and pottery 664-666 235 -0.55* 
other mineral manufactures r. 66 ex. 667 131 -1.27 
Iron and Steel 67 163 -0.68* 
Non-Ferrous metals 68 867 -0.21* 
Finished structures 691 389 -1.19 
Other metal manufactures r. 69,951,961 645 -1.35 
Rubber manufactures 62 832 -1.18* 
other manufactures n. e. s. 61,8,911 1,406 -1.34 
Paper and products 64 406 -3.06 
Source: see [91 , [101 
*Not significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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reflect the difficulties involved in attempting to obtain quantitative 
estimates of the price elasticities. 
The price elasticity, whilst giving an indication of the sensitivity 
of the quantity to changes in price, does not necessarily indicate 
the commodity's ability to pay. Provided that any relationship which 
may exist between the price elasticity of demand for the commodity 
and its unit value can be .,, established, a better measure of a 
commodity's ability to pay a charge may be its unit value (for example, 
a charge of E1.00 on a commodity with a unit value of El, ooo is 
insignificant when compared with the same charge on a commodity with a 
unit value of E10.00). Figures 10.1 and 10.2 Iderived from the data 
in tables 10.12 and 10.13) do not support an hypothesis that there is 
a relationship between the price elasticity of demand for the commodity 
and unit value (for example, it cannot be stated that low unit value 
commodities are more sensitive to price changes or vice versa) . Thus, 
given that there is no discernable pattern in a commodity's elasticity 
as its unit value increases and that a charge (in absolute terms) 
decreases in significance as unit value increases there may be a case 
for using unit value as a measure of ability to pay. 
A similar problem is encountered in the pricing of liner. -shipping 
services. The approach adopted by liner conferences, when fixing a 
rate on a new commodity or reducing the rate on an existing commodity, 
is to require the shipper to provide them with the following 
information [111; 
"(a) Stowage and handling - this includes also the 
properties of the-cargo, such as whether it is 
hazardous, or likely to contaminate other cargo; 
(b) Movement of the commodity - where a reduction 
in the existing rate is requested, the expected 
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increase in the movement of the commodity is 'asked for; 
(c) Capacity of the commodity to bear a particular 
rate - in this contex , 
t, information relating to the 
export incentives received by the shipper and the 
f. o. b. value and rate charges in respect of identical 
or similar commodities moving from other areas to the 
same market is also collected. " 
Thus the liner conference would appear to be combining partial 
infakmation of a qualitative and quantitative nature to estimate the 
userls willingness/ability to pay. 
10.4 Equity Considerations 
one of the statutory principles to be applied to pricing in United 
Kingdom Ports is that users in equal positions should be treated 
equally. Rochdale's summary [12] of the-statutory control of port 
charges states that; 
"Charges at the major independent ports are generally 
controlled by the provision of the Private Acts of 
Parliament relating to the individual ports... The 
port authorityýis free to vary charges within the 
prescribed maxima, provided there is no discrimination 
between users in like circumstances. " 
If the port wishes to increase charges then it can apply to the 
Minister. one of the principles that will be borne in mind when 
considering the application is; 
"that charges should be shared equitably by all users 
of the port. " [131 
Thus, the first quotation requires horizontal equity whilst the second 
is suggesting vertical equity (that is, the relative positions of users 
in different circumstances). Given that it is not possible for the 
port to undertake the required comparisons of interuser utility it 
will be necessary for them to develop various "rules of thumb" which 
are accepted by the users (or can be "sold" to the users). 
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From the port's tariff schedules a number of measures of horizonal. ' 
equity Are used. In the conservancy schedule coastal vessels are 
treated as equals as are the deep sea vessels. With respect to cargo 
handling a measure of equity is productivity - commodities with equal 
productivities paying the same rate (with adjustments made for the 
dirty nature of the commodity) . The underlying measure is however 
the labour cost per shift, with the tariff being designed so that 
(apart from differences in the dirty nature of the cargo and different 
manning scales) all commodities pay the same amount per shift. In the 
goods schedule there is some evidence to suggest that the unit value 
of the commodity is a measure of horizonal . -equity-. -, 
The measures of vertical equity are directly related to those of 
horizonal 
--equity. In the conservancy and 
berth cases traffic is 
separated vertically into coastal and deep-sea traffic. This 
separation was explained (sections 9.1 and 9.2) in terms of voyage 
length, cross elasticities between ports and the number of entries 
into the port. Whilst these factors may explain the differences 
qualitatively they do not explain quantitatively why the coastal rate 
is only one third of the deep-sea rate (conservancy). With respect toý 
cargo handling it has been suggested that the prices are related to 
cost and thus vertical equity is obtained. with measurable differences 
in productivity, manning and dirt allowances. - However it has been 
suggested that the system assumes constant long-run elasticities and 
a greater ability to pay of the commodities with higher direct labour 
costs. In the goods schedule, if there is a relationship between unit 
value and the charge, then the port again has measurable differences 
with which the schedule can be structured. 
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Another issue related to the structure of the port's schedules is 
whether they should be progressive. To a limited extent the conser- 
vancy schedule at Liverpool is progressive with respect to vessel size 
(given that coastal vessels tend to be smaller than deep-sea vessels). 
Given also that berth charges are based on g. r. t. they will be 
progressive with respect to length. - 
Other ports, for example, Tees 
and Hartlepool used to have progressive conservancy and dock dues 
according to the vessel's n. r. t. (Table 10.14) 
Table 10.14 Charges on Vessels - Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority 
(1st August 1973) 
Conservancy (All Ships) Dock Dues (Dry Cargo Ships) 
Size Range Due Size Range Due 
(n. r. t. ) (relative) (n. r. t. ) Irblative) 
0-500 100.0 0-ý-500 100.0 
501-1000 101.7 501-2000 130.0 
1001-2000 123.5 2001-5000 170.5 
2001-5000 127.9 5001 plus 185.9 
5001-10000 132.7 
10000-40000 169.6 
40001 plus 187.6 
It appears however that the port may experience some difficulty in 
obtaining a measurable demand factor which reflects the traffic's 
willingness to pay and can therefore be used to structure the tariff 
vertically. The Tees and Hartlepool charges do not appear to be based 
upon any. other vessel dimension which when converted to an n. r. t. 
basis yields a progressive tariff. For example, the survey of vessels 
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at Liverpool (section 10.2.3) suggests that both g. r. t. and dwt 
increase less than proportionately with n. r. t. - Table 10.15 (length, 
breadth and draft will also increase less than proportionately as they 
Table 10.15 Regressions of. Transformed g. r. t. and dwt on n. r. t. - 
General Cargo 
ig. r. t. = 0.6867 0.9838 ln. r. t. R2-0.9867 
(o. 0434) (0.00623) SEE - 0.1403 
2 
ldwt 1.6738 + 0.9010 ln. 'r. t. R. 0.9621 
(0.0681) (0.00976) SEE - 0.2200 
All variables are in natural.. logarithms. 
-Bracketed numbers are standard errors. 
are linear dimensions) . Distance, on the hypothesis that the propor- 
tion of port costs in total transport costs decreases with distance 
(which in turn implies a lower demand elasticity and thus greater 
ability to pay) could be used as a measurable demand factor. An 
extension of Walter's "development model for road investment" [141 
to the case where productivities increased with distance could turn 
the rent pyramid (with apex at the final market place) into a figure 
whose altitude increases with distance. Under these circumstances the 
good's ability to pay transport costs may increase with distance. 
In some circumstances, it may be the case that unit value is a 
function of distance, however in general, unit value is likely to be 
so variable both within and between ship types that such a relation- 
ship would be inappropriate for general application. The remaining 
measure, in conservancy and berth charges, for vertical equity, is cost. 
The use of this measure presupposes that the port can undertake the 
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required computation (section 6.4.3) and/or that some formula has been 
adopted to allocate the (f ixed) capital dredging costs. 
Questions of equity also arise if the port is considering whether to 
base charges upon a traffic's actual physical characteristics, its 
maximum physical characteristics or the capacity provided by the port. 
For example, should conservancy charges be related to vessel size 
(g. r. t. or dwt) or tonnage discharged/loaded at the port? Should 
berth charges be related to quay length or to the actual vessel 
length? should the charge on containers be related to the T. E. U. 
or the number of tonnes in the container? Given that the main 
function of a port is to act as a transfer point then. '. it: could be 
argued, for example, that actual weight should be the basis of the 
charge. On the other hand, it may also be argued that such a system 
is "inequitable" because a 10,000 dwt general cargo ship which only 
enters the port to discharge 100 tonnes of general cargo, would pay 
the same as a 100 dwt coaster which also discharged 100 tonnes. In 
tab le 10.1 the Port's view of the advantages and disadvantages of 
weight of cargo as a basis of assessment of port rates are listed 
(item 7). The major disadvantage would appear to be the time taken 
(up to two months) for the final out-turn of cargo. - as a measure of 
profitability of the voyage, the case is not proven, as weight is 
not necessarily related to profitability. The Port recognises that 
such a charging base would attract vessels with part cargoes however 
it also believes that in the long-run - such a base would encourage 
liner operators to adopt multiport itineraries which may reduce the 
Port's traffic. The Port does however note that some other ports do 
use the actual tonnage handled to adjust their rates. For example, 
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the Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority used to quote conservancy 
dues for vessels discharging or loading "full cargoes". A "full 
cargo" was def ined as a cargo discharged or loaded which exceeds 70 
per cent of the vessel's n. r. t. The dues for vessels discharging or 
loading less than a "full cargo" are 50 per cent of the quoted dues. 
10.5 Effect on the Port of the Impact of the Charge 
The impact of the port charges (who initially pays the charge) can lie 
with either the shipowner or the goods owner. At Liverpool the impact 
of the various charges is as follows; 
Shipowner 
- conservancy 
- berth charges 
- loading stevedoring 
- discharging stevedoring (plus half the master porter's bonus) 
- wharfinging 
Goods owner 
- goods charges 
- quay rents 
- master porterage . 
(excluding half of the bonus) 
The impact of the charges may be of some importance to the port. if 
the port is dealing with a large number of small users, it can exercise 
some monopoly power, whilst if it is dealing with a small number of 
large users its power may be reduced. In the extreme case of bilateral 
monopoly (figure 10.3) the port acting as a monopolist would produce 
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that level of output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue 
(A) and set price (P from the corresponding point on the user's 
demand curve JB). However the user acting as a monopolist sets his 
marginal revenue product (the demand curve) equal to his marginal 
expense of the port's services (D) (the change in total 6ost of 
purchasing one extra unit of port services) and offers to purchase the 
services at a price (P 2) equal to the port's marginal cost at the 
level of output corresponding to the intersection of these two 
curves (C) . Under these circumstances the final price and quantity 
are indeterminant and will depend upon the bargaining skills of the two 
parties. 
Price 
P] 
al 
inal 
duct) 
P 
ity 
fig 10.3 Bilateral Monopoly 
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Whilst the port will not be operating under the conditions of this 
extreme case, some of the elements of indeterminancy, may be Present. 
This situation is more likely to arise in the Port's dealings with 
the shipowner as the Port argues that a large proportion of their 
general cargo trade is represented by a small number of users (liner 
conferences or trades) . Table 7.3 (Chapter 7) indicates, in the last 
column, whether the berth is a "single or various user berth". Given 
the number of single user berths (and their corresponding tonnages) 
there is some evidence to support this argument. On the other hand 
there tends to be a considerably larger number of goods owners, so that 
the port may find itself in a relatively stronger. bargaining position 
with the goods owner than with the shipowner. Thus, it may be in the 
Port's interest to maintain the separate responsibility for paying 
charges between the shipowner and the goods owner. 
10.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the charging base, willingness to pay, 
equity and the impact of a charge. Following Debreu, different 
measures of quantity were suggested for each of the four main services 
provided by the port. These included: conservancy - number of ships; 
berth - length; cargo handling - time worked, tonnage, volume or 
number of units; and goods - area or volume and number of vehicles. 
In the case of the berth and transit facilities it was further 
suggested that time could be removed from the physical description of 
the service and included in a composite measure of the quantity. 
The choice of any charging base inevitably involves considerations of 
equity and given that the port cannot compare interuser utility it is 
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difficult to judge which is the "best" base. As Prest states, "the 
abstract meaning of equity is a problem for the moral philosopher 
rather than the economist" 1151 . However, it is possible to outline 
some of the bases which could be used and to indicate the differences 
which may arise if they were employed. One of the functions of port 
management will then be to choose bases which are acceptable to, or 
can be "sold" to, the user. 
It was suggested in the conservancy case that the use of the ship as a 
charging base may be commercially unacceptable because, ceteris 
paribus, the larger ships will have a greater ability to pay. Assuming 
that ability to pay is related to the carrying capacity of the ship 
then either a volume or weight measure suggest themselves. The 
vessel's g. r. t. is used extensively and this was compared with 
deadweight. The analysis suggested that the g. r. t. base favours bulk 
carriers and tankers at the expense of container and general cargo 
vessels. If however the unit values of tanker and bulk commodities 
are less than those for the commodities carried on general cargo and 
container vessels then this may not be particularly important. 
The quantity measure suggested for the berth was length however g. r. t. 
is a widely used base for these charges. It could be argued that the 
vessel has an ability to pay which increases more than proportionately 
with length and consequently g. r. t. may be the "better" base. The 
analysis suggested that the elasticity of a due per unit length with 
2 
respect to g. r. t. was ýtrds, there being no significant difference 
between vesselLtypes. 
The two bases discussed under cargo handling were time and tonnage. 
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Given that the costs of factor inputs are both time and tonnage based 
either base could be used. On balance, tonnage is preferred as it 
provides a positive incentive to the port to increase productivity, 
however it is also noted that at Liverpool a time based schedule is 
less sensitive to changes in productivity. 
In the case goods, T. E. U. s (containers) and tonnage (other 
"commodities") were suggested as alternatives to the quantity measures. 
For heterogeneous i cargo this tends to favour commodities with high 
stowage factors. From the practice of ports not to charge vehicles 
delivering and receiving cargoes tonnage would also appear to be an 
appropriate basis. 
Section 10.3 considered the various factors influencing the price 
elasticity of demand for transport services including: the supply and 
demand elasticities of the commodity transported, the share of 
transport costs in c. i. f. value of the commodity and the elasticity of 
substitution. It was indicated however that it may be difficult to 
obtain reliable quantitative estimates for these factors, and unit 
value was submitted as a possible base for incorporating the user's 
willingness/ability to pay. 
Section 10.4 introduced the problem of obtaining suitable measures 
which may be-considered to be both horizontally and vertically 
equitable. For cargo handling, the measurable differences are 
productivity, manning and dirt allowances and for the goods charges 
there is some evidence to suggest that unit value could be used for 
this purpose. For conservancy and berth charges, whilst vertical 
structures are adopted by ports (for example, by voyage type or vessel 
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size) it would appear more difficult to obtain a quantitative demand 
measure which reflects the user's willingness br ability to pay. 
Finally section 10.5 suggested that it may be in the port's interest 
to separate the responsibility for paying charges between the goods 
owner and the shipowner. 
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CHAPTER 11 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 Problems and Solutions 
The pricing and investment problem facing the port was outlined in 
Chapter 2 as being one of indivisibilities leading to jointness. In 
other words, the problem arises because costs in particular are 
difficult to separate (that is, indivisible) which implies that they 
are shared (that is, joint) . On the supply side, table 2.1 suggested 
that the production of a good for one consumer implied that the same 
or other goods were produced for other consumers, whilst on the demand 
side, the consumption of one good implied the consumption of one or 
more other goods. At the simplest level, the problem is manifest as 
being one of recovering the port's capacity costs. The discussion of 
Chapters 6,7 and 8 suggested however that the degree of severity 
of the problem varied between the services and facilities provided by 
the port and depends upon the extent of the indivisibilities in these 
services and facilities. For example, in the conservancy case, it was 
concluded that the majority of the facilities provided were joint to 
all of the traffic. It was further suggested that the level of 
service provided would be unlikely to be altered for moderate changes 
in the traffic volume. In the berth case however it was suggested 
that, in principle, incremental changes in capacity could be made and 
in the cargo handling case, even smaller incremental changes could be 
effected by altering the size of the labour force. An additional 
feature of cargo handling was that the short-run escapable costs 
represented a not insignificant proportion of the service's costs. 
The general solution to these problems consists of a pricing and 
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investment rule, namely;. 
1. Set price equal to marginal cost. 
2. Invest if the traffic is willing to pay the cost of the extra 
capacity. 
If the port is able to make small capacity adjustments and if 
decreasing costs are not exhibited over the range in which the 
decision is being made then an accounting requirement that total 
revenue equals total cost can be met (that is both the capacity and 
operating costs can be recovered) . This is achieved by setting price 
equal to the marginal capacity plus operating costs. In the case whore 
there exists temporal jointness with fluctuating demand# and given the 
sam assumptions with respect to small capacity adjustments and no 
decreasing costs, then an accounting requirement can again be met. 
In terms of costs and prices this can be demonstrated by considering 
the programming problem: 
n 
Max. W=D) dx, 
Jci (x, ) -g (y) ZE 
'fP, (x, 
i=l 0 1-1 
Subject to: 
xi y, i=1, ... n 
where: 
Welfare (consumers' plus producers' surplus) 
Pi (x i Demand 
function in time period i 
ci (x i Total operating costs 
in time period i 
g(y) Capacity cost 
Diý Discount operator 1/(l + r) 
i 
r= Discount rate 
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n- life of asset 
y- capacity 
Forming the rAgrangian expression; 
(x ) dx Dic (x g (y) +DX (y -x 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are; 
3 W'I 
- D: 
Lp (x Di cl (X,. ) -D110, xI 
WX 
=0 3 xi. i13xi 
(2) 
3 wl 
- Di(y -xoxaw0 aXiii 
3 W, w 
(3) 
ay -- 91 (Y) +DX1 40 zy0 
Assuming that all xi>0 and that some capacity is provided (that is, 
Y> We then the cooplementary slackness conditions imply that 
3wawA 
and -i- - 0, and therefore, 3x vy 
Di Pi (x i)-Di CI(xj) -D11, =0 
or, 
PL Ni)= CI(xi) + 'i 
Now, fr (2), if x<y then, 
W1 
>0 and . 1, = 0. 
Thus, price equals rarginal operating cost in those time periods when 
capacity is not fully utilized. When capacity is fully utilized, 
Y= Xie 0 and Ii>0. Now, from (la), 
Pi (x i)- ci 
(x 
i) 
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and frcm (3), since y>0, 
n 
(3a) D 1, W91 (Y) 
Thus, f rc- (lb) and (3 a), 
n 
(4) D (Pi(Y) - Cj(Y)) ` 9'(y), for all i where y=x 
or the present value of the excess of price over marginal operating 
Cost is equal to the marginal capacity cost. 
1hus, as long as the relevant demand and cost functions for each time T 
period are krxnrn, equation (4) is solved for the opti-I'm capacity 
level (y) and price is set such that, 
ci (xiL) , x, ýz y 
CI(xi) + x,. x, =y 
This would ensure that over the life of the asset the ma ginal capacity 
cost is recovered since, 
ED i 1j. = 96(y) 
It should also be noted that the pricing rule implies that if demand is 
fluctuating over ti then prices will be subject to similar fluctua- 
tions. 
If however the port can only =ake discrete adjustments to capacity 
then it will be necessary to co=pute WX for each of the capacity 
levels. The invest=ent criterion is the same as the general case, that 
is, continue investing as long as WI>0. The pricing rule does not 
however guarantee that an accounting requirement will be met. This 
arises because in the Lagrangian expression g (y) and y are constant for 
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for each level of capacitY thatý the port is considering. Thus the 
thl d Kuhn-Tucker condition is no longer relevant, that is, it is not 
required that, 
ED iIi. 
9'(Y) 
The pricing rule is the same as in the above case, that is, 
PILIX, 
)an 
ii 
1 
CI(Xi) 
However EDiIi could be less than, equal to or greater than the 
incre ntal capital cost. Under the circ=stances where the accounting 
require=ent is not =et (E DiIi< gl(y)) it will therefore be necessary 
for the port to find alternative mans to extract some of the surplus. 
11.2 Escapable Costs 
The general solutions to the port's pricing and investment problem have 
inter alia assumed a single identifiable traffic. In the port case 
however it may be necessary to provide facilities which are different 
In quality or nature for different traffic. Thus, when the port is 
considering the investment, reinvestment or disinvestment decision they 
will need to know the longer-run costs specifically associated with 
these separate classes of traffic. It has been suggested that the 
relevant cost for these-purposes Is the escapable cost. This cost is 
ascertained by defining the class of traffic then asking the question 
"which costs couldJnýe escaped if the traffic was not accepted? ". The 
principles of the measurement of escapable cost were outlined in 
chapter 5 and Included the reformulation of Foster's methodology in 
terms of matrices and an extension to the temporal case. The subse- 
quent attempt in chapters 6,7 and 8 to apply the method6logy to 
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, Conservancy, the Docks and Cargo Handling respectively 
indicated 
further the importance of classifying traffic according to "an 
essentially different quality or nature of the seivices and facilities 
provided". Apart from relatively minor differences in the quality of 
the services provided within a class of traffic they are treated as 
being homogeneous and the general solutions suggested above are 
applicable. In the Conservancy case, traffic was identified according 
to area of destination. This classification was used because the 
MDHC is providing services and facilities for traffic proceeding to 
ports other than the Port of Liverpool (including Birkenhead) . Apart 
possibly from some size related costs the traf f ic 'proceeding to 
Liverpool (including Birkenhead) should be treated as a single traffic. 
In the Docks case, the services and facilities provided were divided 
into the lock gate to the quaywall andthe. berth to the dock gate. The 
general conclusion for the lock gate to the quaywall was that apart 
possibly from some size related costs the facilities tend to be 
provided for traffic in general. For the berth to the dock gate 
however, berths tend to be fitted out for particular cargo handling 
operations. Thus, given that the nature of the facilities are essen- 
tially different the cargo handling operation could be used to define 
a homogeneous class of traffic. This distinction can be carried 
forward into the cargo handling case itself. 
The implication of such an approach for. say a liner conference which 
requires sole use of a number of general, cargo berths is that the 
port should supply the facilities if the conference is willing to pay 
the long run incremental costs of the required capacity including 
berths, transit sheds, cargo handling equipment and access roads. 
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The pricing rule is as outlined in section 11.1, namely, 
c! (x) ., 
< 
C, (x) 
which may or may not meet an accounting requirement depending upon the 
port's overall utilization of general cargo berths. When considering 
the long-run costs, the conference may also be required to make a 
contribution to the joint costs of conservancyi lock gate to quaywall, 
berth to dock fate and cargo handling - the requirement with respect 
to these costs being that all the relevant traffic should be Jointly 
willing to pay. for these facilities. 
11.3 The overall Approach 
The outline of the port's pricing and-Linvestment problem, and the 
discussion of the services and facilities provided under the heading of 
Conservancy, the Docks and Cargo Handling suggest that devising a. 
tariff structure for ports is a complex problem. Given the degree of 
complexity, it will be necessary for the port to place the various 
pricing, investment, cost, demand and financial aspects into context 
by-considering the overall problem. 'Turvey Ell suggests in the public' 
enterprise case, that; 
"In principle, of course, the optimal - price-output 
combination should be fixed in the light of predicted 
demand and cost functions. But when only point 
predictions of demand and rough guesses about 
elasticities are possible the, only practical procedure 
is to proceed in steps: 
1. Choose the relationship of prices to marginal costs 
which is most probably optimal; 
2. Forecast demand in quantity terms; 
3. Re-optimize production and investment plans; 
4. Calculate marginal costs with output matching 
forecast demand; 
S. Fix prices unless it is too soon since the last 
change; 
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6. Wait, while getting on with other tasks; 
7. Go to step 2. 
With this cycle there is a feedback from prices to 
forecast demand, but this is not instantaneous. Since 
things change during step 
* 
6, no equilibrium or optimum 
may ever be reached. Life is like that, however, and 
one might as well try to adjust to it. " 
Thus, this approach recognises the difficulties in estimating demand 
and outlines a step-by-step approach. Whilst Turvey does suggest that 
"the study of costs of a public enterprise may have to apply to 
point output forecasts, ignoring feedback via prices", it may also be 
possible to re-examine the demand forecast (step 2) before fixing 
prices (step 5). 
The approach adopted in the 1971 -White Paper "The Nationalised 
Industries" was discussed in chapter 1; figure 11.1 reproducing the 
flow diagram of figure 1.1. This approach is based an the 1967 White 
Paper's recommendation that prices should cover long-run marginal costs 
and it attempts to interrelate the pricing, investment and financial 
objectives laid down by government. In order to be able to use this 
approach, it is necessary for the industry to have an "investment 
programme" which can be used as a "yardstick". The current position 
at the Port of Liverpool is such that no new'investments are planned 
for at least ten years - one of the objectives of the MD11C Study being 
to "minimise capital investment". If there exists decreasing costs 
then this approach may also lead to an accounting deficit. it was 
suggested however, in the case of the- Docks, that the Port could 
attempt to use this approach by considering an hypothetical investment 
in a "basic" berth and access using ex-post data. 
A third approach which attempted to incorporate the valuation of 
assets was outlined in fig5.2. This approach suggested that the port 
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computes an upper and lower limit to "escapable" costs which reflect 
the opportunity cost and. replacement. cost oi the asset respectively. 
In an attempt to synthesize these approaches, the following is a step- 
by-step approach (which can also be converted into a flow diagram) 
for the berth to the dock gate. 
1. Choose a set of prices which are believed to be optimal. (In the 
absence of any other information, the port may have to use the 
current price. ) 
2. Forecast demand in quantity terms over the planning horizon. 
This would involve an investigation of each commodity, trade or 
liner conference. (In a second round, this would also involve 
investigation of trades that may find the port attractive if a 
"suitable" pricing system was available. ) 
3. Group traffic according to the cargo handling operation required 
(and size if it can. be demonstrated that the port provides, an 
essentially different nature or quality of service for vessels of 
differing sizes). 
4. Ascertain the facilities required, over the-planning horizon# to 
meet the demand from each of the traffic groups. For example, 
the port could have an "asset planning chart" (see Table 6.5) 
which included a description of the assetj its age and expected 
replacement date or dates. In addition, the chart would includo 
the operational-requirements of the traffic and facilities 
including labour and maintenance. , 
S. Ascertain the facilities required jointly for any relevant 
combination of these groups (including all traffic Jointly). 
6. Go to step 7a if adopting the total cost approach. Go to stop 7b 
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if adopting the marginal cost approach. 
7a '- (i) Value the assets in steps 4 and 5. Assets and other 
operational requirements which will be replaced are valued 
by reference to their replacement cost which is incorporated 
in the valuation formula. For assets which will not be 
replaced, because either replacement is not warranted by 
demand or the asset is durable, it will be necessary to 
compute a lower and upper value represented by the opportu- 
nity cost and the valuation formula. 
(ii) Compute the directly attributable costs. If the degree of 
jointness between the cargo handling operations is not 
severe then the matrix approach may not be necessary. 
However if it is, the matrix method may be found useful. 
Whilst valuing the assets, the port may also find it useful 
to consider step 7b. 
7b. Use an actual or hypothetical investment programme to generato tho 
incremental costs of different types of cargo handling operations. 
8. Devise pricing system, noting that over the time horizon discountad 
revenue should at--least equal discounted costs. 
9. Go to step 2 and investigate whether the proposed pricing system 
is likely to affect the demand forecast. One area where adjust- 
ments may be made is in step 7. If a pricing system cannot be 
devised whereby a cost as computed from the valuation formula is 
not recovered then the valuation can be reduced down to the 
opportunity cost if necessary and the asset not replaced. If tho 
new pricing system is "suitable" go to step 10. 
10. Investigate whether the accounting requirements are met (according 
to the "accounting policy of the day") . The 1978 White Paper (2) 
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states that; "Changes in an industry's accounting policies e. g. 
in calculating depreciation or, valuing assets, would not necessi- 
tate any changes in prices or outputs". ' The situation could arise 
however where the accounting, practice -is such that depreciation is 
charged to assets for which there is little demand and consequent- 
ly the accounting requirements may not be met. Under these 
circumstances it may be necessary for the port to revise its 
accounting policy. 
Whilst this approach illustrates the berth to dock gate case* its basic 
structure can be applied to other cases. 
11.4 Devising a PriCing System 
The pricing and investment rules; 
1. Set price equal to marginal cost 
2. Invest if the traffic is willing to pay the cost of the extra 
capacity. 
will in most cases faced by the port lead to an optimal allocation of 
resources. Deviations from these rules will (again in most cases) 
represent a compromise or trade-off, between, allocative efficiency and' 
an accounting requirement'. For example, in the, conservancy case at 
the Port of Liverpool there would -need, to'be considerable changes in 
the traffic volume before changes in the level of capacity would be 
required. Thus conservancy would appear to fall into the discrete 
case considered in section 11.1, with the capacity constraint not 
binding (that is, with the excess capacity, the Lagrangian multiplier 
X is always zero) . Given then that the marginal cost approaches zero 
the pricing rule is clear, namely price approaches zero. Now# even 
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if the port was considering whether to purchase, say, a new buoy the 
rule is still clear, namely, invest if consumers are willing to pay 
(measured by compensating variation, areas under Hicksian Compensated 
Demand Curves or areas under Ordinary Demand Curves - if this is the 
only available information) and set price equal to short-run marginal 
cost (which still approaches zero). Any other pricing rule will 
distort demand, that is, consumers who were willing to pay short-run 
marginal cost (that is, the cost that they impose on society by 
proceeding along the channel) but not the alternative price will not 
be accepted. Thus# in devising a pricing system one is also searching 
for a system which leads to the least distortion in demand. There is 
however a second trade-off that the port must consider - this is the 
trade-off between allocative efficiency and equity. For examplef it 
may be the case that a pricing system based upon price discrimination 
(according to, say, unit value) distorts demand to a lesser extent 
than average cost pricing. However, according to the value Judgements 
of the day or statutory obligations price discrimination may not be an 
acceptable pricing system. 
Chapter 3 outlined the theoretical properties of a selection of pricihg 
systems, however there remains the practical aspects of computing the 
price under each of these systems. 
'The 
starting point in developing 
any system is the accounting identity; 
n 
57p, TR 
where, 
P, = price per unit for commodity "ill 
quantity of commodity "i" passing through the port during the 
pricing period 
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TR = total revenue. 
The commodity "i" could be defined as number of ships, g-r-t., tonnes 
etcetera, depending upon the charge which is being investigated. 
Given an accounting requirement that total revenue equals total cost 
then prices under the different systems can be obtained as followsl 
1. Average Cost Pricing 
The -price'under this 8ystem, is relatively easy to -compute. * Given that 
TR =-TC, (total cost) then, 
p TC 
but the price is the same for every commodity, so that, 
TC 
Z: Qi 
If time is introduced, then the costs incurred over the defined time 
horizon (which. may be a fixed period of time or it may be related to 
the asset's life) can be allocated either directly to the forecast 
traffic over the period of time under consideration or they can be 
allocated to years, then the traffic. In the first case, the require- 
ment is that, 
nTT 
DtP, 
t Q, t . 
57 t ct 
i=l t=l t=O 
where, I 
i= traff ic 
t= time 
Ct cost incurred in time t 
t 
D discount operator 11 + r) 
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If the prices are to be the same for all co=odities at, each point in 
time, then, 
Dtct 
P 
EDt 
Qit 
Inflation can be incorporated into the computation by suitably 
adjusting prices, costs and discount factors. For example, if all 
costs are subject to the same inflation rate then the above formula 
I 
can be used by imputing the real costs, computing P then in any year 
t, Pt = P(l + k) 
t, 
where k is the rate of inflation of costs. 
The second case usually applies to capital costs. These costs can be 
converted into an annuity (Annual Equivalent Capital Costs - AECC) 
using the Capital Recovery Factor that is 
AECC 2-- C0x CRF 
co r+ 
r) -n 
where, 
C0= capital cost (incurred in year zero) 
r= discount rate 
n= life of the asset. 
Then in any year t, 
AECC + OC 
t 
p =- 
Qit 
where, 
OC 
t= operating 
costs in year t. 
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2. Price Proportional to Marginal Cost, Average Variable Cost or 
Unit Value 
Baumol and Bradford [31 investigated "Optimal Departures from Marginal 
Cost Pricing" where the welfare maximisation problem is subject to a 
"profit constraint" (accounting requirement that total revenue equals 
total cost). Following Morrison (41, this rule can be derived by 
forming the Lagrangian expression, 
n 
WA )7 Pi (Qi C(Qjj ... Q n) - g(y) 
0 
p C(Q Qn) -g (Y) 
where, 
Pi (Q i)= port charge per unit 
for commodity "ill 
Qi = quantity of co=odity 
C(Q 1'**'Qn total operating costs 
g(y) total capacity costs . 
(fixedl. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
3w, dP,, 
C3W 
,+4p+Q a- 
4.0 pi Qi 
a40, 
Q 
Iii 
dQ i Qi] iaQi 
aw 
(2) a44=T. Qi pi (Qi) -c (Q, il .... #'Qn) - 9(y) > 01 9aQ4-0 
Assuming that some of every commodity passes through the port Q> Ol 
so that 11 0. 
dQ iP 
Defining e to be the price elasticity of demand for the i dP J. Qi 
services with respect to the charge, then condition (1) can be solved 
to yield, [51, 
aWA. 
so that 0. 
dQ iP 
Defining e to be the price elasticity of demand for the i dP J. Qi 
services with respect to the charge, then condition (1) can be solved 
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(1 + g) ei 
(where ei is expressed in absolute terms. ) Since prices will be 
required to be positive, 
4< 
ej, for all i. Thus the value of 1+ ýL 
must be less than the smallest elasticity. For a specified 7-4 
co=odity, if e is known, and given that 4 is constant for all i 
commodities the pricing rule that emerges is to set prices proportional 
to marginal cost. The proportion however is a function of the 
elasticity - the higher the elasticity (in absolute terms) the lower 
the mark-up on marginal cost. Under these conditions the computation 
of k and therefore 4 is particularly difficult. Given the +4 
requirement that TR = TC then, 
P, TC 
Tc 
one approach is to use Taylor's expansion of the term in square 
brackets, 
2 
C 
TC 
e12***IaQ 
aC+ kE aC 
Qi 
k 
2)7 aCi 
-+ TC 
c2 i 
then to truncate the expression and solve the Polynomial for k. 
However one may encounter convergence problems particularly if the 
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values of 
k 
-)- 1. An alternative method is to find a starting value ei 
of k from the linear Taylor approximation, that is, 
TC 
kac 
Q, 
then to use an iterative approach until the accounting requirement in 
met. 
This formulation of the problem assumes that the port has knowledge of 
the elasticities. It has however been suggested in chapter 10 
(sect. 10.3) that elasticities are notoriously difficult to astimata, 
Thus it may be necessary to assume constant elasticition which in turn 
implies a constant proportionality factor (a). This can ba computod as 
follows; 
cl 
aQi 
therefore, 
CQ TC 
TC 
Cl 
aTCQ 
aQii 
This formulation is sizqilar to full cost pricinge where price in act 
proportional to average variable cost (AVC) that isl 
AVC i 
therefore 
AVCj. Q, - TC 
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TC. 
Cl 
5-7, AVC i'Qi 
In chapter 10 fsection 10'. 3) one of the estimates obtained for cL was, 
ci+ uv iI 
where, 
P1. = port charge per unit for co=odity Ili" 
UV, = c. i. f. value of co=odity "i" excluding port chargas. 
(this estimate assuming fixed factor proportions and parfactly alastic 
supply. of other*factor inputs. ) Following Morrison (6), this estimato 
can be substituted into the pricing solution of tho welfara maximisation 
problem to yield (71, 
3C+k 
uv 
T) ii 
pi. k 
Tli 
where, 
k= as defined above - u/(l + 4) 
n4 = the absolute value of the import/export elasticity for 
commodity "i". 
Now, since k must be less than the smallest ci and assuming an avarage 
value of n of 1. Then 1 -1- 2 It so that, i T1 i 
p3C+k UV aQi rii i 
Thus, price is approximately equal to marginal cost plus a proportion 
of the unit value. Thus k can be computed as follows, 
389. 
.'1 Qj. m TC ' 
. ra 
[Zc, ý, 
ZaQi 
Ti i 
TC C -Qi 
. ri ia Qi 
TC -3CQ 
1: 
aQii 
Uvi 
Again however, it may be difficult to obtain estimatas of tho 
elasticities. if it is believed that co=odities fall into dafinad 
categories: with plausible average elasticities then the port could una 
this formulation. If however this cannot ba attempted thon it may 
again be necessary to assume constant elasticities. 
The price is then set such that, 
pi. =ac+a UV aQii 
and 
TC -aCQ 
11 
a Qi i 
Uvi . Qi 
This method could lead to high charges for high valued commodities and 
the port may find that this traffic is not willing to pay these high 
charges. It may therefore be necessary to "reduce" this effect with 
a tranformation of the unit value. A general transformation which 
could be used is, 
UV* = 
Uv 
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One of the properties of this transformation is that as X -o- 0, 
UV* -* In, UV . The actual. value of 
X would have to be decided by the 
port by taking into account vertical equity and the traffic's willing- 
ness to pay the resulting charge. 
Extending this analysis to the temporal case yields similar results 
to those obtained above. The welfare maximising Lagrangian expression 
becomes, 
Tn 
Qit 
Dt Pjt (Qit) dQit Dt Ct (Qlt 0** 0' Qnt) 
t=l i=l 0 tul 
T. Tn 
-57 Dt 9 (yt) +V Dt Qit Pit (Qit) 
t=o t-I .1 
TT 
Dtc -T Dtg(yt) t it, nt 
t=l t-0 
Differentiating with respect to Q it, 
awact [pit 
+ Qit 
dPit 3 ct 
QV-Dtp it -DtaQt+ VD dQ at0 it it it 
F, 
The discount operator Dt divides out and the pricing rule becomes; 
ct 
it it (i + V) cit 
The computation of the constants required to find the price proceeds 
as above. Define the total costs to be the present value of the 
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operating plus capacity costs, that 
is#, 
T 
TC =37 
Dt 
[ct 
(c)., 00 Qnt) + g(yt)] 
t=l 
then, the accounting requirement is that the present value of the 
revenue equals the present value of operating plus capacity costs. 
Thus, 
Dtp it Qit M TC 
DtmaQ Qit - TC 
c it 
I, 
it 
where, 
mv< min c + V) it 
A starting value for m in an iterative approach is, 
tact 
TC DaQ 
it 
. Qit 
ta Ct Qit D 
It it 
if one assumes constant elasticities between commodities and ovar tima 
then, 
act 
pi. t a Qit 
and, 
TC 
Cl ac 
DaQ 
it 
" Qit 
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The, substitution of [P it 
Pp 
it + uv it)]n it for c it yields the 
approximation, 
it + T) 
m UV 
it 
it it 
with the value of m being computed from the formula, 
act 
TC -EE Dt aQ 
it 
.Q it 
t 
uv 
it 37 D 
Ilit it 
However the substitution would require further investigation as it 
I 
assumes fixed factor proportions and perfectly alastic supply of othar 
factor inputs. 
If constant elasticities are assumed them, 
pt uv 
it a it it 
where, 
TC -TII 
act 
Q it it 
Cl = 
T T. Dt uv it*Qit 
and if the traffic with relatively high unit values are not willing to 
pay the implied higher charge then it will be necessary to reduce the 
effect with a suitable transformation of the unit value. 
These formulae are applicable to the case where there is a single 
identifiable traffic with non zero marginal cost. If the port in 
considering groups of traffic jointly (for example grain and container) 
then there may be costs which are marginal or incremental in both the 
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the short- and long-run. Under these circumstances it may be 
necessary for the port to resort to average incremental costs as a 
proxy for marginal cost. Alternatively it may be necessary for. tho 
port to use the marginal cost for the constituent traffic as a basis 
for recovering both the short- and long-run joint costs. It must also 
be borne in mind that these costs may be "common costs which,, though 
not truly joint, and therefore not entirely arbitrary in incidence, 
involve sensitivity in allocation". [8]. 
3. Two-Part/Block Tariff 
Chapter 3 suggested that from an allocative viewpoint, a two-part or 
block tariff may be better than the systems discussed above. The 
spectrum of traffic demanding port services ranges from the frequent 
users to the one-off users. It is the traffic located towards the 
frequent user end of this spectrum which is relevant when considering 
this type of tariff. Chapter 3 further suggested that there are a 
number of ways in which this system can be applied, however, a major 
problem in each case is to ascertain the total amount to be extracted 
in the form of a lump sum or from the blocks. 
if there was only a single user of a particular facility the lump a= 
payment could be ascertained by firstly estimating the level of 
demand (given this pricing system) , secondly estimating the total cost 
at this level, thirdly deciding upon the follow-on price (for example, 
marginal cost at the forecast level of demand or average variable 
cost) then, 
L=p sum - TC -fXQ 
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where, 
follow-on price. 
If the port is going to "spread" the lump-rsum. over a number of units, 
then it must decide upon the size of this first block (Q*) - fig 11.2. 
LUMP 
Sum 
f ig 11.2 The Two-Part Tarif f Structure 
The price per unit in the first block (0) is then, 
TC - 
and the follow-on price is again f. Whilst this approach attempts to 
take cost and demand into account, it will be necessary to iterate back 
through demand to ascertain whether the consumer is willing to pay the 
lump-sum or block prices (see section 11.3). It could, for example, 
be the case that consumers are not willing to pay the total costs 
regardless of the pricing system. Under these circumstances revisions 
will be necessary which may imply that capacity is not replaced. It 
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may also be necessary for the port to "adjust" the initial structure 
of the tariff to make it, attractive to the frequent users. For 
example, if there are indivisibilities in demand whereby an operator 
has a fixed number of sailings during the pricing period then the port 
may "negotiate special rates for guaranteed throughput" (9). A two- 
part or block tariff could be used to perform this function. 
In general, the port will again have a number of users with some of the 
costs being joint to groups of users. If a lump-sum type of system 
is to be adopted then the approach again follows the steps outlined in 
section 11.3. Firstly, choose prices which it is believed will be 
optimal Isimilar to the final prices), secondly estimate demand, 
thirdly estimate the traffic's directly attributable and those 
directly attributable costs to which the traffic may be required to 
contribute, and fourthly decide upon the follow-on price. To the 
extent that capacity costs are directly attributable to the traffic 
then they can be included directly in the lump-sum (or the block 
structure of the tariff). There remains however tha jointt common and 
"fixed" costs which will have to be attributed to the traffic by soma 
means if an accounting requirement is to be met. The basic theoraticaj 
investment rule developed in chapter 2 was that, 
X* 
MRS dx -1 MRTdx -F >0 
00 
and the various "means" adopted in I and 2 above to extract consumers' 
surplus from the benefit measure in this criteria included the use of 
average cost, average variable cost, marginal cost, elasticities and 
unit value. Thus, if a two-part or block tariff is to be adopted then 
396. 
one method of obtaining the lump sum is to work backwards from the 
methods in 1 and 
(a) Average Cost 
In general, the total cost "allocable" to a traffic or commodity i Jol 
n 
TC, DAC F P (I) + 1=0 if I 
where, 
TC i= 
total cost allocable to traffic i 
I= set of n traffics which has been idontified 
separately 
(I) = power set of I, that is, the class of all subacts 
of I 
DAC 
i= directly attributable costs of a subsot of I which 
are allocated to traffic i 
=Ifixed'costs which are allocated to traffic i 
n 
DAC DAC + DAC + DAC + DAC . ..... . DAC P (1) 012 lx2 lx2x.,, )m 
J=O 
(note that in the formula for TCi# only the DAC's 
which have i in the subscript are included) 
Under a system of average cost, traffic i "participates" in each "pool" 
of directly attributable costs (and the fixed costs) according to the 
proportion of its quantity to the total quantity in the pool. For 
example, 
3 
7r DAC 
lx2x3 i lx2x3 
But the directly attributable cost per unit, w, is the same for the 
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three trýLffics, thus, 
7r = 
IT, 
- 
2+Q 3j 
and traffic 1, for example, contributes, 
DAC 
1 
2, DAC 
Ql 
lx2x3 lx2x3 
1Ql 
+Q2+ T31 
The lump-sum for any traffic i is, 
LSi DACi Fi -f P (I) + 
and the follow-on price is f,. 
If this is converted into a block tariff, the port decidas upon tho 
size of the first block, then the price for each block, o, imp 
LS i+fi 101101 i 
f> 
(b) Lump Sums Based Upon Marginal Cost and Unit Value 
The formula derived for prices proportional to marginal cost wasp 
Pi C 
C 
If this is to be converted into a lUMP-sUM plus marginal cost, than# 
ac 
TRj. = LS i+ýQi. 
Qi 
But, 
AC lx2x3 
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TRi Pi 
c 
k3Q, . Qi 
ac+3C 
11 ___ ___ 
Ici 
Ii--' 
. Qj + 
Thus, 
LSi. ý ei a Qi . Qi 
and the marginal cost at Qi is the follow-on price, 
if this is to be converted into a block tariff then the part again 
decides upon Q*, and the price for.. each block, Oit is, 
3CC 
Ci 
-1aQi. 
Qi +aQ10 Q* 
k Qi 4 (OtQ*1 
aCQ> Q* a Qi i 
If it is ass=ed that the elasticities are constant then, 
C- 
TR Q. Qi 
Qi +c Qi Q, 0 
so that, 
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so that, 
LSi 
and for a block tariff, 
3C 
Qe 
The approximate formula which related price to unit value was, 
DC+k UV aQi Ti ii 
This can. be-converted into a lump-sum plus marginal cost as follows, 
TR LS +C 
But, 
TRJ. P Qi 
Uvi + 
Thus, 
k LSi = r1i 
Uvi Qi 
with marginal cost as a follow-on price. 
If this is to be converted into a block tariff then, 
-L uv 
= 
9 Qj 
I Qi IE (o, Q*j 
0 Qi > Q* 
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If again this produces an unacceptably high lump-sum for commodities 
with high unit values then the port will have to investigate a 
suitable transformation of unit value. 
In both of these cases, adjustments may be necessary to make the 
tariff attractive to frequent users. 
11.5 Conclusions 
The pricing policies of ports have been subject to criticisms which 
centre around their relationship to costs. On the one hand it in 
suggested that comprehensive cost accounts are not kept, whilat on tho 
other hand it is argued that even when the information in available, 
prices are not necessarily related to costs. In partictlar it is 
suggested that the tariffs are governed by custom, how the users would 
react or what-the-traffic-will-bear. 
The port however has a number of problems when devising a tariff 
structure. which extend beyond a "first best world". The introduction 
outlined an amalgam of factors which influence the port's pricing 
and investment decisions including# inter aliat the roquiremants of 
the financial backers and expected reactions of other ports and port 
users. Chapter 2 further outlined the economic problems facing the 
port in terms of indivisibilities and jointness. Given these deviations 
from a first best world, the port is faced with the problem of 
maximising welfare subject to a number of constraints. Tho main 
constraints that have been considered include indivisibilities in 
demand, indivisibilities in supply in both a technical and temporal 
sense, an accounting requirement and equity considerations. Undar 
these conditions, various pricing rules emerge which includo 
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elasticities and unit values. In other words, optimisation within 
this second best world does, include an element of pricing according to 
the traffic's willingness, to pay . 
(tempered by equity considerations). 
It is therefore suggested that outright dimissal of tariff structures 
because they contain this element is not particularly helpful. 
These observations do not condone the current pricing practicas of 
ports: they emphasise the importance of the responsibility placed on 
the port to obtain reasonable approximations for these demand factors. 
The estimation of elasticities either quantitatively or qualitativaly 
is not however a particularly easy task. Similarly the wide ranga of 
unit values of the commodities passing through the port may 
necessitate a qualitative assessment of an appropriate transformation 
for the unit values. Thus, given that the port is required to 
exercise some judgement they will also be open to criticism. 
The examination of costs in chapter 5 and subsequent chapters high- 
lighted further the difficulties in defining and attributing costs to 
traffic. The relevant cost measure is the escapable cost, that in, 
the cost that "would be saved if production were curtailed and the 
resources released for use elsewhere". However even this relatively 
simple concept is particularly complex in practice. Tho implication 
of the application of the concept is that costs for some assets may 
tend to be low. However, returning to the demand side this does not 
imply that the assets are of no value. to their users. Thus it was 
suggested that in some cases it may be appropriate to compute limits 
to a range of costs. The lower limit representing the foregone 
opportunities by not employing the asset in its next best feasible 
alternative and the upper limit reflecting the replacament cost of 
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the asset (using the valuation formula) . In spite of the complexity 
of these problem. s,. the information is required by : the port in ardor to 
maie pricing, traffic accept/reject and invest/disinvest decisions. 
Given the measurement problems faced by the port (in both costs and 
demand), and the resultant subjective nature of some of the estimates 
it is not surprising that port pricing systems have been questioned. 
However, criticism is important, as the pricing structures become 
ossified if they appear to work, and if an accounting requirement is 
met, there is a tendency to place less emphasis an ascertaining costa. 
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Notes . 
[11 Turvey, R.., "Economic Analysis and Public Enterprises"t Allen and 
Unwin, London 1971, p54. 
[21 H. M. S. O., "The Nationalised Industries", Cmnd 7131, London, 1978. 
[3] Baumol, W. J. and Bradford, D. F,., "Optimal Departures from Marginal 
Cost Pricing", American Economic Review, Vol 60, June 1970, pp 
265-283. 
(41 Morrison, S. A., "The Structure of Landing Fees at Uncongested 
Airports", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol 16# 
No. 2, may 1982, pp 151-159. 
[51 
pac+4p+Q 
dP C-1 
aQIii dQ Qil 
But, dQ ipi 
ei V* - -Hi- 0 Ti 
so that, 
c 
+ p 
Pi 
a c 0 
(1 + c 
ci 
1- (1 
1 
9) -Z 
Qi 
(61 Morrison, 
404. 
171 Rearranging the first equation in [5), 
ac 
Pi 
c0 i 
lp 
iciQiI. 
.1c4P, (1 + 4) pia Qil ci 
pac i Qi 41 
p (1 + 4) ci 
Substituting c 
pi 
TI 
I-F 
i 
-+U V -I 
acpi+ 
tiv 
il 
ia Qi +WI 'ni 
Let, k+ 
p, 
]c+-! 
L uv 
Qi ni i 
+k uv 
TI ii 
k 
TI i 
(8] Munby, D. (ed. ), "Transport"t Penguin, 1968, p 13. 
[91 Lloyds List, "Liverpool charges rise by up to 17VI, 17th November 
1980. 
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